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“I can also add European policy, I think it’s very important, because all these issues that have 
now been discussed depend on it, and you somehow notice that the EU is united as long as no 
problems arise. Greece, the economy and refugees – as soon as problems arise – it’s like the 
average German marriage.”  
(Konrad, 41-60 HE, excerpt from the German focus groups) 
 
“I think the strategic goal is to shape European citizens, not Greek citizens, European citizens, 
who would be aware of the European context and therefore of the global context that Europe is 
embedded in from a very young age. In other words, active participation in shaping European 
citizens for a Europe that is much more substantial and far more, let's say, fair.” 
(Zacharias, 61+HE, excerpt from the Greek focus groups) 
 
“Some representatives of the history of liberal political thought would have us believe that we 
emerge into this social and political world from a state of nature. And in that state of nature, we 
are already, for some reason, individuals, and we are in conflict with one another. We are not 
given to understand how we became individuated, nor are we told precisely why conflict is the 
first of our passionate relations, rather than dependency or attachment.” 













Chapter 1. Introduction: Talking crisis politics in Greece and Germany 
More than a decade has passed since the “Lehman Brothers” financial crash in 2008 and crisis 
politics has become the new normal. As a reminder, the economic recession that hit the U.S. was 
soon transmitted to Europe. That was a critical time for member states that were well positioned 
in the world economy and kept their finances in check, and those, mainly in the European 
periphery, who faced rising economic difficulties (Hall, 2018). Greece was the first country to 
enter a prolonged recession, joining the so-called “debtor” group, after receiving financial 
assistance so as to avoid a default on its debts. Germany on the other hand, managed to recover 
from the financial crisis, leading the so-called “creditor” group that provided money and set the 
conditions for the bailout agreements [Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs)] (Scharpf, 2011). 
That was the first out of a series of crises that would erupt in Europe. From the financial to the 
sovereign debt and Eurozone crisis to the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, Greek and German 
citizens have been present in each and every of these problem-areas, with their oftentimes 
conflicting relationship attracting media and scholarly attention (GGcrisi, 2013; Sternberg, 
Gartzou-Katsouyanni, & Nicolaidis, 2018). The two publics would subsequently decide whether 
they are partners or opponents in Europe, and thus whether they would help each other or 
compete for resources and status.  
Crises are part of major episodes of institutional innovation called critical junctures 
(Collier & Munck, 2017). Critical junctures develop in long periods of time and trigger 
significant alterations to path dependent politics. They comprise of antecedent conditions, the 
crisis or shock, the critical juncture itself and the legacy. My data and scope of analysis covers 
the emergence of the various crises in Europe in 2015-2017. The project examines citizens’ 
perceptions of crises and political strategies inductively, in two countries that highlight Europe’s 
power asymmetries between centre and periphery, creditor and debtor countries1 (Adler-Nissen, 
2017). It is thus a spatial comparison during crisis times, and not a temporal comparison before 
and during crisis conditions. Crises dramatize "a perceived threat to an institutionalized pattern of 
action" (Graf & Jarausch, 2017: 12). They render politics more plastic and social change more 
tangible, because they signify that existing institutional arrangements no longer work and a new 
 
1 Discursively, I refer to Greece first because it is the paradigmatic crisis case in the pair and appears to be at the 
lower end of power dynamics compared to Germany. 
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paradigm is needed (Koselleck & Richter, 2006). There is ample research on crises as objective 
structures, but citizen discourse on the matter is a hiatus in the field. According to Stanley (2014: 
19), a crisis “is essentially a narrated process that is brought to life through a process of problem 
definition, an interpretive battle over the causes and solutions to that problem, and an intervention 
that seeks to resolve the crisis”. Consequently, the way crises are perceived, defined and narrated, 
conditions the range of interpretations and the type of citizens’ political responses to these 
problem areas. My project investigates the ways in which Greek and German citizens construct 
the crises in their own terms, in order to explain their selection of political strategies to cope with 
the situation, as suggested in the aims and objectives of my thesis. 
1.1. Aims and objectives 
When I embarked on this project, the Germans had already rewarded the conservative party CDU 
and Chancellor Merkel in the 2013 federal elections so as to prolong existing leadership in the 
country and the EU (Bremer & Schulte-Cloos, 2019). Contrary, in the 2015 general elections, the 
Greeks voted in office a radical left party to re-negotiate with the Troika of lenders (EC, ECB, 
IMF) the politics of austerity portrayed as bailouts (Karyotis & Gerodimos, 2015). A pressing 
question emerged: Why did Greek citizens turn increasingly to the left, while German citizens 
shifted predominantly to the right to respond to the crises erupting in their societies (see Roberts, 
2017)? An intuitive answer is that the two publics do not perceive the crises and are not affected 
by them in the same way.  
Instead of a theoretical deductive approach, the current study aims at an inductive, 
societal reconstruction of the crises and their characteristics. It investigates with mixed methods 
the meaning citizens attach to these problem-areas and the justifications they provide for their 
political engagement. The study employs survey data to establish the big picture in Greek and 
German politics. Yet more importantly, the study aims to present, using focus groups, citizens’ 
discourse about their lived experiences beyond the commonly cited statistics. For instance, what 
does a 25% GDP reduction mean for a citizen living in Greece? How does a citizen in Germany 
feel about receiving 1.5 million refugees? What does a two-point difference in democratic 
satisfaction signify for a Greek vis-à-vis a German citizen?  
Furthermore, as political elites in Greece and Germany declared that “There Is No 
Alternative” (TINA) to their management strategy (Hindmoor & McConnel, 2015), I wish to 
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examine whether citizens agree with this decision or whether they suggest alternative political 
strategies to tackle these problem areas. This is an important empirical question for the 
assessment of democratic quality and legitimacy in the two countries, and a significant 
contribution to the literature my thesis seeks to make. 
1.2. State of the field and contribution to the literature 
Literature has examined the transformative effects of crises on movement politics (Castells, 2012; 
Della Porta, 2015; 2018), party politics (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019a; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015), and 
European politics (Castells, 2017; Hooghe & Marks, 2018), at the meso and macro level of 
political actors and representative institutions, in order to identify generalizable patterns for the 
emergence of critical junctures and socio-political change. Della Porta and colleagues compare 
the rise of progressive left-wing movements such as the Indignados and Occupy, promoting 
democratization while challenging (the crisis of) neoliberal capitalism and TINA doctrines. 
Kriesi and the POLCON team investigate the transformation of the electoral arena2 in Europe as a 
result of political conflict generated by the Great Recession and driven by populist right-wing 
parties that oppose globalization and European integration.  
Castells and colleagues, employing Eurobarometer data, approach these diverse crises 
(financial, refugee, political, environmental etc.) as Europe’s crises rather than nationally 
confined issues, and relate them to rising democratic deficits in domestic and European politics. 
Moreover, Roberts’ (2015; 2017) comparative study of debt crises and their transformative 
effects on party systems in L. America in the 1980s and 1990s, shifts the focus on the importance 
of political configuration between incumbent and opposition for a successful (realigning) crisis 
management. With the exception of Castell’s (2017) edited volume and Della Porta’s (2015) 
focus on the democratic crisis of neoliberal capitalism, the majority of these studies tends to take 
“the crisis” as a given – it is the financial crisis, the Great Recession. My project instead, allows 
citizens to construct their own notions of crises that may be multiple and overlapping. 
Discourse analytic studies are more likely to examine how “crises” as such are 
constructed. The authors of “Crisis discourses in Europe” (Murray-Leach et al., 2014) analysed 
European media reports on the Eurozone crisis. They found that political elites, domestic and 
 




European, would rather problematize the crisis in economic but not political terms in an attempt 
to avoid criticism and electoral punishment. Yet, as this study shows, citizens on the ground 
perceive the Eurozone crisis as predominantly political. In addition, the GGcrisi project (2013) 
investigated media accounts of responsibility attributions in Greece and Germany in the 
Eurozone crisis. Contrary to expectations, they found that media and political actors in the two 
cases did not engage extensively in blame avoidance strategies; that is, shifting blame from 
domestic actors to the EU (Roose et al., 2017). However, due to their timeframe of analysis from 
2010 to 2013, the authors examine the Eurozone crisis. My analysis paints a more complex 
picture with processes of assuming responsibility and shifting blame depending on the problem 
under discussion, the level of emergence and multiple actors involved in the crisis management 
strategy. All in all, a detailed account of how people on the ground define the crises they perceive 
and evaluate their political strategies to address them is largely missing in the literature. 
My study attempts a conceptual, methodological and theoretical contribution by placing 
“the citizens” and their lived realities in the centre of analysis. Conceptually, the project aims at 
an inductive, societal reconstruction of the crises in Greece and Germany instead of a theoretical 
deductive approach. Doubtless, large scale comparative studies have advanced sociological 
understanding regarding the emergence of crises and their political outcomes, providing an 
encompassing framework for theory and analysis (Collier & Munck, 2017). However, even in the 
same European region, we notice divergences from these patterns, as in Greece and Germany, 
with regard to both crisis perceptions and selection of political strategies (Roberts, 2017).  
Methodologically, the majority of studies employs survey data measuring trends in 
political attitudes and behaviour intentions at the aggregate level, raising issues of “cognitivism” 
and self-report biases (Wiggins, 2017). Even discourse analytic studies rely increasingly on 
media and elite framing of the crises, due to data availability (Murray-Leach et al., 2014). 
Clearly, quantitative studies allow for representative macro-level comparisons in time and space. 
Yet, they provide a descriptive picture because they fail to present citizens’ own ideas and 
meaning-making processes when discussing politics (Saunders & Klandermans, 2020). This 
study, instead of defining the crises a priori, investigates with a mixed-method design (survey, 
focus groups), the meaning citizens attach to these problem-areas and the justifications they 
provide for their political engagement.  
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Moreover, the project proposes a theoretical contribution. For years, resource mobilization 
and political process – suggesting that it is resources and opportunities rather than grievances and 
threats that drive political participation – provided the main explanatory framework for citizen 
engagement (Kriesi, 2004; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). After the financial crisis in 2008 though, 
mainstream theories are at pains explaining how diminished resources (e.g., austerity) and 
curtailed opportunities (e.g., MoUs) have triggered massive political mobilization (Castells, 
2012; Della Porta, 2015). Literature on critical junctures provides insights into the latter. Instead 
of an “either or” logic, the project argues for a dynamic, relational reconceptualization of the 
literature through citizen discourse. It focuses on the interaction among perceptions of grievances 
(injustice), mobilization of political actors (identity) and opportunity for action (agency). The 
following section outlines the research questions my thesis aims to answer. 
1.3. Theoretical puzzle and research questions 
In the 2015–2017 period under examination, three crises seem to have polarized politics in 
Greece and Germany: A financial crisis triggering tensions with regard to the bailout of Greece 
(and other “debtor” members states) by “creditor” countries like Germany (Scharpf, 2015); a 
refugee crisis with respect to the quota of refugees to be received in each member state (Della 
Porta, 2018); and a political crisis of representation and legitimacy at the state and European level 
as popular sovereignty has been sidestepped over a technocratic management of these crises 
(Castells, 2017). With environmental and pandemic crises (covid-19) on our doorstep, what 
Castells (2017) and Bauman (2014) referred to as an era of multiple and multilevel crises, has 
become increasingly visible. These multiple, simultaneous crises pose a dilemma for citizens 
between transitioning towards global governance (power without politics) and strengthening the 
nation-state (politics without power). Issues such as warfare, poverty, environmental catastrophe, 
immigration, geopolitical and energy crises, to mention a few common examples, challenged the 
capacity of the state to deal effectively with issues that surpass national borders and require 
transnational cooperation.  
In this multiple-crises environment, Zamponi and Bosi (2016) pose the question “Which 
crisis?” to underline a misconception in the field. What is often discussed as “THE crisis” in 
Europe – referring to the financial crisis – actually varies tremendously across countries and 
regions. Historical and political legacy, democratization and political culture, size and openness 
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of the economy, transparency and institutionalization of the political system, whether a country 
was facing a crisis prior to 2008, are all important factors conditioning the type and severity of 
the crisis under discussion (Kriesi, 2014). This poses the first set of research questions I have 
designed to investigate the processes of crisis construction in the two cases: How do Greek and 
German citizens define the crises affecting their societies? Is it one or multiple – local, national, 
or supranational – similar or different, and who is considered responsible for their emergence? 
How do Greek and German citizens conceive of one another – as allies or opponents in Europe?  
It follows logically that the way crises are constructed, defined and narrated, shapes the 
range of interpretations and type of political strategies to address them. It is thus no surprise that 
not only the type and severity of crises differ in the two cases, but also the volume, intensity and 
ideological orientation of citizens’ political strategies (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019a). Overall, studies 
indicate a rise in political engagement in movement and party politics compared to previous 
years, especially in crisis-hit countries (Diani & Kousis, 2014). In movement politics on the left, 
the Indignant movement in Greece and Occupy in Germany have challenged the dominance of 
the markets over society and politics (Roose et al., 2017). Solidarity networks, welcoming 
refugees and assisting with basic needs, emerged in both countries (Lahusen & Grasso, 2018). On 
the right, anti-immigrant mobilization by the Golden Dawn in Greece and the PEGIDA 
movement in Germany attempted to put a halt on unconditional immigration (Dostal, 2015; 
Ellinas, 2015).  
In party politics, economic voting with citizens in both countries punishing mainstream 
centrist political parties and rewarding left-wing and right-wing challengers has been tremendous 
(Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016). Restructuration of the political system marked its presence, with 
power shifts taking place from previous to novel dominant coalitions. In Greece the new 
dominant coalition emerged from the anti-austerity mobilization cycle, with citizens supporting 
primarily left-wing actors in movement and party politics (the Indignant movement, SYRIZA) 
(Karyotis & Rüdig, 2015). In Germany, on the other hand, the new dominant coalition emerged 
from the anti-immigration mobilization cycle, with citizens backing predominantly right-wing 
actors in movement and party politics (CDU, AfD, PEGIDA) (Bremer & Schulte-Closs, 2019). 
This poses the second set of research questions I have designed to map citizens’ political 
strategies and the justifications they provide for their political choices. Namely, which political 
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strategies in the movement and party arenas do Greek and German citizens pursue amidst the 
crises? Which injustices do they address with their action, which political actors do they identify 
with, and which opportunities for action do they perceive? Do citizens suggest alternatives to 
political elites’ TINA management strategies, and if so, what are the alternatives? My project 
aims to answer these questions by focusing on the citizens of two countries that highlight 
Europe’s power asymmetries. 
1.4. Country selection – Most different systems design 
The country selection is a most different systems design that provides a focused comparison 
between a “crisis-hit” and a “crisis-surviving” case in Europe (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The selection is 
driven by a genuine interest in comparing the supposedly “weakest” link in the European chain 
(Greece) with the so-called “strongest” EU member state (Germany) (Adler-Niessen, 2017). 
Greece was selected as a representative case of the “debtor” group in the European periphery and 
Germany of the “creditor” group in the European centre (Scharpf, 2015). As such, the project 
investigates issues of power asymmetries and whether these affect citizens’ crisis perceptions, 
their political strategies, and the relationship between the two publics. Although the project did 
not address the Greeks, the Germans, and their relationship in the research methods, citizens in 
the two cases referred to one another repeatedly when discussing crisis politics. The country 
selection aims at discursively (re)establishing solidarity ties between Greek and German citizens. 
Discussing their life stories, the project indicates that despite economist and nationalist 
propaganda, the two publics are not so different. Citizens in both countries wish to lead a 
worthwhile life, obtain a meaningful job, and enjoy quality time with family and loved ones; but 
when politics gets in the way, people become reasonably disenchanted.  
Moving to country differences, Greece and Germany vary in their structural position in 
the world economy (periphery-centre) (Hall, 2018). They share diverse historical and political 
legacies (city-states direct democracy, post-authoritarian vs. federalism, post-Weimar and GDR 
tradition) (Berg-Schlosser & Rytlewski, 1993; Held, 2006). The openness and institutionalization 
of the political system differs in the two cases (centralized state vs. federalism, majoritarian vs. 
mixed parliamentary system) (Featherstone & Sotiropoulos, 2020; Saalfeld, 2002). As a result, 
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the countries have distinct political cultures3, described by scholars as contentious in the case of 
Greece and moderate in the case of Germany (Colvin & Taplin, 2015; Vasilopoulou & 
Halikiopoulou, 2020).  
In particular, Greece is a small country of eleven million in the European “periphery”, 
with a modest economy driven mainly by small and medium enterprises and tourism (Pagoulatos, 
2020). Despite being known for the direct democracy of the city-states in ancient times, Greece 
has a centralized state structure and a majoritarian (two-party) parliamentary system (Tsirbas, 
2020). The country is considered a young post-authoritarian case that transitioned to democracy 
after two world wars, a civil war in 1946–1949 and a military coup in 1967–1974. Greece has 
enjoyed a relatively stable political system up to the financial crisis in 2010, suffering however 
from corruption and clientelism (Pappas, 2003). On the other hand, Germany is a vast country in 
the European “centre” home to eighty-three million, and the largest net contributor to the 
European Union (EU) (Bulmer & Paterson, 2010; 2013). The country’s strong economy has 
allowed Germany to become the export powerhouse of Europe (Young, 2020). Germany is a 
decentralized federal republic consisting of sixteen states (Länder), with a mixed electoral 
system, proportional at the regional level and majoritarian at the federal level (Lees, 2001). The 
country is considered a stable mature democracy after experiences with national socialism and 
communism, the cold war and the reunification process (Saalfeld, 2002).  
Notwithstanding their differences, both cases share a certain interdependence in Europe. 
Greece and Germany are both members of the EU and Eurozone. They circulate the same 
currency (euro) and are subject to the same supranational institutions (e.g., ECB, Eurogroup), 
treaties, and lately Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) (Scharpf, 2015). Consequently, the 
crises in the two countries have entered the public debate, not only at the level of institutions, but 
also media and citizen discourse (GGcrisi, 2013; Sternberg et al., 2018). Particular stereotypes 
emerged, portraying the Germans as prudent, hardworking and responsible, and the Greeks as 
lazy, profligate and scamming (Reese & Lauenstein, 2014). Apart from yellow press, sadly, even 
focal political figures in the two countries, such as heads of states Tsipras – Merkel and their 
finance ministers Varoufakis – Schäuble, engaged in stereotyping and antagonism (Sternberg et 
 
3 Keating (2008: 108-109) defines political culture as the intergenerational transfer of political norms, values and 
ideas. It is a complex of influences that “shape the conditions for rational action, explain the workings of 
institutions and sustain social and political practices across time, while being amenable to human action”. 
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al., 2018). The project examines whether citizens have reproduced or rather challenged the 
political conflict in their discourse.  
All in all, Greece was selected due to the severity of the financial crisis, and Germany as 
the powerful counterpart in the relationship. It is a focal assumption of the project that by 
examining both the so called “strongest” and “weakest” cases in Europe’s crises, can we grasp 
the complexity of the situation. Yet, another unexpected finding was that while scholars tend to 
approach Germany as surviving the crises (e.g., Hutter & Kriesi, 2019a; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015), 
citizens on the ground appear extremely dissatisfied with existing political arrangements. Hence, 
while one country may be surviving one type of crisis, it may as well be suffering from another, 
as I will show in Chapter 5. The project employs a mixed-method research design to investigate 
crisis politics in the two cases. 
1.5. Research design – Comparative case mixed methods 
I propose a mixed-method research strategy, coupling representative survey data (attitudes) with 
in-depth focus group analysis (discourse), to examine the processes of crisis construction and 
political engagement in Greece and Germany. Mixed methods involve integrating quantitative 
and qualitative data collection and analysis in order to answer different aspects of the research 
questions (Denzin, 2010). Quantitative and qualitative methods address the “what” and “how/ 
why” questions, offering a way of taking into account both structures and processes when 
investigating social phenomena (Woolley, 2009). They assist establishing relationships between 
factors and examining explanatory mechanisms behind these relationships. Consequently, they 
provide a bridge between the micro and macro levels of analysis (Denzin, 2010). Mixed methods 
allow for a fuller picture to emerge that would not be possible by employing either approach 
alone. As Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003: 14-15) argue, “no one can refute the argument that the 
use of more than one method produces stronger inference, answers research questions that other 
methodologies cannot, and allows for greater diversity of findings”. These authors propose the 
notion of inference quality and interpretative rigor for evaluating the findings of mixed method 
studies as opposed to the common reliability and validity metrics. 
In my project, the two methods are considered complementary. On the one hand, using 
survey research, I aim to capture broad generalizable patterns in Greece and Germany with 
respect to the issues citizens care about, political trust and democratic satisfaction, popular 
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political strategies and democratic alternatives. On the other, employing focus groups, I attempt 
to provide in-depth analysis of plausible explanatory mechanisms for these broad patterns 
through citizen discourse. The project is embedded in the European Research Council funded 
programme POLPART, examining political participation in nine countries4 (Klandermans, 2013). 
The POLPART team designed and followed standardized comparable procedures in survey and 
focus group research in the two cases5. The methodology section starts with a description of the 
survey data, as they provide the basis for the more complex focus group procedures. 
1.6. The POLPART survey 
The POLPART survey was conducted online by the opinion poll company TNS NIPO in the 
summer of 2017. The sample is stratified with specific quota for gender, age and education in 
order to establish standardized comparisons among the POLPART countries. The samples in 
Greece (N=1120) and Germany (N=1110) are comparable (see Table A1.1 in Appendix). About 
38% of participants were between 18 and 34 years of age, 45% were between 35 and 49 years, 
and 17% were between 50 and 65 years. Roughly 50% of participants attained lower levels of 
education (1-3 ISCED), 10% vocational training (4 ISCED) and 40% higher levels of education 
(5-6 ISCED). Equal representation of men and women was achieved. Differences in employment 
status indicate the effects of the financial crisis, with Greek unemployed participants reaching 
24% in the sample, according to national statistics, compared to 5% in Germany.  
The survey includes a selected variety of scales based on previous citizenship studies. 
Items include the most important issues in society, economic and income satisfaction, attitudes 
towards immigration, trust in political institutions, evaluations of democratic quality, 
participation in various forms of electoral and movement politics, attitudes towards populism, 
and preferred political decision-making processes. Due to the stratified nature of the sample, I 
cannot compare absolute numbers in the POLPART survey with general population surveys such 
as the European Social Survey (ESS) and Eurobarometer studies that employ random sampling 
procedures. However, I can engage in comparative arguments about the patterns emerging in the 
sample, and the magnitude of differences between the two cases. Secondly, the survey provides 
 
4 The nine countries involved in the POLPART project are the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, the UK, Greece, 
Romania, Hungary, Brazil and Argentina. 
5 The terms “I/my” are used to indicate my research choices and analysis, whereas “we/our” refer to the broader 
POLPART research programme within which my project is embedded. 
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documentation on the case of Greece – one of the hardest hit European countries. Amidst the 
crises, the country has exited cross-national survey programmes such as the ESS due to lack of 
funding. Thirdly, in a period of rising democratic deficits, I include a detailed scale of democratic 
quality (liberal, social, and participatory) originally launched in the ESS 2012 round. The scale is 
considered an improvement to the single item measuring satisfaction with democracy (see Ferrín 
& Kriesi, 2016). 
The aim of the survey analysis is to discuss public opinion in Greece and Germany 
employing general statistics (means, measures of association). That said, I do not engage in 
hypothesis testing with multivariate and multinomial regressions as to leave room for 
participants’ discourse about their lived realities, which cannot be captured by the generality of 
survey questions. Another issue refers to the time constraints of a PhD thesis. Comparative 
discourse analysis is undeniably a time-consuming endeavour. Yet, certain questions arise as to 
what self-report measures actually tap into – accuracy of information, cognitive processes, 
memory of events, participants’ intentions or actual behaviour? As Billig (1987) points out in 
“Arguing and thinking”, attitudes are not neat bundles of responses awaiting researchers to be 
discovered, but represent unfinished business in the continual controversies of social life. These 
controversies may be more effectively captured by free floating discussion than by checking pre-
set responses to researchers’ pre-formulated questions (Wiggins, 2017).  
Notwithstanding these criticisms, surveys are indeed a useful tool in comparative cross-
national large-scale designs, since they capture general societal trends that other methods are 
unable to. With respect to the focus groups, numerous interactions may capture the attention of 
the researcher. As only a limited number of sessions can be conducted and analysed, how 
common are these episodes of participant interaction? To give an example, during the exact same 
period, Greek focus group participants referred repeatedly to austerity and the political crisis that 
it generated, whereas the discussion in Germany was all about the refugee crisis – austerity was a 
non-issue. Does this finding stem from diverse societal processes in the two cases or is it a by-
product of the timing and synthesis of the focus groups? Had I not conducted the survey analysis, 
I would have not been able to know with certainty. The survey data indicated that in the exact 
same period, the most important issues in Greece were indeed related to austerity 
(unemployment, poverty, taxation), whereas in Germany they referred to the refugee crisis 
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(immigration, terrorism, social security), as will be discussed in Chapter 4. The project argues for 
methodological pluralism and triangulation of information, if possible, to methodological purism 
(Della Porta & Keating, 2008). The following section discusses the importance of citizen 
discourse6 in the examination of crisis politics and outlines the focus group procedure. 
1.7. Talking crisis politics  
From the democratic assemblies of the ancients to deliberative models of democracy, it is a 
common assumption that debating public matters with others increases political understanding as 
discussants are being reminded of other perspectives from which to approach the social world 
(Bennet et al., 2000). Focus groups represent “sociable public discourse” where participants 
collectively process and negotiate meaning around a given situation (Gamson, 1992). During the 
session, participants express their views on a topic, try to persuade other participants about the 
accuracy of their views or be persuaded by other arguments (Myers, 1998). Participants engage in 
a debate about the meaning of the social world, which is not given ‘out there’ but is collectively 
constructed and reconstructed through and during the discussion (Stanley, 2016). Therefore, 
focus groups offer an opportunity to observe processes of collective sense-making and can be 
taken as a kind of scaled-down version of what occurs in public life (Duchesne et al., 2013).  
Focus groups are employed to capture the diverse lines of argumentation around notions 
of crises and political strategies. The clear added value of focus groups according to Stanley 
(2016: 9) lies in “their ability through sustained retrospective introspection to reveal previously 
taken for granted assumptions that underpin our common-sense stock of knowledge”. Most 
importantly in this case, they offer insights into the legitimation process – approached as a “two-
way street” – of political actors and ideas, where citizens are not the passive recipients of elite 
claims, but they can use ideas to create and alter institutions (Schmidt, 2014). In a period where 
citizens were denied their collective voice, it is relevant to examine whether politicians’ attempts 
to tackle the crises in Greece and Germany were perceived as legitimate or were rather contested, 
and if alternative political strategies were enacted from below.  
 
6 According to Wetherell and Edley (1999) discourse refers to citizen talk and texts as social practices. It has an 
action orientation, since the social order is constituted intersubjectively as discussants engage in processes of 
collective sense-making. At the macro level, discourse is organized around institutional forms of intelligibility and 
reflects histories of power relations. 
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Political talk can be defined as “a specific type of social interaction, where two or more 
people engage in exchanges of meaning with reference to politics that take place in private, semi-
public, and public settings and have an informal and spontaneous character” (Schmitt-Beck & 
Lup, 2013: 514). Perrin (2006) argues that “talking politics” can be considered a political act in 
and of itself and that together with “thinking politics” and “doing politics” forms the golden route 
to engaged citizenship. Contrary to more deterministic attitudinal approaches, talking politics has 
an action orientation as it captures participant interaction and intersubjectivity (Stanley, 2016). 
The unit of analysis is not individual attitudes, but the range of interpretative repertoires 
participants introduce to the discussion when referring to crises and their political engagement. 
Interpretative repertoires are “the situationally specific, culturally familiar, public ways of 
speaking which are used for characterizing and evaluating social phenomena” (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987: 203). They are often expressed through metaphors or vivid images and employ 
distinct grammatical styles. Interpretative repertoires emerge between the micro and macro levels 
of social interaction, as they are embedded in political culture, providing a basis for common 
understanding of the social world7 (Perrin, 2006). The aim of analysis is to include the many 
repertoires about crises and political strategies into an ideal-typical narrative (Weber, 1949), that 
is richer and more coherent than any of the participants’ single interpretations. This form of 
analysis, however, excludes issues of intersectionality and is not suitable for addressing 
individual, idiosyncratic repertoires that reflect the unique experiences of systematically 
marginalized groups (Stanley, 2016). Acknowledging this limitation, I will refer to possible 
avenues for future research in the Discussion (Chapter 7). 
This project draws on previous influential studies in the focus group literature about how 
citizens’ understanding of politics is organized. Gamson’s (1992) seminal study “Talking 
politics” investigated how “working people” discussed four politicized issues at the time 
(affirmative action, nuclear power, troubled industry and the Arab-Israel conflict). Employing 
pre-existing groups, he found that people are not so naive as they are often portrayed in the 
literature. Instead, they negotiate meaning with others in complex ways, using resources at their 
disposal such as experiential knowledge, popular wisdom and media framing. Perrin (2006) in 
 
7 Williams (2004: 96) suggests that the metaphor of repertoire “combines a sense of choice within structured 
options, leaving room for agency and strategic decisions, while still recognizing that cultural and historical 
circumstances circumscribe the options available, even privileging some choices over others”. 
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“Citizen Speak” attempted to map the action repertoire in the U.S. employing pre-existing 
voluntary associations (church, business, unions and sports) and four popular scenarios (racial 
profiling, political corruption, environmental pollution, airport expansion). Distinguishing 
between individual, collective and institutional strategies, he found that participants’ action 
repertoire was shaped by the possibility, importance, ethics and feasibility of these strategies in 
each scenario. In line with Gamson (1992) and Perrin (2006), I approach citizens as 
knowledgeable users of political discourse. Following Perrin’s categorization of strategies, I aim 
to examine the availability, feasibility, and possible novelty of political action in Greece and 
Germany. Contrary to these studies and influenced by Saunders and Klandermans (2020), I let 
participants talk about the issues they consider important and the strategies to address them. I 
avoid pre-existing groups as to tackle established power dynamics that may affect participant 
interaction and argumentation (Krueger & Casey, 2014). 
My project is one of the few engaging with comparative cross-national focus group 
research. Duchesne and colleagues’ (2013) “Overlooking Europe” presented the analysis of 
twenty-four focus groups conducted with workers, employees, managers and activists in the UK, 
France and Belgium. The project examined citizens’ spontaneous references to Europe and its 
institutions. The authors placed participants in socially homogeneous (age, occupation) yet 
politically heterogeneous (ideology) groups, as for them to feel at ease but also stimulate debate. 
Their study shows that discussants overall tended to overlook Europe when talking about issues 
that mattered to them – more so in the UK and least so in Brussels. White’s (2011) “Political 
allegiance after European integration” investigated the plausibility of a common political bond in 
Europe. Conducting ten focus groups with taxi drivers in the UK, Germany and Czech Republic, 
the study suggests its absence, as participants’ impromptu discussion focused increasingly on 
issues within their local and national environment, even when they comparatively referred to 
other Europeans. What both studies suggest is citizens’ indifference towards Europe and its 
institutions, and the latter’s absence from everyday political talk at the ideational and perceived 
institutional level. This study, applying similar criteria of social homogeneity and political 
heterogeneity as Duchesne and colleagues (2013), and examining discourse about the 
problematization of issues and political strategies as White (2011), partially replicates these 
findings. The EU is perceived by both Greek and German participants as distant and elite-driven, 
with detailed information on its actual function missing by and large. Contrary to these studies, 
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participants in this project engaged in long politicized debates about the EU, with a majority 
expressing from soft to strong Eurosceptic sentiments. The recent crises in Europe and the EU’s 
role in their management may explain this divergence.  
1.8. The POLPART focus groups 
The Greek focus groups were conducted in Athens from October to December 2015 at the 
Kapodistrian University Lab, after the EU/austerity referendum, the government’s U-turn to 
accept another MoU, and the snap general elections in September. The German focus groups took 
place in Berlin in October 2015 at the Items Berlin opinion poll company, following the onset of 
the refugee crisis and a massive demonstration against the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership), but before the terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels and Berlin later that 
year. The Greek focus groups were supervised by the author and the German focus groups by 
Swen Hutter and his research team, embedded in the POLPART project. Both procedures 
followed the ESOMAR8 guidelines for social research and adhered to the ethical protocols of the 
partner universities involved in the project. Participants in the focus groups ranged from four to 
six as to capture opinion diversity without losing control of the group (Morgan, 1996). They were 
recruited through ads and flyers, and from an existing pool of participants according to specific 
selection criteria (see Table 1.2). The topic of discussion, which lasted roughly two hours, was 
disguised as “social issues” and there was a monetary reward of 20 euros to avoid selection bias 
and attract citizens that were not interested in the topic (Krueger & Casey, 2014). Upon arrival, 
participants were introduced to the topic of discussion (politics), signed informed consent, and 
were briefed on the ethical principles of anonymity, confidentiality, data protection, no harm and 
the right to withdraw at any moment in the research process.  
The sampling aim was to guarantee a minimum of representativeness of the participants in 
the qualitative sense, by representing the diversity of interpretative repertoires on the topics of 
interest (Duchesne et al., 2013). Upon contact with the researchers, participants filled in a brief 
screening questionnaire on the phone in order to be placed in socially homogeneous but 
politically heterogeneous focus groups. The questionnaire included items on age, gender, ethnic 
background, educational attainment, political activity, political interest, political ideology and 
organisational involvement (see Table A1.3 in Appendix). Social homogeneity was achieved by 
 
8 The world association guidelines for market, opinion and social research. 
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grouping together participants with the same age and education, as for them to feel comfortable 
discussing with each other. Research has shown that age and education provide citizens with the 
necessary experience, knowledge and civic skills to discuss and participate in politics (Verba et 
al., 1995). Political heterogeneity was established by placing together individuals with different 
political ideology (left, centre, right), and levels of political activity (from apolitical to active in 
party and movement politics). The idea behind political heterogeneity was to stimulate debate so 
as to capture the variety of repertoires on crises and political strategies, while avoiding 
groupthink tendencies (Duchesne et al., 2013). 
Following life course categorization, we formed four age groups with citizens in similar 
life stages: i) young adults (18-25), ii) working adults (26-40), iii) parenting adults (41-60), iv) 
retired adults (61+). These four age groups were further distinguished into lower and higher 
educated groups (see Table 1.2) according to the International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED); with lower educated individuals that attended elementary, non-university 
education (ISCED: levels 1-4) and higher educated individuals that graduated university or 
higher levels of education (ISCED: levels 5-6). We also included a mixed age-education group of 
activists to capture more politicized repertoires on the topics of interest. Activists are considered 
a relatively homogeneous group in the sense that they acquire the necessary knowledge and skills 
to participate in politics compared to the general population (McAdam, 1986). They were 
recruited from political parties and social movement organizations, on the left and right of the 
political spectrum. In the focus group analysis, I use abbreviations to indicate the age and 
education level of the group under discussion. Hence, “Germany, 26-40LE” refers to the German 
focus group that consists of participants aged 26-40 who do not have a university degree. 



















In total 50 participants in Greece and 48 participants in Germany took part in the nine 
focus groups based on the selection criteria (age, education, ideology, participation) and their 
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availability. Tables A1.5 and A1.6 in Appendix present the full list of the focus group 
participants. Overall, the two samples are comparable (see Table A1.4 in Appendix). Equal 
gender representation was achieved, with roughly 55% of participants being men and 45% 
women. Education was evenly distributed, with about 45% of the sample having attained lower 
levels of education (1-4 ISCED scale) and 55% higher levels of education (5-6 ISCED scale). 
Mean left-right self-placement was 4.0 (2.5) among Greek participants and 4.7 (1.9) among 
German participants on an 11-point scale (0 extreme left and 10 extreme right). Mean political 
interest was 7.7 (2.2) among Greek participants and 8.1 (1.7) among German participants on an 
11-point scale (0 not at all interested and 10 extremely interested). Large standard deviation in 
both cases indicates individual variation according to the selection criteria. Past political activity 
varied from no activity to engagement in party and movement politics.  
The focus groups were conducted by a professional moderator and attended by the 
researcher, who assisted with practicalities, sound and video recordings, and kept notes of the 
sessions (Van Bezouw et al., 2020). A non-directive moderation style was selected, with the 
moderator setting the topic of discussion and letting participants engage in the debate. Non-
direction gives participants the opportunity to express themselves about matters that are 
important to them, rather than what is presumed to be important by the researcher (Duchesne et 
al., 2013). Participants were encouraged to talk with each other instead of replying to the 
moderator as in a one-on-one interview. The moderator kept track of time, introduced the themes 
for discussion and made sure that all participants had equal opportunity to express themselves 
(Van Bezouw et al., 2020). At the beginning of the session, the moderator would explain that all 
opinions were valued and that participants may freely agree or disagree on topics, as they came 
from different ideological backgrounds. 
The discussion would start with participants introducing themselves and reporting the first 
association that came to mind when hearing the word “politics”. This first task gave participants 
the opportunity to get to know each other, while simultaneously familiarizing them with the topic 
of discussion. The second collective task was a brainstorm session on the five most important 
issues in society. Participants would discuss together, and agree or disagree on issues at the local, 
national or international level. The moderator wrote the selected issues on a blackboard as to be 
visible to everyone (see Figure A1.1 in Appendix, Van Bezouw et al., 2020). The next collective 
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task asked, what we, as citizens, can do about these issues. Again, participants would work 
together to propose strategies they deemed legitimate and effective in addressing the selected 
issues. After a first round of discussion, the moderator presented a selection of pictures with 
individual and collective, moderate and radical, political strategies to stimulate further debate 
(see Figure A1.2 in Appendix, Van Bezouw et al., 2020). There would be a small break of ten 
minutes as participants got snacks and refreshments. The second part started with prompt cards. 
These cards showed names of main political institutions at the local (e.g., city council), national 
(e.g., government), supranational (e.g., EU) and international levels (e.g., NATO). Participants 
would select the institutions that were closest and most responsive to their demands, and those 
that were most efficient in addressing these demands through governmental policy. Participants’ 
task was to discuss together the plausibility of their choices. The final theme addressed citizen 
disenchantment with politics and asked participants for plausible alternatives to democratic 
dissatisfaction. At the end of the session, participants were thanked and paid for their 
participation. The focus groups were transcribed verbatim by the moderator and participants’ 
names were replaced by fictitious names for further analysis. 
 A constructivist grounded theory approach was selected, as to highlight inductively the 
ways in which participants define the crises in Greece and Germany, and their political strategies 
to cope with the situation (Charmaz, 2006). The eighteen focus groups were analysed with 
Atlas.ti – a computer aided qualitative data analysis package that assists the interpretative 
analysis by implementing a systematic coding of the discussions (Mattoni, 2014). The grounded 
theory analysis started with multiple readings of the discussions until a primary understanding of 
the texts was achieved. The analysis continued with assigning codes, agreed upon with the 
POLPART research team after an intense week-long meeting, to portions of text (see Table A1.7 
in Appendix, Van Bezouw et al., 2020). These codes were categorized into larger families with 
an underlining common theme. I studied the relationships between codes and larger families as to 
make connections with theory (Charmaz, 2006). Analytically, I employed thematic analysis to 
summarize the issues discussed and the range of interpretative repertoires regarding those issues 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Interpretative repertoires were identified when: i) issues were talked 
about and developed in considerable amount of depth, by more than one participant, across 
multiple focus groups; ii) there were cross references in the discussions, and descriptions draw on 
more than one source of information (media, personal experience, popular wisdom); iii) 
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participants shared affective responses such as laughter or outrage, and iv) expression of opinion 
was followed up by other participants (White, 2011: 61). The conversational context of the focus 
groups prioritizes the presentation of excerpts to highlight argumentative interaction among 
discussants (Saunders et al., 2020). Individual quotes were employed to provide further 
clarification on interpretative repertoires about crises and political strategies. Finally, results and 
theory were discussed and compared with the German team. The introductory chapter closes with 
the outline of the thesis structure. 
1.9. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of three parts. Part one introduces the research design and analytical 
framework on discourse about crises and political strategies in Greece and Germany. The second 
part presents the research findings of the quantitative (survey) and qualitative (focus groups) 
analysis. The third part discusses the findings in light of the theory and suggests future directions 
for research.  
Chapter 2 operationalizes the concept of “crisis” in the study and provides the theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the first research question – how Greek and German citizens 
perceive the crises in their countries. Synthesizing insights from critical junctures, discursive 
psychology and social psychology of intergroup relations, I derive the theory of social 
construction, discursive performance and subject positioning. The framework suggests that in 
order to understand how Greek and German citizens perceive the crises, we need to examine how 
ordinary people define these problem-areas in their own terms. Secondly, we ought to explore 
what they do with these crisis constructions vis-à-vis elite explanations. Thirdly, we need to 
interrogate how Greek and German citizens position each other in these crisis constructions and 
what this positioning tells us about the state of the union in Europe in times of crisis.  
Chapter 3 operationalizes the concept of “political strategy” and addresses the second 
research question – how Greek and German citizens respond politically to the crises they 
perceive. The proposed framework synthesizes literature on critical junctures, economic voting, 
political process and framing discursive practices. It sets out to examine the availability, 
feasibility and subtlety of the action repertoire in Greece and Germany amidst the crises, with 
particular attention drawn on citizen discourse about injustice, identity, agency and alternatives. 
The theory focuses on the problems that citizens deem important, the mobilizing actors in the 
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movement and party arena seen as addressing injustice, and evaluations of agency, opportunity 
and democratic alternatives from below.  
 Chapter 4 introduces the empirical section of the dissertation. The chapter discusses 
public opinion in Greece and Germany. It employs survey data to capture the broad political 
patterns – the big picture – in crisis perceptions and political strategies and further tests the 
broader commonality and applicability of the focus groups. With respect to crisis perceptions, the 
analysis presents the differential problematization of economic, cultural and political issues in the 
two countries. As regards political strategy, it outlines citizen (self-reported) engagement in a 
series of electoral and movement strategies. In light of the survey findings, the chapter scrutinizes 
the latest election results in Greece and Germany and discusses attitudes towards democratic 
alternatives.  
 Chapter 5 presents the inductive focus group analysis of social construction, discursive 
performance and subject positioning in the Greek and German crises. The chapter examines the 
differential politicization of economic, cultural and political threats in the two countries and 
Europe’s multilevel polity. The analysis illustrates that even though the crises in Greece and 
Germany may have been triggered by different issues, namely the economy and immigration, 
they are comparable due to the common crisis of post-democratic representation at the national 
and European level. The chapter further investigates the politics of solidarity and competition 
emerging between the two publics. 
Chapter 6 presents the inductive focus group analysis about the availability, legitimacy 
and subtlety of political strategies in Greece and Germany. The chapter analyzes citizen discourse 
on grievances and injustice, the role of mobilizing actors in the movement and party arenas, 
opportunities and threats in the socio-political context for agency, and plausible alternatives to 
the status quo. Although the level, intensity and ideological orientation of citizen discourse about 
political strategies differ in Greece and Germany, common processes of polarization and 
radicalization are identified. Demos-centric9 alternatives to the post-democratic crisis of 
representation are proposed in both countries. 
 
9 The term “demos-centric” underlines the importance of citizen inclusion in the political process for representation 
accountability and legitimacy in an era of rising democratic deficits and post-democratic politics. 
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Chapter 7 introduces the concluding section of the dissertation. The chapter summarizes 
the research findings and discusses the utility of the analytical framework proposed in the project. 
It addresses points of comparison and contrast, and provides plausible explanatory mechanisms 
for the similarities and differences in the two cases. The chapter discusses possible intergroup 
variation, outlines the limitations of the project, and suggests areas for future work. Finally, 
Chapter 8 offers direct answers to the main research questions and discusses scientific and 
societal implications of the thesis. It addresses current political arrangements in Greece and 

























Chapter 2. Crisis theory: Social construction, discursive performance and subject 
positioning 
The crises in Greece and Germany may seem different at first but they are part of the same 
process, that of globalization and European integration (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019b). Global and 
European interconnectedness may have reduced time and space among citizens, countries, 
products and services, yet they have triggered new challenges. Issues such as financial crises, 
immigration, climate change, warfare and terrorism, have challenged the capacity of the state to 
deal effectively with problems that surpass national borders and require transnational cooperation 
(Bauman & Bordoni, 2014). However, as political power and policy making moves higher to 
supranational and international institutions, state democratic politics are hollowed out of their 
significance, representative capacity and political influence (Della Porta, 2013; Mair, 2013). 
Scholars have referred to the crises as Great Recession, Eurozone, European, capitalist, financial, 
refugee and democratic to mention a few common examples (Castells, 2017; Della Porta, 2015; 
2018; Giugni & Grasso, 2015; Hall, 2018; Hutter & Kriesi, 2019a; Pitty, 2014; Scharpf, 2015). 
Yet, how citizens on the ground define these crises in their own terms? Are they affected by all 
and thus perceive them as interrelated or is one more predominant due to unique political 
histories, democratic legacies and civic cultures in the two cases? The aim of the chapter is to 
develop a theoretical framework for the systematic analysis of the Greek and German crises 
through citizen discourse. 
As a reminder, Greek citizens, severely hit by the financial crisis, were obliged to adopt 
austerity measures and structural adjustment programs by signing MoUs with the European 
partners (Karyotis & Gerodimos, 2015). These MoUs came with strict conditionalities that 
minimized the space for deliberation on crucial political issues (economic and social policy, 
privatizations, welfare state); and as a result, democratic legitimacy at the national and European 
level (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2013; Roth et al., 2013). Located at the southern border of 
Europe, Greece received large refugee flows from the MENA region as first host country 
according to the Dublin European Regulation, together with Italy and Spain (Della Porta, 2018). 
On the other hand, German citizens retained relative control over their economic policy, but they 
were pushed to bailout “debtor” countries like Greece, increasing taxes and political discontent 
among the citizenry (Kriesi, 2014). Being well positioned in Europe, Germany attracted large 
refugee flows from crisis-hit and war-torn areas, as financially crisis-hit countries could not 
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provide the requirements of political stability, economic development, and secure employment 
(Hutter & Kriesi, 2019a).  
These two crises, namely the financial and refugee, and their technocratic TINA 
management, have triggered a crisis of democratic representation and legitimacy at the national 
and European level (Castells, 2017; Della Porta, 2015). Hindmoor and McConnel (2015) argue 
that although elites may suggest that “There Is No Alternative” to a particular management 
strategy, in reality there are always more than one way to deal with a crisis. Firstly, politicians 
can speak up and involve the citizenry in the decision-making process or they can shut up public 
dialogue and pursue technical solutions. Secondly, they can allow a government to be consistent 
with its programmatic agenda or they can apply incongruent policy measures. Thirdly, they can 
attribute importance to mutual interdependence and internationalism or they can assert domestic 
interests. As participants in the focus groups suggest, citizens in both countries were never asked 
whether they wished to participate in the bailout packages or accept large numbers of refugees – 
their support was taken for granted by domestic and European politicians. This political crisis is a 
crisis of responsiveness (Mair, 2009), as national governments have become increasingly attuned 
to economic and business interests in the European and global market in order to provide stability 
and prosperity to their constituents (see post-democracy, Crouch, 2004). Yet in the case of 
Greece, it is also a crisis of responsibility as these same promises of stability and prosperity have 
been negated by a state of permanent crisis and crisis-management since 2010 (Castells, 2017). 
There is ample research on crisis politics in Europe (Castells, 2012; 2017; Della Porta, 
2015; 2018; GGcrisi, 2013; Giugni & Grasso, 2015; Hutter & Kriesi, 2019a; Kriesi & Pappas, 
2015; Lahusen & Grasso, 2018; LIVEWHAT, 2017). However, it approaches “crisis” as an 
objective structure and tends to focus on one type (financial, refugee etc.) instead of their 
sequence and interaction as multiple and multilevel. This project seeks to investigate how citizens 
themselves define the crises by examining political talk about the issues they deem important. 
The chapter argues that in order to understand citizens’ perceptions of crises in Greece and 
Germany, we first need to discuss how they define these crises in their own terms. Next, we need 
to examine what citizens accomplish with these particular crisis constructions vis-à-vis dominant 
elite explanations. Thirdly, we ought to investigate how Greek and German citizens position each 
other and other nationals in these crisis constructions, and what this positioning tells us about 
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intergroup relations in Europe. The chapter begins with the operationalization of the concept and 
proceeds with the elaboration of the theoretical framework – namely social construction, 
discursive performance and subject positioning. 
2.1. Conceptualization of crisis 
The concept has its origin in the Greek word “krisis”, which entails both objective and subjective 
connotations. The objective connotation defines a situation as severe or critical, whereas the 
subjective connotation indicates cognitive processes of perception and critique. Thus, its 
etymological origin demonstrates that the notion is closely related to human perception and 
subjectivity (Koselleck & Richter, 2006). Among the most common uses of the term, in medicine 
crisis signifies the crucial moment of a severe illness that determines whether the patient will live 
or die. In the military, it describes the moment of the battle in which the decision over victory or 
defeat is declared. In religion, it refers to the Last Judgement where people are assigned to 
heaven or hell according to their pious lives (Graf & Jarausch, 2017: 3). In modern times, crises 
became the transitional and potentially disruptive periods in history. In Marxist theory, they 
defined phases of turmoil in which antagonistic powers competed with each other until a new 
stage of development and stability was reached (Harvey, 2007). In the period of great revolutions, 
such as the French and the Russian, the concept was introduced in political science to refer to 
times of conflict, turmoil, and radical social change (Koselleck & Richter, 2006). During the 
Great Depression in the 1930s, the concept was recontextualized in economics to explain 
business cycles of prosperity and recession (Streeck, 2015). In times of globalization, the range of 
the concept expanded to describe international crises, political systems in crisis, economic crises, 
societies in crisis, and cultural crises (Graf & Jarausch, 2017).  
In this project, I retain the structural element of the concept, which signifies the 
emergence of a threatening situation that poses a crucial dilemma between two alternative states 
of the future: one that is deemed desirable and another that is considered harmful (Koselleck & 
Richter, 2006). Discursively, the concept combines diagnostic and prognostic elements. The 
diagnostic element refers to the process of identifying the causes of the problem(s) under 
discussion, while the prognostic element indicates plausible strategies to tackle the latter 
(Stanley, 2014). Depending on the level of analysis, crises can be studied at the macro level of 
political systems and institutions, the meso level of collective actors like social movements and 
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political parties, and the micro level of citizens and social groups. The project focuses on the 
micro level of interaction between the citizens and the state (Klandermans, 1997). As shown in 
Figure 2.1, the relationship between crisis, citizens and the state, is intrinsically related to notions 
of democratic representation and legitimacy. Current democracies are representative and operate 
on majoritarian rule (Dahl, 2000; Held, 2006). Which means that first, it is not citizens 
themselves who rule and are called upon to deal with a crisis, but elected officials; and second, 
political decisions are expected to represent the preferences of the largest segments of the 
population. As the term “demos+cracy” indicates, inclusion of citizens’ preferences in the polity 
is of utmost importance for a regime to acquire legitimacy (Della Porta, 2013). A regime is 
legitimate, when citizens regard that they are substantially represented in the polity, and the state 
does not resort to violence to impose social order (Ferrín & Kriesi, 2016; Weber, 1965). When 
the system lacks legitimacy, the social contract is broken and citizens do not comply with the 








Politics regulates the distribution of power among the spheres of civil society (citizens), 
the state (government), and increasingly with globalization, the markets (economy) and 
international institutions (Rodrick, 2011). This relationship varies across political systems, 
nonetheless it ought to be balanced. Otherwise, tensions rise when one actor gains influence over 
the other(s). Lately, the markets, supranational and international actors have gained prominence 
in European politics, deciding even the fate of member states (Della Porta, 2013). As Ferrín & 
Kriesi (2016: 2) point out, to a larger extent than ever “supranational agencies and other 
unaccountable actors such as central banks, the Troika, panels of experts, major enterprises, 







investors and the bond market are calling the shots”. External actors seem to dominate 
democracy, especially in crisis-hit “debtor” countries like Greece (Pitty, 2014); but also, as this 
project indicates, in crisis-surviving “creditor” countries like Germany.  
Yet, not all crises (e.g., economic, immigration, environmental) transform into 
generalized political crises, threatening the legitimacy of incumbent parties, and eventually if 
they pursue, the political system as a whole. A certain type of crisis can trigger a legitimacy crisis 
when politicians and institutions are perceived as unable to tackle effectively a threatening 
situation over a critical period of time. Hutter and Kriesi’s (2019: 33) definition is illuminating: A 
political crisis emerges when “routine incremental problem solving no longer works, when 
institutions are no longer taken for granted, when compliance of the citizens is no longer 
guaranteed, and when positive feedback processes accentuate rather than counterbalance the 
emerging crisis”. This macro-level definition, however, does not take into consideration citizens’ 
subjective perceptions, which is the focus of this project. According to Hay (1996: 225) crises are 
“narrations of failure” and Stanley (2014: 19) argues that “crises are essentially narrated 
processes that are brought to life through a process of problem definition, an interpretive battle 
over the causes and solutions to the problem(s), and an intervention that seeks to resolve the 
crisis”. Consequently, political talk is a suitable arena to examine how citizens perceive and 
define the crises, their causes and characteristics. 
The designation of any given situation as a crisis, actual or perceived, creates an 
exceptional state of emergency that requires unusual measures (Coleman, 2013). It separates 
certain areas from the “business as usual” politics, in which political decisions can be overturned 
in the next election cycle (Graf & Jarausch, 2017: 12). Thus, crises render politics more plastic 
and social change more tangible from a political opportunity perspective, because they signify 
that existing institutional arrangements no longer work (Kriesi, 2014). Political opportunity and 
social change can emerge “top-down” via politicians and institutions, but also “bottom-up” 
through citizen mobilization and engagement (McAdam et. al, 2001). Crucial for the latter, as 
proposed in Figure 2.2 , is: 1) a precise definition of the crisis under discussion – social 
construction of crisis; 2) the articulation of responsibility attributions for the problem, which may 
be supportive or antagonistic of dominant discourses and practices – discursive performance of 
crisis constructions; and 3) the relational placement of citizens vis-à-vis politicians and social 
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groups, differentiating between allies and opponents in a crisis situation – subject positioning in 




2.2. Social construction 
Crises as social phenomena signal that particular systems, be it economic, cultural or political, 
have encountered some form of severe malfunction, indicating the need for paradigm change 
(Koselleck & Richter, 2006). It is thus crucial to identify which paradigm may be considered 
problematic, and the direction of change citizens envision, if we wish to understand what the 
crises under examination are about. Framing a problem as a crisis, political actors portray an 
imminent threat that demands immediate responses (Hay, 1996). The stakes in the political arena 
go up and the temperature of political conflict rises because decisions will supposedly affect 
future generations (Coleman, 2013). A perceived as “successful resolution” may provide support 
and legitimacy to the political actors involved, leading to possible de-escalation and a new level 
of stability (Graf & Jarausch, 2017: 12). However, a perceived crisis mismanagement may lead to 
a prolonged and generalized crisis. 
As a result, crises generate deep ideological divides and discursive struggles over the 
most adequate framing of the origins and the most appropriate exit strategies (Hay, 1996). 
























 Figure 2.1. Model for the analysis of citizen discourse on the Greek and German crises: Social 
construction, discursive performance and subject positioning  
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conflict over which issues should be considered predominant. Crises generate political conflict in 
society, because they are characterized by scarcity of resources and uncertainty regarding the 
potential consequences of perceived threat(s) (Kriesi, 2014). This project differentiates between 
material, symbolic, and political threats. Material threats refer to perceived risks to afford basic 
resources such as food, employment and housing (Sherif & Sherif, 1953). Symbolic threats relate 
to perceived risks to people’s sense of worth, value, and influence over the environment (Tajfel, 
1982). Political threats involve risks to democratic quality, citizen representation, political 
accountability and social justice (Della Porta, 2013). A crisis may trigger all three, yet which 
threats become politicized in the public debate depends on the resonance with citizens’ lived 
realities and discursive contestation in the public sphere (Stanley, 2014). 
The politicization of threats is not coincidental, but embedded in a legacy of socio-
political struggles. Cleavages are societal divisions which were shaped by politicized conflicts 
that took place during nation-state formation and consolidation and left an enduring mark on 
society (Bartolini & Mair, 1990). Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) seminal work identified four types: 
centre-periphery, religious-secular, urban-rural, and workers-capital. The national revolution 
produced a cleavage between the central state, peripheral communities and a supranational 
church. The industrial revolution triggered a cleavage between urban and rural areas and later 
between employers and workers (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). Crises tend to activate previous (class, 
religion) and/or trigger new cleavages (Europe, globalization), as political actors struggle to 
define and tackle the problematic issue-areas. A suggested recent cleavage emerging with 
globalization and European integration is the integration – demarcation cleavage, with political 
actors adopting favourable or opposing views towards further world integration (Hutter, 2014; 
Kriesi et al, 2008; 2012). The theory argues that by supporting growing international 
interconnectedness since the 1970s, politicians of different ideological orientations gradually 
aligned with pro-globalization and pro-EU agendas in the areas of the economy, immigration and 
politics (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016) (see Chapter 3 for further theoretical elaboration). The project 
examines the issues that trigger crisis perceptions in Greece and Germany and discusses the 
broader cleavages in which they are embedded so as to evaluate current theoretical approaches. 
As Hay (1996: 255) points out, “power resides not only in the ability to respond to crisis, 
but to identify, define, and constitute crisis in the first place”. For instance, framing the financial 
36 
 
crisis as a “Greek/German particularity” or a “global capitalist crash”, makes a difference in 
identifying what the problem is about, who should be held responsible, and which strategies need 
to be pursued to tackle the problem. Hay (1996) proposes that the discursive construction of crisis 
should be seen as a process of “abstraction and meta-narration” through which various stories 
about complex events and statistics are linked together as “symptoms” of this crisis (Angouri & 
Wodak, 2014: 544). Since people relate their experiences to one another through narration, they 
place together diverse sources of information into a plot, connecting a beginning and middle of a 
story with a conclusion in temporal and causal ways. Such repertoires compete in terms of their 
ability “to find resonance with citizens’ lived experiences, and not in terms of their ‘scientific’ 
adequacy as explanations for the condition they diagnose” (Hay, 1996: 255).  
In this process, particular interpretative repertoires may appear more effective in 
conveying citizen experience than others, providing the discursive foundations for the 
interpretation of crises. They facilitate the formation of a unifying explanatory framework for the 
perceived causes, effects, and crisis characteristics, and offer justification for the proposed 
courses of action (Benford & Snow, 2000). It goes without saying that the social construction of 
such a unifying interpretative framework is the outcome of political contestation and negotiation 
of shared meaning in the public sphere (Gamson, 1992). Typically, there is individual variation in 
the extent to which citizens accept and circulate it, yet the question remains: why is it that in this 
particular time and place, people tend to perceive a crisis situation as such and not in other ways? 
In my view, it is because these perceptions are not random or limitless, but they are constrained 
and enabled by their situatedness in a specific historical and socio-political context (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). They resonate with citizens’ lived realities that facilitate a particular 
interpretation of the crisis under discussion. As such, crisis constructions provide the opportunity 
to reconstruct that very societal context that generated them and offer insights on the motivations 
and justifications for citizens’ particularistic crisis perceptions. Moving to the next section, social 
constructions do not only describe lived realities, they also perform specific discursive functions. 
2.3. Discursive performance 
Engaging in constructions and re-constructions of the social world, citizens pursue their 
discursive and political aims. They debate these social constructions in discussions with one 
another to evaluate the accuracy and appropriateness of their stories and strategies (Perrin, 2006). 
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In this process they may introduce certain interpretative repertoires circulated through the media 
and citizen interaction to get their point across. They may also present their own stories to 
validate or discredit these discursive constructions by employing popular wisdom, or personal 
and anecdotal evidence (Gamson, 1992). Thus, particular crisis constructions have also strategic 
performative functions in relation to particular audiences (Coleman, 2013). They may be 
employed as to embrace, critique, subvert, revise, or resist a particular framing of the problem 
(Stanley, 2014). 
Citizens are historically and culturally situated within not only a specific interactional 
context, such as European, German or Greek politics, but also within a rhetorical/argumentative 
framework in the public debate (Angouri & Wodak, 2014). Billig (1987) argues that there are 
always alternative versions of reality and arguments that a specific crisis construction may 
counter, even though these are not always indicated explicitly. This is where ideology comes into 
the picture. Billig and colleagues (1988) argue that ideology comprises of contrary themes. In this 
sense, ideology is not a complete and unified system of beliefs that directs people’s perceptions 
and actions. Instead, ideology is seen as containing contrary themes, such as generalizations (all 
Greeks are cheats), but also particularizations (yes but not my friend Anastasia) that enable 
people to perform particular discursive practices (speech acts) vis-à-vis specific contexts and 
audiences (Wiggins, 2017). Gamson (1992), in his seminal work “Talking politics”, made a 
similar distinction between themes and counter-themes in ideological debates. Without contrary 
themes, citizens could neither puzzle over their social worlds nor engage in debates about crises.  
The dilemmatic aspect of ideology is also important for voicing or silencing alternatives 
to the status quo (Billig et al., 1988). Constructing particular version of crises, it is important to 
examine which arguments are presented as common-sensical and which others are silenced, and 
why. One basic function of ideology is to present one pole of an argument as self-evident and 
legitimate, while placing the other in non-existence or marginalizing its status as utopian and 
counter-productive (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). By addressing both sides to a story, citizens may 
appear to acknowledge the broader universal picture within which crises take place, and to be 
driven by motives of fairness instead of particularistic interests. On the other hand, citizens may 
selectively present a discursive construction that portrays them in a favourable light and provides 
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justification to their actions, concealing information that could delegitimize their choices (Tajfel, 
1982; Turner et al, 1987).   
Hay (1996) points out that constructions of crises are in essence narrations of failure, and 
as such it is important to examine where citizens place the locus of responsibility for the crises 
they perceive. Is it themselves, refugees, national governments, the EU, international actors, the 
markets, all or nothing of the above that are blamed for the problematic situation? Perceptions of 
failure are threatening to people’s self-esteem, and thus, as causal attribution theory (Kelley, 
1973) suggests, people have the tendency to attribute successes to personal characteristics and 
failures to external circumstances. Therefore, constructing particular versions of crises, citizens 
may seek to assert responsibility for the situation by acknowledging their fair share; or they might 
attempt to avoid blame by identifying other actors as responsible for the negative turnout of 
events (Roose et al., 2017). Asserting responsibility may sound intimidating but restores agency 
and a sense of control to the speaker. Blame avoidance may present oneself in a positive light, but 
takes away control over the situation and may lead to victimization. 
Billig (1987; 1988) suggests that the presence of ideological dilemmas may be universal, 
meaning that dilemmas emerge in all societies. However, the content of these dilemmas varies in 
different societies and times. Diverse patterns of cultural norms, beliefs and actions give rise to 
diverse patterns of dilemmas and crisis constructions (Stanley, 2014). Consequently, crisis 
constructions and their performative functions are expected to trigger ideological dilemmas in 
both cases – for instance pro-austerity and anti-austerity positions in the Greek and German 
crises; yet, the content of these dilemmas is expected to be sensitive to particular historical, 
cultural and socio-political developments in each society – for example, what does austerity 
signify for a German vis-à-vis a Greek citizen? By assuming the existence of contrary themes in 
discursive constructions, a dynamic image of the citizen emerges, that of a strategic performer in 
front of an audience, instead of an obedient subject who conforms blindly to ideology and the 
status quo (Billig et al., 1988). Constructing versions of crises not only has performative 
argumentative functions, but positions particular actors as allies in a crisis situation, while placing 
others as opponents. 
2.4. Subject positioning 
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Summing up the literature so far, social constructions of crises are essentially narrations of failure 
that blame particular actors for the crisis situation (blame attribution); present some actors as 
victims and others as perpetrators (locus of responsibility); and position specific actors as allies 
and others as opponents (locus of solidarity/competition) (Roose et al., 2017; White 2011). 
Consequently, crisis constructions are intimately related to perceptions of history, political 
culture, and shared collective identities. Stråth and Wodak (2009: 16) point out that major crises 
can be seen as “condensed events with symbolic or iconic value” that are construed as “turning 
points in history”. Such interpretative repertoires involve “contentious value mobilization” 
(right/wrong, good/bad, friend/enemy) and provide the discursive foundations for building new or 
politicizing existing collective identities that locate particular subjects as allies and others as 
opponents (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).  
Collective identities refer to the idea that “a group of people accept a fundamental and 
consequential similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves” (Fligstein, 
Polyakova & Sandholtz, 2012: 7). This sense of collective identity is socially constructed. It 
emerges as the intentional or unintentional consequence of social practices and interactions 
(Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). Since people are raised in families and communities, they tend to 
identify with the groups in which they are socially located. Age, gender, class, ethnicity, religion 
and nationality have been at the basis of citizens’ collective identities (Brewer, 1999). Collective 
identities are not static or stable, but dynamic and context dependent. Meaning that as people 
ascribe to multiple identities, the latter become salient depending on the context in which they are 
activated (Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). Brubaker and Cooper (2000) make an 
interesting claim against the reification of identity concepts as static personality traits, but argue 
instead for investigating the processes of identity formation and categorization, of subject 
positioning and boundary formation in discourse.  
Drawing on the work of Davies and Harré (1990), subject positioning refers to the 
discursive practice in which individuals assign positions to themselves and others. It is a 
relational activity, since others are positioned as the discussants position themselves, and it can 
exceed the intentions and awareness of participants (Lamont & Molnár, 2002). Subject positions 
may refer to the discussants as subjects, the protagonists in a crisis situation; the social groups 
and categories discussants construct for themselves. At the same time, there are those who are 
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different from them, who can be seen as allies or opponents in a crisis situation. White (2011: 96) 
suggests that allies are “people like us”, who even though may live in different environments, 
they share with us the same predicament in a crisis situation. Opponents are “people who are 
different from us” and with whom a competitive relationship is constructed, such as when one 
benefits at the expense of the other. The project examines the ways in which Greek and German 
citizens position one another, and the groups they approach as allies and opponents in their crisis 
constructions. 
An important prerequisite for the discursive construction of allies and opponents is acts of 
social comparison (Reese & Lauenstein, 2014). By engaging in social comparisons, citizens 
appear to acknowledge that the problems they face are not idiosyncratic or personal, but are 
located in a broader field of experiences in which other people may be involved (White, 2011). 
According to relative deprivation theories, citizens and social groups tend to compare the type 
and intensity of their grievances to others as to evaluate their predicament, instead of simply 
assessing the objective material conditions in society (Klandermans, 1997; Runciman, 1966). It is 
through comparisons with others that citizens become aware of the nature of their problems, and 
the extent to which they can be seen as justifiable or soluble (White 2011). Hence, acts of social 
comparison have a function. In a just world, collective identification and subject positioning 
could be considered neutral descriptions of social location. Vast power inequalities within and 
between social groups, however, trigger conflicts – material, symbolic and political. Tajfel (1982) 
and the social identity framework suggests that people tend to stress ingroup similarities and 
underline outgroup differences as to present the discussants and their reference groups in a 
favourable light. This is due to the fact that people strive for positive identification and thus they 
are more likely to attribute positive traits to their reference groups and negative to the ones 
perceived as outgroups (Turner et al, 1987). The greater the conflict between social groups, the 
greater the discrepancy between positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (social 
polarization) (Brewer, 1999). 
As Reese and Lauenstein (2014) argue, ingroups and outgroups are comparable with 
reference to a common superordinate category that includes both the in- and outgroup. In the case 
of the Greeks and the Germans, “Europe” could function as a superordinate category that 
provides the criteria for intergroup comparisons between the two publics. The superordinate 
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category sets the positive standard against which the inclusive subgroups are compared (Wenzel 
et al., 2007). The comparison criteria are not stable and natural, but historically constructed and 
socially contested. The more one’s own group resembles the prototype, the more positively is 
evaluated. When the superordinate category is negatively perceived, however, for example when 
the Germans or Greeks see Europe as a problematic social formation, ingroup members are likely 
to distance themselves from the superordinate category (Reese & Lauenstein, 2014). Members of 
the negatively evaluated group may then try to change the standard of comparison, in an attempt 
to maintain positive self-identification, employing strategies of social creativity (Tajfel, 1982). In 
the focus groups, for instance, whereas the Greeks tended to portray themselves as “poor but 
hospitable”, the Germans would refer to their group as “conformist but responsible”. 
In the context of Europe’s crises national categories became particularly salient. Existing 
studies indicate the emergence and circulation of particular (racist) stereotypes attributed to the 
two publics (Adler-Nissen, 2017; Sternberg et al., 2018). For instance, while the Germans were 
characterized in the media as prudent, hardworking and responsible, the Greeks were largely 
portrayed as lazy, profligate and scamming (Bickes, Otten, & Weymann, 2014; Kutter, 2014). In 
everyday political talk, stereotypes “constitute parts of arguments, used by the authors of those 
arguments to enhance self-representation, establish meaningful categories, explain inequalities, 
and negotiate power” (Theodossopoulos, 2013: 202). Thus, it is no surprise that in a period of 
scarce resources and uncertainty, of material and symbolic threats, citizens in Germany and 
Greece resort to stereotyping to simplify and gain control over a complex reality. Yet, the 
existence of stereotypes among Greek and German citizens about one another and other 
Europeans would also indicate a problem of European integration at the citizen level and a lack 
of solidarity between these publics in times of crisis. All in all, crisis constructions position 
particular actors as political subjects, the protagonists in a crisis situation, and others as allies or 
opponents. These subject positions are indicative of the state of intergroup relations in Europe, 
their solidaristic or antagonistic character. They allow us to examine the image of the 
superordinate category against which the subgroups are evaluated, disentangling points of 
approval and criticism to the European project from below in a period of widespread political 
disenchantment. The next chapter illustrates the theoretical framework for the analysis of citizen 
discourse about political strategies in the Greek and German crises. 
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Chapter 3. Political strategies theory: Discourse about injustice, identity, agency and 
alternatives 
The crises in Greece and Germany have underlined the representation gap between politicians 
and citizens at the state and European level, and brought Europe’s multi-level governance 
structure centre stage (De Vries, 2018a; Hutter & Kriesi, 2019b). Citizens in crisis-hit “debtor” 
countries like Greece have been pushed to accept extreme austerity policies against their own 
interests (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2013). Likewise, citizens in crisis-surviving “creditor” 
countries such as Germany were pressured to bailout crisis-hit “debtor” countries like Greece, 
raising political discontent among the citizenry (Bremer & Schulte-Cloos, 2019). With the onset 
of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, citizens in both countries received increased migration 
flows from crisis-hit and war-torn regions in search of peace and stability (Della Porta, 2018). 
These political decisions were presented to them as non-negotiable TINA management strategies 
(Hindmoor & McConnel, 2015). However, Greek and German citizens were not convinced by 
politicians. They contested elite strategies and opened up alternative ways to tackle the crises 
with their contentious political mobilization. This begs the question that I address in the chapter: 
How did citizens respond to the problematic political environment in Greece and Germany? 
Which political strategies – citizens’ purposeful activities in the electoral and movement arena – 
did they pursue amidst the crises (financial, refugee, political), and why? 
Greece stands out among European countries for the severity of the impact of austerity 
measures on people’s lives and the extent of anti-austerity mobilization in movement and party 
politics (Karyotis & Gerodimos, 2015). Diani and Kousis (2014) noted over 20.210 protest events 
in the country taking place between May 2010 and March 2014; the formation of the Indignant 
movement in 2011, with 36% of the population participating in it and 70% expressing support 
(Karyotis & Rüdig 2015); and the emergence of a vast self-organized solidarity network with 
ordinary citizens providing necessities and assistance to people in need due to lack of state 
provision (Kousis, 2017). In the electoral arena between 2010 and 2015, the Greeks triggered and 
participated in four (snap) general and one European elections, punishing mainstream parties 
(labour PASOK and conservative New Democracy) considered responsible for the crises, while 
rewarding challengers mainly on the left (anti-austerity SYRIZA), but also on the right (far-right 
Golden Dawn) (Altiparmakis, 2019). In 2015 the Greeks elected the first radical left party 
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(SYRIZA) in government since the overthrow of the military coup in 1974, and triggered a 
referendum on the submitted austerity plan by the Troika of lenders (EC, ECB, IMF) – the first 
since the abolition of monarchy in 1975. The turnout was massive and 61.3% voted ‘No’ to more 
austerity. 
Germany, on the other hand, is often depicted as the powerful counterpart of Greece 
during these crises. The country is widely considered a stable and moderate liberal democracy, 
scoring highest in the Polity IV index of democratization among European countries (Dolezal, 
2008). Germany witnessed also a wave of discontent in movement and party politics, however, 
later (towards the end of 2014) and with less severity than Greece (Weisskircher & Hutter, 2020). 
In the movement arena, Occupy protests were staged in Berlin and Frankfurt outside the ECB 
headquarters between October and November 2011, yet citizen participation was low (8.000-
9.000) and the movement did not attract the support that was manifest in other parts of Europe 
(e.g., Greece, Spain) (Roose et al, 2017). A massive protest of 250,000 participants took place in 
Berlin against the TTIP and the lack of transparency in the EU negotiations of the treaty in 2015 
(Weisskircher & Hutter, 2020). In the 2013 federal elections, the Germans rewarded the grand 
coalition between the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) and labour Social Democrats 
(SPD) that kept the financial crisis at bay. The unresolved Eurozone crisis and the onset of the 
refugee crisis, however, triggered a wave of citizen disenchantment with consensus centrist 
politics (Bremer & Schulte-Cloos, 2019). Already since the end of 2014, the weekly marches of 
the PEGIDA movement made their presence noticed throughout the country (Dostal, 2015). 
Germany saw also the emergence of a radical right party, the Alternative für Deutschland 
(Alternative for Germany; AfD). The party appeared in 2013 as a Eurosceptic response to the 
Greek bailouts. Yet by 2015, it transitioned into a radical nationalist party (Arzheimer & Berning, 
2019). The AfD made electoral gains in state elections, and eventually emerged as the main 
opposition in the 2017 federal elections – coming third after the CDU and SPD, and appearing in 
14 out of the 16 state parliaments.  
In light of these tumultuous times, processes of polarization – vacation of the moderate 
centre – and radicalization – expression of increasingly radical political positions – are observed 
in both countries (McAdam et al., 2001). Yet, Greek citizens supported predominantly left-wing 
actors, whereas German citizens strengthened right-wing actors in the party and movement arenas 
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(see Roberts, 2017). The aim of the chapter is to provide a theoretical rationale for these 
differences by focusing on the discourse of those most commonly missing in the literature, 
citizens themselves.  
Scholars disagree on the causes and outcomes of the crises in Europe. One line of 
literature, focusing on the party arena in advanced democracies, argues that political change is 
triggered mainly by populist right wing actors opposing globalization and European integration 
(Kriesi & Hutter, 2019a; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). These authors suggest that processes of 
modernization and post-materialism have rendered citizens’ values increasingly progressive and 
liberal. As such, a “cultural backlash” is emerging from the “losers of globalization and European 
integration” (Kriesi et al., 2008; 2012; Hutter, 2014) – primarily white, male, working class 
conservatives, who perceive their privilege, power and traditions being threatened by 
cosmopolitan, multicultural, gender-fluid citizens. These right-wing supporters protest the 
transference of decision-making powers to the EU and ask for renationalization of politics (De 
Vries, 2018b). Whereas the first theory takes capitalism and modernization for granted and 
prioritizes the cultural cleavage, the second theory problematizes the relationship between the 
economy and politics, capitalism and democracy, and focuses on the class cleavage (Castells, 
2012; Della Porta, 2015; 2018). Examining mainly the movement arena, these scholars argue that 
social change is triggered by anti-austerity and pro-refugee social movements and parties that 
challenge neoliberal capitalism and TINA doctrines. These mainly left-wing actors bring forward 
participatory, direct and social democratic demands, criticizing democratic deficits in national 
and European politics, with the aim of democratizing the latter (Castells, 2012; 2017). This 
project, taking into consideration citizens’ political strategies in the movement and party arenas, 
in two countries that are differentially positioned and impacted by Europe’s crises, indicates that 
both tendencies are present. Findings depend largely on the research focus on party or movement 
politics, and the selection of cases (centre-periphery, north-south). 
Moreover, for years resource mobilization and political process – suggesting that it is 
resources and opportunities rather than grievances and threats driving political participation – 
provided the main explanatory framework for citizen mobilization (Kriesi, 2004; McCarthy & 
Zald, 1977). After the financial crisis in 2008 though, an increasing number of studies shows that 
political engagement is triggered by grievances such as economic deprivation, cultural backlash, 
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political distrust and democratic dissatisfaction; facilitated by the mobilization of new or 
transformed political actors in the movement and party arenas (anti-austerity, anti-immigrant, 
Eurosceptic); and the emergence of threatening political contingencies (austerity measures, long 
summer of migration, EU’s supranational policies (Della Porta, 2015; 2018; Giugni & Grasso, 
2015; Hutter & Kriesi, 2019a; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). Could it be that while resources and 
opportunities predict citizen engagement in prosperous times, it is grievances and political threats 
that drive the latter in crisis times? Literature on critical junctures provides insights into these 
processes, which is the focus of the chapter (Collier & Munck, 2017; Roberts, 2015).  
The chapter is structured as follows. First, the concept of political strategies will be 
operationalized, followed by literature on critical junctures and political mobilization in party and 
movement politics. The third section discusses political talk and framing discursive practices. 
The chapter closes with the explanation of the theoretical framework for the analysis of citizen 
discourse about political strategies, namely injustice, identity, agency and alternatives. 
3.1. Conceptualization of political strategies 
Politics indicates “the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a 
certain order and organize human coexistence, in conditions that are always potentially 
conflictual” (Mouffe, 2000: 101). Conditions are potentially conflictual due to unequal 
distribution of resources, power and status within society and the world hierarchy (Adler-Nissen, 
2017; Tajfel, 1982). Politics can be examined at the level of citizens and social groups (micro); 
parties and organizations (meso); institutions, regimes and states (macro) (Klandermans, 1997). 
The chapter focuses on micropolitics, that is citizens’ political power in society vis-à-vis interest 
groups, political organizations and institutions. Traditionally, political strategies refer to “those 
activities by citizens that aim at influencing the government, either by affecting the choice of 
government personnel or by affecting the choices made by the government personnel.” (Verba & 
Nie, 1972: 2). This commonly cited definition is closely related to a liberal conceptualization of 
democracy in which public representatives and electoral competition lie in the centre of the 
political process (Ferrín & Kriesi, 2016). Nevertheless, it is not the only definition in the field. 
More participatory or direct democratic conceptualizations approach political strategy as 
deliberation among diverse groups in society so as to reach a collective decision, like attending 
town hall meetings or organizing public assemblies (Held, 2006; Habermas, 1996); or even as 
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direct involvement in the community or decision-making process by the citizens concerned, such 
as engaging in referenda and participatory budgeting (Barber, 1984; Pateman, 2012). A more 
recent conceptualization by Van Deth (2014) defines political strategies as all voluntary activities 
by citizens located or targeted at the sphere of the government, the state or politics, and aiming at 
solving collective or community problems; on the condition that these activities are used to 
express political aims and intentions of the participants. The classic definition of political 
engagement is expanded to take into account participants’ intentions when engaging in the polity, 
and capture innovations in the action repertoire including expressive or personalized “life style” 
activities like political consumerism, social media usage and communitarian living. Therefore, 
the concept of political strategies depends on the notion of politics and democracy citizens have 
in mind (Bengtsson & Christensen, 2014) 
 Political strategies can be further categorized into two groups based on their form and 
arena of activities, namely party and movement politics (McAdam & Tarrow, 2010). Party 
politics offers the institutionalized route to political influence, with elections held at regular 
intervals, at predefined local, national or supranational levels (Katz & Crotty, 2006). Movement 
politics on the other hand, is far more episodic and less predictable as there is no institutionalized 
rhythm prescribing when and how protest events should occur (Della Porta, 2015; Tarrow, 2011). 
Party politics involves activities related to political parties such as voting, contacting, donating, 
campaigning, being a party member and engaging in voluntary work. Movement politics involves 
activities staged by social movement organizations, interest groups and civic associations like 
signing petitions, engaging in demonstrations, occupations of public sites, strikes, blockades and 
activism to mention a few common examples (McAdam & Tarrow, 2010).  
The fact that participation in party and movement politics differs does not mean that 
citizens feel constrained by the division of labour in the social sciences. The most plausible 
hypothesis is that citizens employ party politics, movement politics, or both as they see it fit to 
their objectives (Klandermans, 2013). For instance, even though distinct, political parties and 
social movements are embedded in multi-organizational fields sharing connections which may be 
supportive or antagonistic (Hutter, Kriesi, & Lorenzini, 2019). Social movements can join 
electoral coalitions or turn into political parties themselves (Della Porta et al., 2017). 
Alternatively, political parties may facilitate movements by forwarding their political demands in 
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the electoral arena, or they may hinder them by co-opting or repressing them (Kriesi, 2004). The 
relation between party and movement politics is also context dependent. In election years citizens 
are more likely to take the opportunity and engage in the party arena to voice their preferences, 
whereas in protest cycles they are expected to participate increasingly in movement politics 
(McAdam & Tarrow, 2010).  
Therefore, citizens may exert political influence by engaging in party politics, movement 
politics, or both. However, they may choose to do nothing and disengage from the political 
process altogether. Already since the 1990s, an increasing number of studies has been addressing 
a grave concern with political disengagement especially among young people and disadvantaged 
groups (Franklin, 2004; Hay, 2007; Putnam, 1995; Stoker, 2006). These authors reverse the 
question, asking instead why citizens should bother to participate at all, since politics is a 
cognitively complex, time consuming and at times frustrating and dangerous activity (e.g., police 
repression). Lack of political knowledge, interest in politics and resources such as time, income 
or education are important factors behind political disengagement (Stoker & Hay, 2017). In 
addition, macro level processes triggered by recent changes in modern democracies contribute to 
disengagement, such as marketization of politics and generational replacement by more apolitical 
voters (Franklin, 2004); reduced social capital in the individualist culture of capitalism (Putnam, 
1995); and dissemination of post-democratic technocratic institutions in the neoliberal era (Hay, 
2007). As argued, however, political engagement in periods of crises is expected to differ from 
those in prosperous times. The next section explains why. 
3.2. Critical junctures and political strategies in the electoral arena 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in order to explain citizens’ selection of political strategies 
in Greece and Germany, it is crucial to identify which arrangements are considered problematic 
and what kind of paradigm is emerging. Polanyi (1944) in his seminal work “The Great 
Transformation” reflected on “the double movement” between market liberalization and 
protectionism in the Great Depression. In current times of Great Recession (Hutter & Kriesi, 
2019a), dysfunctional institutional arrangements seem to indicate citizen disenchantment with 
consensus centrist ‘third-way’ politics (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). As mainstream labour and 
conservative parties moved to the centre to attract more voters, they transformed into “catch-all 
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parties” and eventually “cartel parties”, converging programmatically in economic policy, 
immigration, democracy and Europe (Katz & Mair, 1995; 2009).  
In economic policy, centre-left labour parties moved to the right by gradually adopting 
pro-market legislation, increasing privatization and deregulation, while cutting down on public 
spending to advance competitiveness in the common market (Crouch, 2004; Hay, 2007). In 
immigration policy, centre-right conservative parties moved to the left by progressively opening 
up borders for people, products/services and corporations, in fear of capital flight (Beramendi et 
al., 2015; Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). In democratic politics, mainstream labour and conservative 
parties prioritized economic efficiency and responsibility to citizen representation and 
responsiveness in order to generate growth (Mair, 2009). They aligned with pro-EU agendas, 
transferring decision-making powers to supranational non-majoritarian institutions such as the 
European Commission and the European Council, which lie further away from citizen 
representation and democratic accountability (Della Porta, 2013; Mair, 2013). Their long-time 
supporters appear visibly dissatisfied, since they cannot discern meaningful policy differences 
between centre-left and centre-right mainstream parties, finding themselves unrepresented in the 
public sphere. As a result, they turn to more ideologically distinct parties to represent their 
interests. The ideological struggle takes place between progressive and reactionary alliances on 
the left and the right of the political spectrum (social, egalitarian, environmental, feminist politics 
vs. neoliberal, elitist, nationalist, patriarchal) (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Furthermore, positions 
on “Europe” and globalization appear to add a transnational dimension to political conflict 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Hutter & Kriesi, 2019b). 
Hay (2007) suggests that this crisis of representation and legitimacy was in the making 
since the 1970s with the change of socio-political paradigm from embedded liberalism to 
neoliberalism and the fall of communist and socialist regimes as alternatives to capitalist 
democracies. Accelerated by globalization and European integration, a shift from a ‘welfare 
state’ to a ‘market-based’ model of democracy emerged, where citizens are portrayed as 
consumers of social policies, while parties function as firms competing against each other to 
attract voters (Della Porta, 2013). Colin Crouch (2004) coined the term “post-democracy” to 
portray the secret alliance between politicians and business that has led to de-politicization of 
previously contested socio-economic and political issues. In post-democratic times, political 
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decisions are taken in isolation by groups of specialists (politicians, EU and IMF technocrats), 
while citizens’ demands are approached as irrelevant or “populist” in the political debate 
(Stavrakakis, 2014). In a similar manner, Peter Mair (2013) underlined the “hollowing of 
democracy” due to the declining representative capacity of political parties, and proposed a crisis 
of responsiveness plaguing national and European politics.  
The post-democratic crisis of representation is also visible in Europe’s multilevel polity. 
Although the EU began as a peace project and attracted citizen trust and support the first decades 
after World War II, this started to change after the oil crisis and cold war period (Castells, 2017). 
The difficulty to ratify the Maastricht treaty in 1992 and the unsuccessful EU referenda in France, 
the Netherlands and Denmark in 2005 marked the beginning of the so-called Euroscepticism 
period (De Vries, 2018a). The latest crises appear to have contributed to this trend. But why are 
Europeans dissatisfied with the EU? Literature suggests that the EU is to a great extent an elite-
led project that has been largely unexplained and under-advocated to the average citizen 
(Follesdal & Hix, 2006). Studies show that Europeans lack knowledge of the EU and its 
institutions (Duchesne et al., 2013). Voter turnout in European elections is low, since citizens 
perceive that they are not substantially represented in the European Parliament (Mair, 2013). The 
latter appears weak as the design of the EU prescribes that policy-making at the European level is 
dominated by executive actors like the EC and the ECB (Crum, 2018). The actions of these 
executive agents are beyond the control of national parliaments and their citizens. What is more, 
the EU functions mainly to regulate trade and market integration. This means that it responds less 
to citizens than to market forces (Schmidt, 2014). Despite developing new institutions and 
instruments after the 2010 Eurozone crisis (e.g., European Stability Mechanism, European 
Semester), the latter empower executive rather than representative functions (Crum & Merlo, 
2020). Scholars tend to agree that the EU’s growing focus on monetary unification has 
undermined its political imperative of developing a “European demos” (Habermas, 2012; Mair, 
2013). 
Moving to citizens’ political strategies in the electoral arena, according to economic 
voting literature, in the short-term citizens punish political parties and politicians that performed 
poorly just before or during the crises by abstaining in the next elections or even rewarding 
opposition parties (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007). Attribution of responsibility for bad 
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economic performance is of utmost importance for retrospective economic evaluations and 
electoral punishment. Research shows that it is not objective economic indicators that matter for 
economic voting, but citizens’ perceptions that bad economic performance is the result of poor 
governance (Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016). Whether it is the government or the EU blamed for the 
crises has important implications for electoral punishment (Costa-Lobo & Lewis-Beck, 2012). If 
deleterious performance is seen as the outcome of external forces and not the government, the 
effects of economic voting may be minimized. Economic voting is cyclical, which means that 
after an economic recession, citizens return to their partisan loyalties. 
Long term outcomes, as outlined in cleavage theory, involve the restructuration of party 
systems (dealignment and realignment), with new challengers entering the political system and 
power shifts taking place from old to new dominant coalitions (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). These 
new challengers appear as old cleavages re-emerge (class, religion), and/or new cleavages 
(Europe, globalization) surface due to the crises. Whereas in Greece the new dominant coalition 
emerged from the anti-austerity mobilization cycle and positioned itself on the left, in Germany it 
surfaced from the anti-immigration mobilization cycle and placed itself on the right (Hutter & 
Kriesi, 2019a). Important for the stabilization of party systems is programmatic realignment of 
policy responses; meaning, consistency between political positions and policy implementation. 
Crisis experience in L. America (Lupu, 2014; Roberts, 2015) shows that citizens detached 
themselves radically from left-wing labour parties that introduced (de-aligning) austerity and 
market liberalization policies, triggering electoral abstention, reactive electoral sequences and 
societal upheaval that lasted years after the post-adjustment era. Conversely, when austerity and 
structural adjustment programs were implemented by right-wing conservative parties with the 
opposition expressing societal resistance, political transition was more stable and durable. 
3.3. Critical junctures and political strategies in the movement arena 
Citizens may also engage in social movements and solidarity networks to bring about social 
change from below, especially when elections are scheduled far in advance or when political 
parties are delegitimized due to major scandals or poor governance (McAdam & Tarrow, 2010). 
Crises trigger discontent due to grievances related to scarcity of resources and uncertainty 
regarding the potential outcomes of perceived threats (Kriesi, 2014). Grievances are shared 
perceptions that a social group is denied rights, opportunities, respect, safety, or some other form 
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of social good, and are analogous to the severity of crises (Buechler, 2013). Grievances may be 
felt as relative deprivation in comparison to the status of another social group, illegitimate 
inequality, suddenly imposed grievances, and violated principles generating moral outrage (Van 
Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Grievance theories suggest that the emergence of socio-
economic strain in society such as unemployment or income deprivation, and their attitudinal or 
emotional consequences (anger, resentment, indignation) can motivate citizens to engage in 
collective action to ameliorate the problematic situation (Buechler, 2013).  
Studies have shown that it is not the objective level of grievances, but the perception and 
framing of grievances as unjust and legitimate threats to citizens’ wellbeing that fosters political 
engagement; and the specific, rather than abstract, attribution of responsibility for the 
problematic situation (injustice) (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992). Otherwise, grievances 
may be seen as personal problems leading to a retreat to the private sphere and disengagement. 
Moreover, literature suggests that grievances are indeed a necessary but insufficient condition for 
citizen engagement. Alternatively, poor and disadvantaged social groups would be the first to 
revolt. Research indicates that although the former do revolt occasionally (Piven & Cloward, 
1977), it is actually citizens with resources such as time and income that mobilize regularly 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Grievances are the crisis latent potentials that require mobilization 
by political actors (party and movement), and political opportunity to be successfully voiced (see 
Figure 3.2) (Kriesi, 2014; McAdam et al., 2001).  
Resource mobilization theory moved the focus of analysis from grievances, which are 
considered relatively constant in society, to organizational resources and feelings of solidarity 
among participants as providing motivation for political engagement (Kriesi, 2004). The theory 
argues that citizens engage in collective action not so much because they feel discontent, but 
because they possess the resources to do so (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Mobilization (in my 
model) refers to citizens’ perceptions of the political supply; that is, the presence or absence of 
political organizations offering opportunities for political engagement. Mobilization can be 
organized top-down via institutionalized actors such as political parties and state authorities 
(party politics), or bottom-up through non-institutionalized actors like social movements and 
solidarity networks (movement politics) (McAdam & Tarrow, 2010). The crises in Europe 
politicized not only the mobilization of existing actors, but brought new challengers to the 
52 
 
movement and party arenas such as the Indignant and PEGIDA movements, the SYRIZA and 
AfD challenger parties, solidarity networks and citizen initiatives (Della Porta et al., 2017; Hutter 
& Kriesi, 2019a; Lahusen & Grasso, 2018).  
Kriesi (2014) argues that citizens are more likely to turn to political parties to voice 
discontent, as party politics is the institutionalized route to political influence that is more 
accessible and less costly than movement politics. On the other hand, scholars have indicated a 
certain delegitimization of the electoral arena and a shift towards movement politics, as a 
consequence of mainstream parties’ ideological convergence and diminished representative 
capacity (Castells, 2012; Della Porta, 2015). My model examines the availability and legitimacy 
of actors in the movement and party arena aiming to address citizens’ grievances in the two 
countries. As the political process framework underlines, it is not the objective presence of 
political actors that matters, but the perception and framing as appropriate and legitimate agents 
to voice citizen discontent (identity) (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992). In the event that 
available actors are seen as illegitimate, citizens may express political cynicism and distance 
themselves from “corrupt politics”. 
Political opportunity scholars argue that the individualist focus of grievance theories on 
discontent and the agentic attention of resource mobilization on organizational resources, has 
downplayed the role of socio-political context and contingency in the emergence of political 
action (Koopmans, 1999; McAdam et al., 2001). Political opportunity and threat refer to factors 
in the socio-political context seen as facilitating or impeding social change, such as elections at 
different levels (local, regional, national, European), protest cycles (Indignados, Occupy, 
PEGIDA), endogenous and exogenous shocks (austerity, immigration) (Kriesi, 2004). 
Furthermore, systemic factors in the political opportunity structure like openness of the political 
system, state strength and repression tactics, divisions and alliances among political elites, and 
configuration of political actors in the movement and party arena, influence the mobilization and 
efficacy of political strategies (McAdam et al., 2001). Depending on the closing and opening of 
political opportunities – for instance the presence of a crisis or timing of elections – citizens may 
mobilize strategically in these arenas, or disengage if they perceive closure and irresponsiveness.  
Not only opportunities but also threats can stimulate citizen engagement especially in 
crisis times (Kousis, 2017). The concept of threat reintroduces grievances to the political process 
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framework in an implicit manner. With crises generating threats to citizen well-being, as well as 
bringing extra-institutional actors in the power play (e.g., the Troika), the stakes in the political 
arena rise, and citizens may increasingly pursue strategies to influence political outcomes (Della 
Porta, 2015). Citizens may not only seize existing opportunities (and avoid threats), but they can 
trigger novel ones with sustained political engagement, as was the case with the Greek 
referendum in 2015 or the political impasse in the 2017 German elections (Garyfallou, 2020). In 
line with the politicization of grievances and mobilization of political actors, political 
opportunities and threats must be perceived and framed as such in order to foster engagement 
(agency) (Gamson & Meyer, 1996). If citizens perceive no opportunity to influence politics, they 
may resort to fatalism and personal adaptation strategies. An important criticism in the literature 
is that retrospectively almost every aspect of the political context can be considered a(n) 
opportunity or threat (Koopmans, 1999). Addressing this shortcoming, I rely on citizens’ 











To sum up, it is expected that the problematization of different grievances (austerity vs. 
immigration), politicized by distinct political actors (anti-austerity vs. anti-immigrant parties and 
movements), within a diverse political opportunity structure (debtor vs. creditor, periphery vs. 
centre) in the two cases shaped citizen discourse about political strategies (see Figure 3.2). In 
Figure 3.2. A model for the analysis of citizen discourse about political strategies in the Greek and German 









































contrast to grievance and resource mobilization theories that prioritize one of these blocks and in 
line with the political process framework, the chapter argues that these processes – politicization 
of grievances, mobilization of actors and appropriation of opportunities – are activated and 
citizen agency transformed (cognitive liberation) for political action to emerge (Kriesi, 2014; 
McAdam et al., 2001). Alternatively, citizens are more likely to resort to the private realm and 
passivity. Contrary to static models measuring attitudes and behaviour intentions with pre-
defined questions and answer categories, the proposed analytical framework examines the social 
construction of political strategies in Greece and Germany through political talk (Schmitt-Beck & 
Lup, 2013). The latter is approached as a dynamic symbolic space where citizens interact with 
one another, constructing intersubjective meaning about crises and political strategies. In this 
sense, it is not the objective presence of grievances, mobilization and opportunity that will be 
analysed, but citizen discourse about these processes, with a focus on injustice, identity, agency, 
and alternatives (see Table 3.1).  
3.4. Social construction of political strategies 
 As argued in the previous chapter, political mobilization is facilitated by shared interpretative 
repertoires that serve specific functions: i) diagnostic (problem identification and responsibility 
attribution), ii) prognostic (suitable strategies to address the problem) and iii) motivational 
(legitimate reasons for engaging into action) (Benford & Snow, 2000); or what Gamson (1992) 
refers to as injustice, identity and agency (see Table 3.1). The diagnostic function defines a 
situation or the actions of an authority as unjust, and clearly identifies the sources of blame or 
responsibility for the problematic situation. Boundary formation between the political subjects 
fighting injustice and the actors seen as responsible for injustice (opponents) is crucial for the 
transformation of individual identities into politicized collective identities (Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001). The prognostic function involves the articulation of proposed solutions to 
the problem and the strategies to achieve it. The better the fit between diagnostic and prognostic 
functions, the greater the legitimacy and resonance of citizen action (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
The motivational function provides a “call to arms” for collective action, offering legitimate 
reasons for political engagement. In the event that citizens do not perceive a problematic situation 
as unjust, are unable to attribute responsibility to specific actors, fail to construct inclusive 
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collective identities that resonate with those involved and express legitimate reasons for action, 
they are unlikely to engage in politics. 
Table 3.1 presents the synthesis of the proposed political process framework (see Figure 
3.2) with the analytical strategy introduced by Saunders and colleagues (2020) – discourse about 
issues, discourse about supply, discourse about citizen action. My framework specializes in 
discourse about “crisis politics”, differentiates between supply and opportunity, and contributes 
“political alternatives” to the model. In particular, it examines political talk about the availability, 
feasibility and legitimacy of political strategies in the two cases. It focuses on the interplay 
between the issues that matter for citizens, the political actors considered available and legitimate 
to address those issues, and the constraints/opportunities in the political environment seen as 
obstructing or facilitating citizen action.  
 
 
Political strategies refer to citizens’ purposeful activities in the party and movement arena 
deemed as worthwhile to address these problems. The distinction between action by institutions, 
the general public, and the private individual is useful for the analysis of political strategies 
(Perrin, 2006; Saunders et al., 2020). Action by institutions involves expectations that public 
officials can adopt policies to tackle the problems in question, and may be evaluated according to 
their willingness and efficacy in pursuing these aims (White, 2011). Keeping a balanced budget, 
tackling unemployment and poverty, and investing in renewable resources are common 
examples. Collective action refers to citizen mobilization and coordination for a common cause 
Social construction of 
political strategies & 
Alternatives 









- Institutions                       
- Collective                           
- Individual                          
- Existing action 
repertoire vs. expansion 
- Issue (economy, immigration, 
democracy)                               
- Level (local, national, 
European, global)                     
- Specific vs. abstract locus of 
injustice & responsibility 
- Politicized collective 
identities                           
- Political subjects vs. 
opponents                         
- Existing vs. novel 
political actors 
- Active vs. passive 
citizenship          
- Efficacy vs. fatalism          
- Reformist vs. 
revolutionary motives 
Table 3.1. Social construction of political strategies in the Greek and German crises: Discourse 
about injustice, identity, agency and alternatives 
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in the party and movement arena (Klandermans, 2013). Formation of solidarity networks, 
electoral support of candidates, and organization of strikes and boycotts are typical collective 
action examples. Individual strategies, on the other hand, involve moves to avoid problems rather 
than a coordinated effort to resolve them (White, 2011). This approach supposes that certain 
issues can be addressed only by individual adaptation, such as self-development and individual 
mobility.  
In addition, the novelty of political strategies will be assessed. Critical junctures signify 
major episodes of institutional innovation at the micro (citizens), meso (organizations) and macro 
(institutions) levels of the polity. Studies indicate citizen disenchantment with the shortcomings 
of the (neo)liberal democratic model (Ferrín & Kriesi, 2016), third-way politics (Hobolt & Tilley, 
2016), post-democracy and political corruption (Della Porta, 2015). Do citizens discuss new ways 
of doing politics? Do they envision alternative democratic models? Chapters 4 and 6 discuss 
citizens’ proposed alternatives in Greece and Germany. 
3.5. Discourse about grievances: Injustice and blame attribution 
Discourse about grievances refers to political talk about those issues considered problematic and 
threatening to citizens’ well-being. When crises emerge, controversies regarding whom or what 
to blame frequently erupt among the citizenry, the media and politicians (Sommer et al., 2016). 
Literature suggests that political engagement is more likely when citizens are able to frame their 
situation as a social and political problem rather than a personal issue (Simon & Klandermans, 
2001). This includes identifying the source of injustice precisely. Whether it is the politicians, the 
EU, capitalism, citizens themselves, refugees or the markets deemed responsible for the crises, is 
consequential for political strategy. Instead, attributing responsibility to abstract forces such as 
“the system” or “life” may inspire a sense of fatalism and a retreat to the private sphere (Gamson, 
1992). Boin and t’Hart (2001) argue that the politics of crises are politics of blame avoidance. 
Incumbent governments are more likely to take credit for positive policies, while shifting blame 
to the opposition or other parties for negative outcomes, as to avoid electoral punishment (Lewis-
Beck & Stegmaier, 2007). The EU’s multilevel governance structure is suggested to facilitate 
blame avoidance strategies. Domestic politicians are more likely to assume responsibility for 
positive policy outcomes, while outsourcing blame for unpopular reforms to European 
institutions (Costa-Lobo & Lewis-Beck, 2012).  
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Blame avoidance is a common bias in social relations as it presents the speakers and their 
reference groups in a positive light (Kelley, 1973; Tajfel, 1982). However, it is not the only 
strategy. Politicians and citizens alike may take responsibility for a problematic situation out of 
fairness or honesty. On a practical level, identifying the locus of responsibility for a problematic 
situation is key for tackling the problem in the first place. Roose and colleagues (2017) examined 
blame attributions in the Greek and German media in the Eurozone crisis and indicated very few 
instances of blame avoidance in the two cases. My analysis, focusing on citizen discourse about 
the various crises that emerged in Greece and Germany in 2015-2017, paints a more complex 
picture. Processes of assuming responsibility and shifting blame were identified, the activation of 
which depended on the problem under discussion (economy, immigration, democracy), level of 
emergence (local, national, European, global) and multiple actors involved in the crisis 
management strategy (Troika, government, EU).  
3.6. Discourse about mobilization: Identity and boundary formation  
Discourse about mobilization is defined as citizens’ discussion about political organizations, 
which offer opportunities for political engagement to address grievances such as political parties, 
social movements and solidarity networks. Although distinct, political parties, social movements 
and civic associations are embedded in multi-organizational fields, sharing connections with each 
other that may be supportive or antagonistic (Klandermans, 2013; McAdam & Tarrow, 2010). 
With mainstream centrist parties seen as part of the problem (neoliberal convergence, post-
democracy, corruption), it is relevant to examine which political actors citizens perceive as 
available and legitimate to voice their demands. Discursive practices link individuals and groups 
ideologically, by constructing identities that range from collaborative to conflictual (Brubaker & 
Cooper, 2000). Research indicates that it is politicized collective and not individual identities that 
motivate citizens to engage into action (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Politicization of collective 
identities occurs when citizens consciously engage in power struggles on behalf of their group(s). 
It is a process that involves awareness of shared grievances, identification of opponent(s), and 
inclusion of the wider societal context or the general public in political conflict (Baka & 
Garyfallou, 2011).  
By holding people accountable for injustice, citizens engage in boundary formation 
between those included in the “subjects” category, the protagonists in a crisis situation and their 
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allies, and those “others” excluded from it, their opponents (Lamont & Molnár, 2002). The 
subjects are the social groups discussants construct for themselves and others as experiencing a 
similar predicament in a crisis situation. Allies are possible candidates for engaging in political 
action to fight injustice. On the other hand, lie the opponents. These are the actors who are 
explicitly blamed for the problematic situation, and whose behaviour is seen as contributing to 
the problem (White, 2011). By distinguishing between allies and opponents, citizens attempt to 
form broad alliances to maximize their power and influence in society. Studies show that 
constructing inclusive collective identities where diverse groups feel represented – voicing 
specific demands on which everyone agrees, pursuing strategies seen as legitimate and effective 
by the majority – is a challenging endeavour (Saunders, 2008).  
3.7. Discourse about opportunity: Agency and motive 
Discourse about opportunity and agency refers to citizens’ evaluations of organizations, 
institutions and events in the wider societal context that facilitate political engagement. The 
project approaches structure and agency as dialectically interrelated (Bourdieu, 1989; Sewel, 
1992). On the one hand, structures are “sets of chronically reproduced, deeply sedimented rules, 
resources and networks of relations that constrain and facilitate social action”. On the other, 
citizens are more or less “knowledgeable and skilled users of these rules, resources and networks 
of relations, so as to reproduce or challenge the social order” (Jessop, 2005: 45). In this sense, 
actors are constrained and enabled by their environment. They can use ideas and strategies to 
create and alter institutions by employing practices that legitimize institutional continuity or 
change (Schmidt, 2014). The proposed change can be radical or moderate. Radical social change 
indicates a revolutionary rupture and transformation of society. Moderate social change involves 
reformist, incremental policy action entrusted in politicians and representative institutions. The 
outcome of social change depends on broad alliances in society, strong social movements, 
support by institutional actors and political momentum (McAdam et al., 2001; Tarrow, 2011). 
Critical junctures are periods when radical societal transformations can occur, with both 
democratizing and de-democratizing outcomes (Collier & Munck, 2017). 
According to political and discursive opportunity structure, opportunities and threats 
ought to be attributed and actively appropriated by political actors to foster mobilization (Gamson 
& Meyer, 1996; Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). In the event that citizens perceive no opportunities 
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of influencing the political system either due to diminished efficacy or system irresponsiveness, 
part of the citizenry may radicalize their strategies in the party and movement arena, while others 
will disengage (Garyfallou, 2020). Greece and Germany provide exemplary cases where system 
irresponsiveness and politicians’ disregard for popular sentiment triggered polarization of 
political attitudes and radicalization of political strategies, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
To recap, the chapter proposes a novel theoretical framework for the analysis of citizen 
discourse about the availability, efficacy and legitimacy of political strategies in Greece and 
Germany. As argued, the way crises are discussed in the two cases introduces specific common 
problems citizens wish to address (discourse about grievances, injustice); brings in particular 
political actors citizens identify with to address those issues (discourse about mobilization, 
identity); and opens up certain possibilities for their remedy while closing down others (discourse 
about opportunity, agency). The following section presents the findings of the research project. 
Chapter 4, employing survey data, outlines the broad political patterns in Greek and German 
politics and establishes connections with the focus groups. Chapters 5 and 6 dive into citizen 
discourse about crises and political strategies, and propose explanatory mechanisms for the 

















Chapter 4. Perceptions of crises, evaluations of political institutions and democratic quality, 
political strategies and democratic alternatives in Greece and Germany.                   
Evidence from the POLPART survey. 
The empirical analysis begins with the POLPART survey aiming to establish the broader 
generalizable picture in Greek and German politics. The chapter examines the salient issues that 
trigger crisis perceptions in society, citizen self-reported engagement in movement and party 
politics, and plausible alternatives to the post-democratic crisis of representation. The survey 
analysis provides the basis for the more complex focus group examination. Survey research 
offers a representative yet descriptive view of citizens’ attitudes towards politics, because it fails 
to shed light onto their own ideas and meaning-making processes when discussing politics 
(Saunders & Klandermans, 2020). Focus groups, on the other hand, offer a comprehensive 
approach to citizens’ motivations and justifications for these attitudes, but they are not 
representative of the general population as only a limited number of sessions can be conducted 
and analysed (Kruger & Casey, 2014). The two methods are considered complementary in this 
project, since they offer insights onto structures and processes in the two cases that neither 
method alone could provide (Denzin, 2010). General statistics (means, measures of association) 
about broader political patterns are coupled with brief segments of focus group interpretative 
repertoires, to highlight the overlap between the two methods. In Chapters 5 and 6, I establish 
explanatory mechanisms for citizens’ crisis perceptions and selection of political strategies in 
further detail. 
As the project’s centre of attention is on citizen discourse about lived experience with 
crisis politics, I use survey data to test the broader commonality and applicability of the focus 
group findings – a quality of quantitative research that is not normally assured in this way. 
Employing survey data from a representative sample collected in 2017, the chapter addresses the 
following questions: Which issues trigger crisis perceptions in the two cases? How do Greek and 
German citizens evaluate politicians and institutions, and how satisfied are they with democracy 
as it currently functions in the country and Europe? Which political strategies in the movement 
and party arenas do they engage in and how do they evaluate alternatives to the post-democratic 
crisis of representation? Overall, to what extent does the survey analysis resonate with the focus 
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group examination? What are the implications for the interpretation of findings (quantitative and 
qualitative), their broader commonality and applicability?  
The chapter starts with citizens’ ranking of the most important issues in society, followed 
by economic and income satisfaction, assessment of immigration, trust in political institutions 
and evaluations of democratic quality. It continues with a summary of citizens’ political 
strategies in the party and movement arenas, followed by specifics on voting behaviour, protest 
politics and civic engagement. Attitudes towards democratic alternatives will be discussed last.  
4.1. Crisis perceptions  
4.1.1. Most important issues in society  
Citizens in Greece and Germany were asked to select the three most important issues in society 
from the list in Table 4.1. As the table shows, by far the most important issues in 2017 in Greece 
were austerity-related such as unemployment, poverty and taxation. 64%, 40% and 40% of Greek 
respondents respectively answered that these issues were most crucial in contrast to 11%, 25% 
and 12% of German respondents. Healthcare (30%), immigration (24%) and corruption (23%) 
score also high among the Greeks (in contrast to 13%, 48% and 6% among the Germans) related 
to the financial, immigration and political crises discussed in the focus groups.  
Table 4.1. Most important issues in Greece and Germany10 
Most important Issues in society Greece Germany 
Unemployment 64% 11% 
Poverty 40% 25% 
Taxation 40% 12% 
Healthcare 30% 13% 
Immigration 24% 48% 
Corruption 23% 6% 
Education  20% 26% 
Political system 19% 11% 
Inflation 13% 20% 
 
10 The significance tests can be found in Table A4.1, Appendix. 
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Pensions 10% 26% 
Crime 9% 20% 
Environment 3% 24% 
Housing 2% 15% 
Terrorism 1% 36% 
Gender Inequality  1% 5% 
 (N=1120) (N=1110) 
 
During the same period, Germany’s most problematic issues related to immigration and 
terrorism. 48% and 36% of German respondents referred to those issues as most important in 
society compared to 24% and 1% of Greek respondents. Concerns over social security such as 
education (26%), pensions (26%) and poverty (25%) score high too among the Germans 
(compared to 20%, 10% and 40% among the Greeks), indicating that economic grievances were 
present, yet not as politicized as cultural threats. Environmental issues (24%) were also visible in 
Germany (in contrast to 3% in Greece) reflecting the significant legacy of the Green movement 
and possibly coinciding with the onset of yet another crisis – climate change.  
Therefore, an environment of multiple threats is reflected in the survey data. However, the 
predominant issues triggering crisis perceptions differ in the two cases, namely, the economy and 
politics in Greece, immigration and politics in Germany. Focus group participants in Greece 
portrayed the generalized, multiple crises and their psychological effects on the population as 
“national depression”. As a result of austerity measures and budget cuts, citizens lack basic 
welfare provision in education, healthcare, housing and employment, filling them with insecurity 
and fear for the future. 
Stamatis: Ok apart from the financial problem, there is sadness, depression I’d call it. 
Vivi: Yes, we see it also with the rise in drug addiction in the country.  
Vivi: Also, in the healthcare sector, there’s a serious lack of medicine and doctors in the hospitals. 
Athanasia: Education is also underfunded  
Makis: Basically, we start with the economy, and we discuss each public sector, because they all depend on 
the economy.                          (Greece, 26-40HE) 
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In Germany on the other hand, focus group participants discussed the “refugee crisis” and 
the issue of “integration” as threats that triggered serious concerns and fear for the future. 
Participants seemed overwhelmed by an “invasion of foreigners” – “they are too many” they said 
repeatedly, after Chancellor Merkel announced that the country will receive 1.5 million refugees 
in 2015.  
Jennifer: At the moment I think it’s the breeding ground for everything terrible, because people are working 
with fear on all sides. I must honestly say that I’m a bit afraid of the near future. 
Sascha: And detailed information is missing. So it's nice that Mrs Merkel stands up and says: We can do it, 
without offering any solutions… And we already had foreigners [in the past], that includes my background, 
and a lot went wrong. Now we're starting over again and we have the opportunity to do it right this time, 
but no there’s no way.       (Germany, 41-60LE) 
In both countries, crises trigger politics of fear. Participants portray an environment of major 
material and symbolic threats. In Greece, crisis perceptions have mainly a material basis of 
“survival”, whereas in Germany they relate to post-material threats to “life quality”. These threats 
trigger crisis perceptions to the extent that a majority of citizens feels affected, while politicians 
seem unable to tackle these issues effectively. 
4.1.2. Economic situation and income satisfaction 
Indicative of the severity of the financial crisis in Greece, dramatic differences emerged when 
citizens were asked about their financial situation (see Table 4.2), personal and country specific, 
in the last and next 12 months. The default choice for the majority of Greek respondents was “it 
is/will be worse”, whereas for most German respondents was “it is/will be the same”. Lack of 
hope for the future marks its presence in Greece, while stability is expected in Germany. 
Table 4.2. Evaluations of economic situation in Greece and Germany 
Economic situation (1=better, 2=same, 3=worse) Greece Germany 
Last 12 months, country’s economy  74% (worse) 48% (same) 
Next 12 months, country’s economy 64% (worse) 53% (same) 
Last 12 months, personal financial situ 68% (worse) 50% (same) 
Next 12 months, personal financial situ 51% (worse) 51% (same) 




In line with “economic situation” evaluations, income satisfaction (see Table 4.3) 
followed a similar pattern in the two cases. In Germany 38% of respondents reported living 
comfortably, 35% coping and only 12% expressed difficulty with current income. Contrary, in 
Greece 42% of respondents appeared to be in a difficult situation and 24% expressed extreme 
difficulty in making ends meet, while only 29% appeared to be coping with current income. That 
is, 66% of Greek participants in the sample reported that they are struggling to get by with 
current income compared to 19% of German participants. On the other hand, whereas 46% of the 
Germans reported living comfortably with current income, only 6% of the Greeks reported the 
same. Self-reported unemployment rate in the sample was 24% in Greece and 5% in Germany, 
while minimum wage reached 700 euros in Greece compared to 1500 euros in Germany (OECD). 
Greek focus group participants suggested that in reality wages are even lower, with exploitation 
and underemployment becoming the norm. 
Table 4.3. Income satisfaction in Greece and Germany 
Income satisfaction (1=not all, 5=very much) Greece Germany 
Living very comfortably  1% 8% 
Living comfortably 5% 38% 
Coping  29% 35% 
Difficult 42% 12% 
Very difficult 24% 7% 
X2 (1,2230) = 339.34, p<.001 (N=1120) (N=1110) 
 
Statistics are in line with the focus groups. In Greece, discussants introduced a particular 
interpretative repertoire, “mode of survival”, to narrate their precarious financial situation, 
personal and country-specific. Every time the Greek government signs a bailout agreement with 
the European partners (three MoUs by 2015), citizens become poorer due to extended wage and 
pension cuts as well as tax increases being conditional to signing these agreements. Austerity was 
described as “forced poverty” imposed on the population by corrupt and irresponsible politicians. 
Mihalis: What I am saying is that when you earned 1500euros it wasn’t a matter of sustenance, but of life 
quality – well now that you end up getting 500euros and you’re in danger to go to 400euros, you don’t have 
life quality anymore. When one doesn’t have food to eat, really, I don’t think they care, they get into 
survival mode.        (Greece, 18-25HE) 
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Contrary, German discussants acknowledged their powerful position in Europe and wealth 
in the country. They narrated threats to “life quality” and to Germany’s leading role in the world 
economy, but did not construct a crisis per se. 
Konstantin: I believe a little bit us Germans, now, we are doing well insofar as we have something to eat, 
we have something to drink, we drive a car, we have a mobile phone, why should we change anything? 
Many people think so, they don't have serious problems...   (Germany, 41-60LE) 
In times of crisis German focus group participants raised concerns with keeping up their 
good performance. They introduced a notion of relative deprivation. Compared to southern 
Europeans their economic evaluations were optimistic. In comparison to Scandinavian citizens or 
past times, however, they felt they lagged behind. Participants in both countries were fond of the 
Scandinavian social democratic model, which in their view offered all citizens a basic level of 
economic and social security. 
4.1.3. Evaluations of immigration 
Immigration was evaluated negatively in both countries, as average scores were below the 
midpoint (5.5) of the 11-point evaluative scale. In Greece the effects of immigration on the 
economy, cultural life and life quality were rated roughly 0.8 lower than Germany, possibly due 
to the ongoing recession. Greek citizens lost 25% of their GDP since the onset of the financial 
crisis in 2010. This finding is in line with Eurobarometer longitudinal data indicating that the 
Greeks score lower on support for globalization and immigration compared to the Germans due 
to the country’s modest economy, and limited experience with mass immigration and 
multiculturalism (Triandafyllidou, 2020). In the focus groups, whereas German participants 
problematized the issue of immigration, Greek participants discussed the problem of emigration, 
especially for the youth.  








For the economy 4,1 (2,8) 5,0 (2,7) t(2228) = 8.52, p=.002 
For cultural life 4,1 (2,9) 4,9 (2,9) t(2228) = 7.17, p=.006  
For the country in general  3,6 (2,7) 4,4 (2,8) t(2228) = 7.07, p=.001 
 (N=1120) (N=1110)  
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Immigration and the refugee crisis were perceived as serious international problems in 
both countries. In Greece immigration was discussed as contributing to the financial and political 
crises, since focus group participants acknowledged that refugees target more stable and wealthy 
economies to settle with their families. There was a tendency to “identify with the weak” as 
participants perceived themselves to be powerless in Europe. They felt disproportionally affected 
by the refugee crisis located at the southern border of Europe.  
Vivi: Yet Greece has a very specific role in the European Union, because we receive refugees, and this has 
to do with Europe’s interests. So, the situation in the country becomes even more complicated.  
Makis: But they don’t want to stay here, they only see it as a passage.  
Vivi: Yes, but how easy is it for them to leave Greece? 
Makis: Not at all since other countries have closed their borders… and they don’t care what happens to 
them or us, they are like “[since] you are there, you’ll receive them now”. (Greece, 26-40HE) 
In Germany focus group participants described the refugee crisis as triggering the crisis 
situation when Chancellor Merkel announced that the country will receive 1.5 million refugees 
without considering public opinion on the matter. Discussants appeared sympathetic to refugees’ 
troubled life stories. However, they felt threatened by a potential “cultural clash” between the 
locals and the foreigners, expressing fears of political and religious radicalization. They also 
indicated their annoyance at not being asked about this important political decision that would 
affect future generations.  
Doris: Yes, you can't do anything yourself, you're not even asked. Merkel says: we can do it, the question is 
though, do we want it? So many people think they don't want it.  
Armin: I think you’re absolutely right. I personally think it's ruining our country. We can't make it. 1.5 
million, it’s madness! I have nothing against foreigners, but they are too many. And we are not responsible 
for the Syrian civil war either, there must be an end somewhere.  (Germany, 26-40LE) 
Based on the survey data we would expect more xenophobia and negative views towards 
refugees expressed in Greece compared to Germany. This would be in line with studies 
suggesting that Greece is a relatively intolerant society, because it lacks the institutional 
framework for migrant integration compared to advanced European democracies (Galariotis et 
al., 2017). However, the focus groups indicate otherwise. Processes of responsibility attribution 
for the problematic situation and mechanisms of identification and othering play a significant role 




4.1.4. Trust in political institutions and evaluations of democratic quality 
Moving on to indicators of political crisis in the two countries, Greek and German participants’ 
trust in politicians and institutions (see Table 4.5) was poorly rated, well below the mid-point 
(3.0) of the 5-point scale, with the exception of German courts (3.1) and police (3.4). Political 
trust in Greece was evaluated on average one point lower than Germany. Politicians and parties 
(Greece: 1.4, 1.4 and Germany: 2.4, 2.2) received the lowest scores in both countries followed by 
the government (1.6 vs. 2.6 respectively), the media (1.7 vs. 2.6) and banks/corporations (1.9 vs. 
2.4). Political trust in the European Parliament is similarly low (2.1 vs. 2.5). This pattern is 
generally supported by Eurobarometer longitudinal data. The Greeks tend to trust the European 
parliament (2.1) more than the country’s parliament and government (1.6, 1.6 respectively), with 
domestic politicians considered corrupt and responsible for the financial and political meltdown. 
In Germany the opposite pattern appears. Citizens traditionally report higher trust in the country’s 
parliament (2.7) and federal government (2.6) than the European Parliament (2.5). However, 
these differences have become marginal also in Germany (0.1), indicating a crisis of political 
trust at the national and European level.  
Table 4.5. Political trust in Greece and Germany 
Political trust 






European parliament 2,1 (1,0) 2,5 (1,1) t(2228) = 10.10, p=.03 
The government  1,6 (0,9) 2,6 (1,1) t(2228) = 27.29, p<.001 
The parliament 1,6 (0,9) 2,7 (1,1) t(2228) = 26.77, p<.001 
Local council 2,1 (1,0) 2,9 (1,0) t(2228) = 20.23, p=.009  
Courts 2,6 (1,1) 3,1 (1,1) t(2228) = 12.31, p<.001 
Trade unions 1,9 (1,0) 2,9 (1,0) t(2228) = 25.19, p<.001  
Police 2,7 (1,1) 3,4 (1,0) t(2228) = 17.15, p=.004 
Politicians  1,4 (0,7) 2,2 (1,0) t(2228) = 26.18, p<.001 
Political parties 1,4 (0,7) 2,4 (1,0) t(2228) = 28.40, p<.001 
Banks/corporations 1,9 (0,9) 2,4 (1,0) t(2228) = 13.75, p<.001 
Media 1,7 (0,8) 2,6 (1,0) t(2228) = 25.32, p<.001 
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 (N=1120) (N=1110)  
 
Although the crises in Greece and Germany were triggered by different issues (the 
economy and immigration respectively), the political crisis of democratic representation 
underlying these crises, was portrayed in surprisingly similar ways. Focus group participants 
introduced particular interpretative repertoires, “puppets of the economy” and “money-oriented 
politics”, to describe the close relationship between politicians and business interests (post-
democracy, Crouch, 2004). A common repertoire referred to politicians being too far away from 
the “little people”, yet very close to “moneyed interests”.  
Liza: Great disappointment. Not only with politics in Greece, but also in Europe. I grew up with the word 
“austerity” since I was a kid. I’m getting old and I hear this word again, it’s imposed on me to live in 
austerity. And this austerity is worse than the austerity I encountered when I was a kid. In the 1950s and 
1960s there were the poor and the rich. So, some people thought that the poor shouldn’t become middle 
class, there’s no need. Hence, I don’t believe politicians. Nobody. I don’t believe that any of them loves 
their country so much as to improve the situation.     (Greece, 61+LE) 
Konrad: The question is, where do they live, what do they eat, where do they move, what are they afraid of? 
I refer to all topics now, TTIP is just an example. I think the federal government is trapped in lobbyists’ 
associations; I don't want to say now puppets of the economy but this is the direction.  
Ingrid: You notice that when someone from the political life loses his/her post in the Bundestag or is retired, 
they somehow end up in the economy, as advisors or something.  (Germany, 41-60HE) 
Overall, satisfaction with the way democracy functions in the country was low. In 
Germany (5.0) scores reached almost the mid-point of the 11-point scale in a country that is 
generally considered a mature democracy and only slightly affected by the crises. In Greece, as 
expected, scores were extremely low (2.6). 
Table 4.6. Satisfaction with democracy in Greece and Germany 
Democratic satisfaction 






    
 2,6 (2,3) 5,0 (2,5) t(2228) = 25.72, p<.001 
 (N=1120) (N=1110)  
 
Specific assessments of democratic quality are presented in Table 4.7. The scale includes 
four items for satisfaction with liberal democracy (free and fair elections, parties’ representative 
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function, free media, rule of law), one item for satisfaction with social democracy (protection 
against poverty) and two items for satisfaction with participatory and direct democracy (public 
deliberative meetings and referenda). Democratic evaluations refer to the assessment of these 
qualities as they currently function in the country. Democratic aspirations indicate the importance 
of these qualities as normative ideals for a well-functioning democracy. The notion of democratic 
deficit refers to the discrepancy between citizens’ aspirations of democracy and actual application 
in real life (Ferrín & Kriesi, 2016; Norris, 2011). The democratic deficit score is calculated by 
subtracting democratic aspirations from democratic evaluations.  
Table 4.7. Evaluations of democratic quality and democratic deficit in Greece and Germany11 
Democratic quality   (0=not 















 Greece   Germany   
Free and fair elections 6,0 (2,9)  8,9 (1,9) -2,9 7,2 (2,6) 8,2 (2,1) -1,0 
Media are free to criticize the 
government  
4,3 (3,1) 8,4 (2,3) -3,9 7,1 (2,5) 8,2 (2,1) -1,1 
Political parties offer 
alternatives 
3,4 (2,6) 8,0 (2,3)  -4,6 5,3 (2,3) 6,9 (2,1) -1,6 
Courts treat everyone the same 2,8 (2,8) 9,1 (1,8)  -6,3 5,5 (2,8) 8,4 (2,1) -2,9 
Citizens voting in referenda 2,5 (2,8) 8,0 (2,3) -5,5 3,8 (3,0) 7,3 (2,3) -3,5 
Government protects citizens 
against poverty 
2,0 (2,4) 9,0 (1,8) -7,0 4,4 (2,8) 7,8 (2,2) -3,4 
Citizens can participate in 
public meetings 
2,3 (2,4) 8,0 (2,2) -5,7 5,8 (2,7) 7,8 (2,1) -2,0 
 (N=1120)   (N=1110)   
 
Democratic evaluations were very low in Greece and low in Germany. Even the minimum 
of liberal democratic requirements such as equality before the law (Greece: 2.8, Germany: 5.5), 
parties’ representative function (3.4 vs. 5.3 respectively) and competitive elections (6.0 vs. 7.2) 
were rated poorly in the two cases. Scores were even lower when citizens were asked about social 
and participatory democratic elements, like poverty reduction (Greece: 2.0 vs. Germany: 4.4) and 
 
11 The significance tests can be found in Table A4.7, Appendix. 
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organization of referenda on important political decisions (2.5 vs. 3.8). All items on democratic 
aspirations were rated higher in Greece than Germany, indicating possibly an idealized notion of 
democracy in the former vis-à-vis a more pragmatic conceptualization in the latter (Colvin & 
Taplin, 2015; Held, 2006). It could also be that the legitimacy crisis is so dire in Greece that 
participants underline the importance of these prerequisites for a healthy democracy. Democratic 
aspirations rated highest in Greece were equality before the law (9.1 out of 10), poverty 
protection (9.0) and free and fair elections (8.9); whereas in Germany were equality before the 
law (8.4 out of 10), free media (8.2), and free and fair elections (8.2).  
The lowest scoring democratic evaluations in Greece emerged in poverty protection (2.0 
out of 10), public deliberative meetings (2.3), participation in referenda (2.5) and equality before 
the law (2.8). In Germany they appeared in participation in referenda (3.8 out of 10), poverty 
protection (4.4), parties’ representative function (5.3) and equality before the law (5.5). The 
recurrent focus on poverty protection in Greece highlights the extent of the financial crisis. 
Poverty protection emerged as an important issue also in Germany, while calls for justice and 
equality were present in both countries. The crisis of representation marked its presence, with 
inclusion of citizens’ preferences in the political arena via parties, referenda and public 
deliberative meetings scoring lowest among democratic evaluations in both cases. 
The difference in evaluations of democratic quality between the two countries is roughly 
two to three points on a 11-point scale, which is telling of the democratic deficit reported in 
Greece. The democratic deficit scale indicated negative performance scores between three and 
seven points in Greece, while one and three fifty in Germany. These rates mirror the focus group 
data, suggesting “major delegitimization” of the political system in Greece. The two mainstream 
labour and conservative parties that governed the country for 35 years were portrayed as 
“traitors” with their involvement in the Eurozone statistics scandal. Practices of “corruption and 
clientelism” were condemned for causing democratic degeneration. Focus group participants 
were also dissatisfied with European democracy. SYRIZA’s U-turn on austerity made them 
believe that “foreign powers” control the political system. 
Anna: I believe that not even these people govern Greece, everything comes from higher levels. PM Tsipras 
[prime minister at the time and leader of SYRIZA] organized the referendum, I really believed in him, even 
though I didn’t vote for him. He triggered hope. Definitely they didn’t let him follow the NO vote [61.3% 
voted NO to more austerity]. 
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Vivi: Yes, he had a problem 
Anna: Neither Greece has the final word, nor political leaders   (Greece, 26-40HE) 
Focus group participants in Germany expressed also dissatisfaction with federal and 
European democracy, arguing that they were “disproportionally burdened” with the crises in 
Europe. Contrary to Greece, where the political crisis emerged already in 2010, Germany was 
entering a political crisis in 2015. Severe criticism was directed towards the political class for 
mismanaging the Eurozone (bailouts) and refugee crises, while falling short of alternatives 
among political parties (crisis of representation). Its surviving status in the financial crisis may 
have prevented a generalized crisis of legitimacy. 
Susanne: So, I'm going to vote, but I feel so shaken every time, because in principle it’s always the same in 
power anyway, it's always about the two, the SPD and the CDU. So, I think whether I vote now or not, the 
result is almost always identical, with a few deviations.  
Anton: In foreign policy, most of them in the case of Greece, with the refugees, are now in agreement, the 
Greens, FDP, SPD and CDU they all agree.     (Germany, 26-40HE) 
 The financial, refugee and political crises, their characteristics and consequences, will be 
elaborated further in Chapter 5. 
4.2. Political strategies  
4.2.1. Political strategies in the party and movement arena 
According to the critical juncture literature, crises are periods of intense political mobilization 
triggered by the severity of threats – material, symbolic and political – to citizens’ wellbeing and 
life quality. Therefore, as regards political strategies, Greek and German respondents appeared 
overall active in politics. In contrast to mainstream theories of political participation (post-
materialism and resource mobilization theories, Inglehart, 1997; McCarty & Zald, 1977) and in 
line with critical juncture literature (Della Porta, 2015; Roberts, 2015), the Greeks reported 
higher engagement in politics (10%-20%) than the Germans (see Table 4.8), in an attempt to alter 
their desperate situation (more grievances and threats, less resources and opportunities). This is 
the case when asked about political participation ‘ever’ as well as ‘in the past 12 months’. It is 
important to point out that the ‘ever’ data includes popular mobilizations during the anti-austerity 
contentious cycle (2011) and the long summer of migration (2015). The ‘last 12 months’ 
coincided with the German federal elections (2017).  
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Indicative of the intensity of mobilization in Greece, focus group participants reflected 
explicitly on the possibility of “revolution” (nothing to lose strategy). On the other hand, in line 
with the culture of moderation in Germany after experiences with radicalism in the past, 
participants discussed “reform” and distanced themselves from radical social change to retain 
their strong position in Europe (much to lose strategy).  
Manos: My opinion is that we are trying to change something which is overall wrong. With small 
alterations the situation does not change, there needs to be a revolutionary/fundamental change of the 
system. I think we rely on a value system that has been imposed on us.    (Greece, 26-40LE) 
Alexander: I believe it simply takes a certain amount of suffering to get out of your comfort zone, and many 
people [in Germany] don't have that pain, they're fine, they have a secure job. For example, if I don't kill 
anyone, I will be able to work until retirement, I earn well, I don't have to get involved.             
         (Germany, 41-60HE) 
Back to the survey data, the largest differences in the use of political strategies in the two 
countries (see Table 4.8) appeared in voting in national (‘last 12 months – ever’ Greece: 78%-
84%  vs. Germany: 65%-71%) and European elections (GR: 62%-63% vs. DE: 46%-50%); 
participating in referenda (GR: 14%-75% vs. DE: 8%-30%); boycotting (GR: 38%-51% vs. DE: 
20%-29%); demonstrating (GR: 19%-45% vs. DE: 6%-19%) and striking (GR: 16%-32% vs. DE: 
2%-11%), with half or more than half of Greek respondents reporting political engagement. As 
the Greek focus groups indicated, these differences were driven by participation in massive 
strikes before signing the first MoU in 2010, the anti-austerity Indignant movement in 2011, 
electoral punishment of mainstream parties and reward of challengers in the 2012, 2014 
(European) and 2015 elections, and the referendum on EU/austerity in 2015.  
Table 4.8. Political strategies in the movement and party arena in Greece and Germany12 
Political strategies Ever Last 12 
months 
Efficacy      
(1-5 scale) 
Mean (SD) 
Ever Last 12 
months 
Efficacy   
(1-5 scale) 
Mean (SD) 
 Greece   Germany   
Vote 84% 78% 3,2 (1,4) 71% 65% 3,4 (1,2) 
Referenda 75% 14% 2,8 (1,4) 30% 8% 3,4 (1,2) 
EU vote 63% 62% 3,1 (1,4) 50% 46% 3,1 (1,2) 
Boycott 51% 38% 2,9 (1,4) 29% 20% 2,9 (1,3) 
 
12 The significance tests can be found in Table A4.8, Appendix. 
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Demonstration 45% 19% 2,6 (1,3) 19% 6% 2,7 (1,2) 
Petition 40% 20% 2,7 (1,2) 47% 23% 3,1 (1,2) 
Strike 32% 16% 2,8 (1,3) 11% 2% 2,6 (1,2) 
Social media   22%    14%   1,1 (1,2)     12%      7%   1,2(1,1) 
Town hall meeting 20% 9% 2,5 (1,3) 15% 6% 2,9 (1,2) 
Contacting 15% 7% 2,0 (1,1) 12% 5% 2,4 (1,2) 
 (N=1120)   (N=1110)   
 
On the other hand, political action in Germany reached moderate levels. Voting 
(‘12months – ever’: 65%-71%), petitioning (23%-47%), boycotting (20%-29%) and participation 
in state referenda (8%-30%) featured as common strategies among German respondents, aiming 
at addressing particular issues instead of the political system as a whole. The popular anti-TTIP 
petition and demonstration, refugee welcoming initiatives, PEGIDA protests, the Tempelhof and 
Waterworks13 referenda were examples of political mobilization participants referred to in the 
focus groups. Contacting politicians in both countries (‘last 12 months – ever’ Greece: 7%-15%, 
Germany: 5%-12%) fared particularly low, signifying distance and distrust between citizens and 
politicians. Social media usage for political purposes was relatively low in both countries (GR: 
14%-22% vs. DE: 7%-12%), while striking in Germany (2%-11%) seems to be a relatively rare 
strategy compared to Greece (16%-32%).  
On the efficacy of political strategies, the Germans appeared slightly more confident that 
political action can have an impact in society than the Greeks, especially about voting (Germany: 
3.4 vs. Greece: 3.2), referenda (3.4 vs. 2.8) and petitioning (3.1 vs. 2.7). Political consumerism 
and boycotting (2.9) featured prominently in both cases and emerged as a common strategy in the 
focus groups. Social media usage was evaluated as relatively ineffective (1.2 for the Germans, 
1.1 for the Greeks). However, the differences between the two countries are marginal (0.1 to 0.4) 
and scores are close or below the mid-point of the 5-point scale (3.0), which indicates a certain 
scepticism that citizen action may actually be effective. Lack of responsiveness to citizens’ 
 
13 Transformation of former airport into recreational space and re-municipalitization of water provision previously 
owned by private companies. 
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demands and the increasing gap between politicians and the citizenry may explain this finding, as 
will be discussed in the focus group analysis. 
4.2.2. Vote intentions and election results 
Regarding vote intentions in the next elections (see Table 4.9), mainstream centre-left and centre-
right parties were losing ground, while challenger parties on the left and the right were winning 
votes in both countries. In Greece the once dominant labour party PASOK collapsed (and 
rebranded itself as KINAL) after its involvement in the Eurozone statistics scandal. The radical 
left party SYRIZA took its place in the 2012 and 2015 elections winning vote majority; yet it lost 
popular support after the U-turn on the EU/austerity referendum in 2015. The mainstream 
conservative party New Democracy lost voters with its involvement in the Eurozone statistics 
scandal, while challengers on the far right (Golden Dawn) attracted part of its electorate.  
Likewise, the mainstream conservative and labour parties in Germany were counting 
losses due to their grand coalitions (GroCo) and similar political positions in the financial and 
refugee crises. The centre-left labour SPD lost support for adopting neoliberal austerity policies 
in 2002-2005 and forming grand coalitions with the centre-right conservative CDU. The latter 
dissatisfied its electorate with the bailout agreements in 2010-2015 and the liberal refugee policy 
in 2015. The radical right (AfD), the Greens (Die Grünen) and the radical left (Die Linke) were 
gaining votes in our sample, which indicates that processes of polarization and radicalization 
were emerging also in Germany.  
Table 4.9. Vote intentions in Greece and Germany 
Vote intentions (Greece)   (Germany)  
New Democracy 13% CDU/CSU 19% 
SYRIZA 9% SPD 15% 
Golden Dawn 7% Die Linke 10% 
KKE 5% AfD 9% 
KINAL (ex-PASOK) 3% Die Grünen  7% 
Union of Centrists 2% FDP 6% 
IDK 26% (13% blank) IDK 14% (7% blank) 
(N=1120)  (N=1110)  
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Electoral dealignment and realignment in Germany was relatively moderate compared to 
Greece. Major restructuration of the Greek party system took place, with electoral punishment of 
mainstream parties and reward of challengers occurring already in the critical elections of 2012 
and 2015. Self-reported electoral volatility was particularly high in Greece as well as undecided 
and abstaining voters (roughly 45% compared to 25% in Germany) after SYRIZA’s U-turn on 
austerity. Elections were also scheduled far in advance in 2019. Focus group participants 
suggested that Greek citizens wanted “a real political change” with SYRIZA, a party that openly 
supported and engaged in anti-austerity mobilizations in 2010-2015. Yet, system irresponsiveness 
to citizens’ demands and the betrayal of the parliamentary left’s anti-austerity promises, led left-
leaning citizens to disappointment and disengagement, while right-wing sympathizers started 
mobilizing again. 
Ionas: I think there is disappointment now, because citizens tried their last chance with SYRIZA, people that 
didn’t want to react violently [to the crisis]. They wanted to act lawfully by the Constitution, in elections, 
and they decided they wanted a real change, and they lost. All this disappointment has numbed them now. 
[…] A whole society of active citizens is shocked as a matter of fact. Because it’s the very active citizens 
that turn to the centre-left and the left, these are the people that participate most in politics. 
Akis: There’s also activism on the other side, not only on the left. Because it’s activism, we just don’t agree 
with it.         (Greece, 41-60HE) 
In Germany focus group participants in 2015 were contemplating economic voting 
strategies, which they put into effect in the state (Länder) and 2017 federal elections. The country 
seems to be facing also a political crisis. Punishment of mainstream parties and reward of 
challengers was discussed as a first step for citizens to express their dissatisfaction with 
consensus centrist politics and the lack of alternative party positions on the crises after two grand 
coalitions in 2005 and 2013. German discussants expressed concern rather than approval over the 
rise of the radical right in the country. Yet, a common repertoire indicated that part of their 
demands with respect to relative control over immigration may be legitimate. 
Armin: It really needs a big bang, otherwise nothing happens. I wish in the next election that both people’s 
parties are punished, that they both get 15% so that they understand what’s going on, otherwise it will 
eventually end in civil war and chaos, it cannot go on like this. I wish that they both are punished. I hope, of 
course, that the (radical) right does not get more votes.  
Doris: But I think it's [elections] not enough, it needs to be more frequent, because at the moment there are 
many issues on which many people would like to express their opinion somehow.        (Germany, 41-60HE) 
Vote intentions in our sample are supported by actual election results (see Table 4.10). 
Naturally, the percentage of undecided and blank votes fell considerably in both countries. 
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Electoral turnout was very low in Greece (58%), where voting is compulsory, compared to 
Germany (76%), indicating an ongoing crisis of legitimacy.  
Table 4.10. Election results in Greece and Germany 
Election results (Greece, 2019)   (Germany, 2017)  
New Democracy 40% CDU/CSU 33% 
SYRIZA 32% SPD 21% 
KINAL (ex-PASOK) 8% AfD 13% 
KKE 5% FDP 11% 
Greek Solution 4% Die Linke 9% 
MeRA25 3,5% Die Grünen  9% 
Turnout      58% Turnout 76% 
 
In both countries, punishment of mainstream parties and reward of challengers is 
observed. Electoral punishment of labour parties is harsher than the conservatives due to the 
former’s neoliberal convergence. In the 2017 German elections, another fragile grand coalition 
between the mainstream parties CDU (33%) and SPD (21%) was formed, yet with both losing 
votes to challenger parties. The new radical right party AfD climbed to third place (13%), 
receiving the highest increase in votes in the German parliament. It was followed by the free 
market FDP (11%), the radical left Die Linke (9%) and the Greens Die Grünen (9%).  
In the 2019 Greek elections, left-wing SYRIZA (32%) lost to conservative New 
Democracy (40%) after disappointing its anti-austerity progressive electorate, but has replaced 
the once dominant labour PASOK (rebranded as KINAL) that only came third (8%). The far-
right party Golden Dawn collapsed under criminal investigations and was replaced by a new 
moderate nationalist party Greek Solution (4%). The Communist Party (KKE) remained stable at 
5%, while a new anti-austerity radical left party with European orientation, MeRA25/DiEM25 
(3.5%) entered the parliament. 
4.2.3. Participation in demonstrations 
In the movement arena (see Table 4.8), self-reported participation in demonstrations was 
moderate in Germany (6% last 12 months, 19% ever). Empowering experiences with the 
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environmental and anti-nuclear movement in the 1970s–1980s, and the Monday protests in 1989 
that brought the fall of the Berlin Wall were common examples of “the power of the people”. 
Participants suggested that engaging in demonstrations can be an effective strategy when 
politicians disregard citizen discontent and crucial issues are not addressed in the parliament, as 
was the case with the massive anti-TTIP demonstration and the PEGIDA protests.  
Doris: I’m not a member of PEGIDA or so, but there are many people who are afraid at the moment and 
some just overreact and shift completely to the right… And those that have good ideas about the TTIP and 
the like, I don’t know whether politicians really listen to their demands 
Ana: Well, I see that demonstrations serve to politicize people… and well, they don’t necessarily need to be 
directed at politicians, but at the broader [societal] context. They appear in the media and make sure that 
the topic gets big.        (Germany, 26-40LE) 
In Greece, participation in demonstrations (19% last 12 months – 45% ever) emerged as a 
relatively common practice. Social movement mobilization is related to successful outcomes 
(resistance, revolution) in the country’s political history. Common examples participants referred 
to were the Independence movement during the Turkish occupation, the Resistance movement in 
World War II, the overthrow of the military coup in 1974 by the Student movement, and the anti-
austerity Indignant movement in 2011.  
Giannis: Out of all the demonstrations I remember the only massive demonstration that scared politicians 
was the situation with the Indignant movement. That time everyone who looked at politicians would 
understand that they were all scared, all the political spectrum. 
Evaggelia: They [Indignant movement] were persistent and had duration. 
Despoina: Yes, it [the movement] changed the political landscape.  (Greece, 41-60LE) 
Focus group participants in Greece argued that the Indignant movement instituted social 
change from below that was later reflected in the party arena with the rise of the radical left party 
SYRIZA. Likewise, in Germany the mobilization of the PEGIDA movement coincided with the 
rise in support for the radical right party AfD. Yet, respondents in both countries expressed 
doubts about the efficacy of collective action in post-democratic times. They referred to the high 
costs associated with the strategy, especially police violence and citizen surveillance (see Table 
4.11). Greek and German scores on demonstration costs were very close, with more police 





Table 4.11. Costs for participating in demonstrations in Greece and Germany 
Demonstration Costs  
(1=not at all, 5=very much) 
Greece Germany  T-test Sig 
Problems at work 3,2 (1,3) 2,8 (1,1) t(2228) = -8.35, p<.001 
Family disapproval 2,5 (1,2) 2,6 (1,1) t(2228) = 1.68, p=.09 (ns) 
Police violence  3,7 (1,2) 3,2 (1,2) t(2228) = -11.10, p<.001 
Surveillance 3,3 (1,3) 3,3 (1,2) t(2228) = -1.52, p=.13 (ns) 
 (N=1120) (N=1110)  
 
4.2.4. Civic engagement  
Self-reported participation in voluntary associations – passive through donations and active 
engagement – was moderate in both countries. Greek respondents appear more active than their 
German counterparts in almost all organizations presented in Table 4.11, apart from religious 
organizations, trade unions and sports clubs. These differences are indicative of the extensive 
mobilization of solidarity networks in the financial and refugee crises in Greece, and the refugee 
crisis in Germany.  
Table 4.12. Participation in political and civic associations in Greece and Germany 
Organizational embeddedness 
(1=no member, 2=passive, 3=active) 
Greece  
(passive – active) 
Germany 
(passive – active) 
Chi square test Sig  
Trade union/professional org 16% - 6% 13% - 6% X2 (2,2230)=4.25, p=.12(ns) 
Political party  10% - 3% 7% - 3% X2 (2,2230)=6.60, p=.03 
Student association 8% - 3% 5% - 3% X2 (2,2230)=7.90, p=.02 
Church/religious org 8% - 4% 17% - 7% X2 (2,2230)=71.1, p<.001 
Sports club/leisure org 13% - 12% 13% - 18% X2 (2,2230)=21.6, p<.001 
Environmental/animal rights org 19% - 10% 14% - 4% X2 (2,2230)=55.60, p<.001 
Neighbourhood association 13% - 5% 7% - 4% X2 (2,2230)=28.20, p<.001 
Charity/human rights org 19% - 10% 14% - 3% X2 (2,2230)=71.0, p<.001 
Nationalistic/patriotic org 7% - 2% 4% - 2% X2 (2,2230)=15.3, p<.001 
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 (N=1120) (N=1110)  
 
Greek respondents reported higher participation (active + passive) in charity/human 
rights’ organizations (29% in Greece, 17% in Germany), environmental/animal rights’ 
organizations (29% vs. 18%), and neighbourhood associations (18% vs. 11% respectively). As 
discussed in the focus groups, alternative resilience networks emerged out of necessity to support 
increasing numbers of crisis-hit citizens, the poor and the homeless. With the refugee crisis, these 
networks extended their services to aid the needs of asylum seekers.  
Evaggelia: I want to stress that in Greece nowadays there are many groups [that help] and they are not 
only charities. They are voluntary associations that appear to do something specific but behind the scenes 
they do much more. [I know] because I participate in many of these. We also collect clothing and food for 
several communities.        (Greece, 26-40HE) 
German respondents appeared more active in religious organizations (24%) than Greek 
respondents (12%). This is not surprising since neighbourhood activities and charities are often 
organized by religious associations (e.g., Caritas). Other organizations respondents supported 
were charities/human rights (17%) and environmental/animal rights organizations (18%), 
indicative of the mobilization of environmental groups and “welcoming initiatives” for refugees. 
Focus group participants provided numerous examples of solidarity initiatives at the local level 
welcoming refugees and assisting with basic necessities and German bureaucracy, as the state 
appeared increasingly disorganized in accommodating their needs. 
Alexander: My dog trainer is totally committed [to the refugee issue]. The first days when the refugees came, 
she said: It cannot be that people have to stay out there, this is ridiculous. So, she went there, served tea and 
gave them blankets. She’s engaged personally and feels good about it. The only thing she sacrifices is time and 
maybe some money for fuel or something.      (Germany, 41-60HE) 
Examining the survey data, citizen engagement in voluntary associations seems modest. 
As will be shown in the focus group analysis, however, the emergence of solidarity networks was 
evaluated as rather significant in both countries and inspired citizens to get involved in politics.  
4.2.5. Democratic alternatives: Populism and political decision making 
In a period where politicians are perceived as being distant from ordinary citizens, yet very close 
to business interests, and liberal democracy appears to be in crisis, it is relevant to examine 
whether citizens explore alternative ways of doing politics. The focus group and survey data 
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indicated a certain preoccupation with further citizen inclusion in the political process in both 
countries. Nonetheless, politicians and representative democracy did not emerge completely 
delegitimized. Citizen inclusion in political decision-making was assigned a complementary role 
to that of politicians and experts, and had a corrective effect on the post-democratic crisis of 
representation.  
Table 4.13. Populist attitudes in Greece and Germany 
Populism  






Politicians talk too much and do very little   4,3 (0,8)   3,9 (0,9) t(2228) = -11.32, <.001 
Politicians should follow the will of the people 4,1 (0,8) 4,0 (0,8) t(2228) = -1.32, p=.09(ns) 
The people should make the decisions 3,6 (1,0) 3,6 (1,1) t(2228) = -1.12, p=.13(ns) 
Ordinary people can’t be trusted 2,6 (1,0) 2,9 (1,0) t(2228) = 5.62, p=.04 
 (N=1120) (N=1110)  
 
Starting with populist attitudes, the survey data do not indicate significant differences 
between the two publics, apart from one item referring to irresponsible governance, which was 
arguably higher in Greece (see Table 4.13). As a first step, respondents in both countries agree 
that politicians should find ways to follow the will of the people (4.1). They concede that 
politicians should take into consideration citizens’ views when taking important political 
decisions. Thus, Greek and German respondents seem to address the crisis of democratic 
representation in multilevel governance rather than express unconditional trust in the “pure will 
of the people” (3.6 in both countries). This finding is supported by the focus groups, where 
discussants in both countries expressed doubts about their compatriots’ accuracy of political 
knowledge and unbiased judgement to make binding political decisions. However, they 
welcomed further citizen inclusion in politics in an attempt to tackle the crisis of responsiveness 
by engaging in advisory referenda and public informative meetings on important issues. 
Anna: Citizens getting more involved in the decision-making process I think it's the best thing that can 
happen, because I've seen something similar in Switzerland. For every important political decision in the 
country, they ask the citizens. I think that would help a lot. 
Nikos: Especially if the media were organized in such a way so that knowledgeable and not paid people 
were able to provide information regarding the alternatives we’ll be voting on.    (Greece, 26-40HE) 
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Beatrix: Politics would not overwhelm people if politicians offered an opportunity to actively engage 
citizens, and not only with a cross on the ballot. Switzerland is now voting for Universal Basic Income at the 
end of the year… First and foremost, you need to make sure that it’s not too time-consuming and citizens 
won’t vote because they have to sacrifice their Sunday or holiday after a long work-week. So, we could also 
vote online, we’re so networked and have such an infrastructure that could make everything easier. 
         (Germany, Activists) 
This finding is in line with attitudes towards political decision-making (see Table 4.14). 
When asked who should make important political decisions, participants agreed with citizens 
participating in referenda (7.4 in Greece vs. 6.5 in Germany) and public meetings (6.7 vs. 6.2 
respectively). Experts’ providing “informed opinions” (6.8 in Greece vs. 6.2 in Germany), in 
contrast to “paid opinions” as proposed in the focus groups, was evaluated positively. Politicians 
came third (5.9 in Greece vs. 5.8 in Germany), while successful businessmen were not preferred 
in this domain, with ratings below the mid-point of the scale (4.1 in Greece vs. 3.2 in Germany).  
Table 4.14. Political decision-making in Greece and Germany 
Political decision-making 






Citizens with referenda 7,4 (2,4) 6,5 (2,4) t(2228) = -9.88, p<.001 
Experts 6,8 (2,5) 6,2 (2,3) t(2228) = -7.22, p<.001 
Citizens with public meetings 6,6 (2,6) 6,2 (2,2) t(2228) = -4.15, p<.001 
Citizens  6,5 (2,5) 6,1 (2,4) t(2228) = -5.15, p<.001 
Politicians 5,9 (2,6) 5,8 (2,3) t(2228) = -1.51, p=.13(ns) 
Successful businessmen 4,1 (2,9) 3,2 (2,7) t(2228) = -8.37, p<.001 
 (N=1120) (N=1110)  
 
Scores ranged between five and six on a 11-point scale, indicating ambivalence about who 
can make the right decisions in times of crisis. The relatively high score for Greek citizens 
participating in referenda (7.4) reflects disappointment with the disregarded outcome of the 
EU/austerity referendum as suggested in the focus groups. Overall, higher scores for citizen 
inclusion in decision-making in Greece (6.5 vs. 6.1) may be resonating with the “city-states” 
direct democratic tradition where popular sovereignty lies in the centre of governance as the term 
“demos+cracy” implies. German federalism provides relative political autonomy to the states 
(Länder) in line with the “city-states” democratic tradition, while taking into consideration the 
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issue of scale at different levels of the polity as the states are subjected to the powers of a 
centralized federal authority (Held, 2006).  
Moreover, respondents were rather supportive of further engagement in the political 
process, highlighting the growing gap between citizens and politicians. 87% of the Greeks and 
the Germans in the sample expressed willingness to participate regularly or occasionally in 
referenda about all or most important political decisions (see Table 4.15).  
Table 4.15. Frequency of referenda 
Referenda (how often?) Greece Germany  
Regularly on all important decisions 37% 38% 
Occasionally on most important decisions 50% 48% 
X2 (1,2230)=2.07, p=.56(ns) (N=1120) (N=1110) 
 
As stated in the focus groups, participants in both countries appeared cautious of the 
dangers of binding referenda for minority rights and unbiased, inclusive, and informed political 
decisions. They did not give “the people” blank checks.  
Vasilis: Citizens should participate more in politics and not only with voting or referenda, because the 
majority is not always right. If there was a referendum for example, on migrant rights or women and gay 
rights, I’d be very much afraid of the outcome in our perfect little society [Irony].        (Greece, Activists) 
Walter: So, I think, in Berlin it could work. [Referenda such as] Tempelhof is a good example, Waterworks 
is a good example, but now to vote on the refugees or the euro or the EU, I don’t think it could work, 
especially with the refugees, it’s certainly a vote that could go wrong, in my opinion.   (Germany, Activists) 
Once again, yet surprisingly, Greek and German participants seem to agree on the 
political crisis affecting their countries and the proposed alternatives for strengthening democracy 
as will be further explored in Chapters 5 and 6. 
4.4. Discussion 
The chapter presented the salient issues triggering crisis perceptions in Greece and Germany, 
citizens’ self-reported political strategies in the movement and party arena, and attitudes towards 
alternatives to the crisis of representation. These general patterns, representative of the Greek and 
German population, provide the basis for further analysis of citizen discourse about these 
processes, adding validity, depth and complexity to survey research. The survey analysis showed 
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that the most important issues in Greece were austerity-related such as poverty, unemployment 
and taxation. In Germany they referred to the refugee crisis, notably immigration, terrorism and 
social security. Evaluations of economic situation in the last and next 12 months and income 
satisfaction were extremely low in Greece and stable in Germany. Immigration in both countries 
was perceived as having negative consequences for the economy, cultural life and life quality, yet 
more so in Greece possibly due to the severity of the crises.  
The post-democratic crisis of representation marked its presence in Greek and German 
politics, and more severely, as expected, in Greece. Trust in political institutions was low in 
Germany and poor in Greece, below the midpoint of the evaluative scale in both countries, 
especially for key actors such as the government and parliament, politicians and political parties. 
Satisfaction with democracy was remarkably low in Greece and just on the midpoint of the scale 
in Germany, a widely considered advanced democracy. Specific democratic evaluations were 
very negative in Greece and quite negative in Germany; not only for social and participatory 
democratic aspects, but for the minimum of liberal democratic requirements like competitive 
elections, parties’ representative function of diverse interests in society, equality before the law 
and justice. European institutions were also criticized for exacerbating existing democratic 
deficits. Participants’ trust in the European parliament was below the midpoint of the scale in 
both countries.  
Regarding political strategies, Greek respondents reported higher levels of political 
engagement in the movement and party arenas compared to German respondents, especially for 
voting in national and European elections, participating in the EU/austerity referendum, 
demonstrating, striking and boycotting. German participants reported moderate levels of 
engagement, particularly for voting in national and European elections, petitioning and 
boycotting. Vote intentions in our sample were generally in line with the 2017 German and 2019 
Greek elections. Participants in both countries punished mainstream labour and conservative 
parties and rewarded challengers on the left and right of the political spectrum. In Germany 
where immigration was the crucial issue, voters favored mainly anti-immigrant challengers. In 
Greece with austerity being the main issue, voters rewarded predominantly anti-austerity 
challengers. Overall, vote intentions and actual election results indicate fragmentation of former 
dominant coalitions, with new and transformed political parties gaining ground.  
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Participation in demonstrations was evaluated as a relatively common yet costly strategy, 
with police violence and surveillance of protesters suggested as rather negative consequences in 
both cases. Engagement in civic associations was modest. Membership in human rights and 
environmental groups, trade unions, neighbourhood and religious associations were common 
examples. Regarding alternatives to the post-democratic crisis of representation, participants 
argued for correctives to representative liberal democracy in both countries. Further citizen 
inclusion in politics was proposed to have a complementary role to politicians and experts. 
Respondents suggested that politicians should take into account citizens’ views when deciding on 
important issues via advisory referenda, public deliberative meetings and opinion polls, and make 
use of experts and independent media to inform the public about alternative political positions.  
In conclusion, the significance of the focus groups becomes apparent when attempting to 
interpret the survey results and what the numerical differences may indicate in the two cases. 
Firstly, had I not conducted the focus group analysis, I would have missed the finding that the 
crises are perceived as multiple, multilevel and overlapping. The crises were triggered by 
different issues in the two countries, but they are comparable with respect to the underlying crisis 
of democratic representation, as I will show in Chapter 5. This is an advantage of the inductive 
analytical strategy I introduced in Chapters 2 and 3. Secondly, due to the unexpectedly low scores 
in political trust and evaluations of democratic quality, I may have concluded that people are 
ready to take back political power or that politicians are completely delegitimized, whereas this is 
not the case (even in Greece), as I will show in Chapter 6. Should the post-democratic crisis of 
representation continue, citizens may move to the front after experimenting with direct and 
participatory democracy (Indignant movement, Occupy) and alternative solidarity networks 
(refugees are welcome, solidarity economy). However, this consists a future empirical question.  
Thirdly, I would have been unable to assess the extent of legitimacy crisis and what a one 
or two-point difference in trust in institutions and democratic satisfaction may signify for politics 
in the two countries. Germany’s scores were also low, but the country was entering a political 
crisis in 2015, with punishment of mainstream parties suggested as a first step. In Greece several 
critical elections have taken place since 2010. Disappointment was directed to both mainstream 
and challenger parties for mismanaging the crises and being unable to follow citizens’ mandate, 
resulting in a generalized crisis of legitimacy. Finally, I would have been unable to examine 
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novel forms of political engagement such as grassroots solidarity networks and eventful 
demonstrations in the two cases that cannot be captured by the generality of survey items.  
On the other hand, the POLPART survey is a useful tool for assessing the commonality 
and applicability of the focus group findings. There can be many interesting interactions in the 
sessions and some topics may trigger more heated debate than others – is this due to the timing of 
the focus groups, the participants comprising them or their interaction? Due to the nature of focus 
group data, only a limited number of sessions can be conducted and analysed (Morgan, 1996). A 
careful, theoretically informed selection of participants and themes to be discussed, and non-
directive moderation leaving space to group discussion, can provide very rich data (Duchesne et 
al., 2013); not only about participants’ crisis perceptions and selection of political strategies, but 
more importantly, about the meaning-making mechanisms behind these processes. In this sense, 
focus group and survey data are complementary, and triangulation of findings is preferred to one 
source of information, since multiple sources increase the quality of inference and rigour of 
interpretation (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2006). That said, the next chapter shifts the focus of 














Chapter 5. Talking crises in Greece and Germany: Social construction, discursive 
performance and subject positioning. Evidence from the POLPART focus groups. 
The chapter examines the ways in which Greek and German focus group participants construct 
the crises in their societies (social construction), the performative function of these constructions 
(discursive performance) and the relationship between the two publics (subject positioning). It 
presents the inductive grounded theory analysis of 18 focus groups conducted in Athens and 
Berlin in Fall 2015. Just before the focus groups, citizens in both countries were denied their 
collective voice. In Greece, a left-wing government was elected on an anti-austerity mandate, and 
a referendum took place in July with 61.3% voting against austerity. In Germany a massive 
demonstration was held against the TTIP – 250.000 marched in Berlin – and the lack of 
transparency in the EU negotiations of the trade agreement. The refugee crisis was also at its peak 
with pro and anti-refugee actions taking place in both countries. The topics for discussion 
addressed the most important issues in society and what citizens can do about those issues, 
without referring to the crises or Greek-German relations explicitly. Notably, the crises featured 
prominently from the beginning in participants’ discourse, while the Greeks and the Germans 
were present in each and every of these crises. 
  Sociological literature suggests a state of multiple crises taking place since the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008 (Bauman & Bordoni, 2014; Castells, 2017). Yet, citizen discourse on 
these problem-areas is a hiatus in the field. Instead of defining the crises a priori, I analyse 
political talk to examine how citizens construct and define them in their own terms. Political talk 
is a specific type of social interaction where two or more people engage in exchanges of meaning 
with reference to politics (Schmitt-Beck & Lup, 2013). During the session participants engage in 
a debate about the meaning of the social world, which is not objectively ‘out there’, but is 
collectively constructed and reconstructed through and during the discussion. The analysis of 
political talk offers an opportunity to observe processes of collective sense-making and provides a 
glimpse of the public debate on the issue (Duchesne et al., 2013; Stanley, 2014). The aim of 
analysis is to present the diverse lines of argumentation and illustrate the main interpretative 
repertoires – the culturally familiar ways of speaking used to characterize and evaluate social 
phenomena – that emerge across focus groups when participants discursively construct crises in 
the two cases (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
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The chapter addresses the following questions: Firstly, with respect to social construction, 
Graf & Jarausch (2017) point out that crises dramatize a perceived threat to an institutionalized 
pattern of action. Which threat(s) do participants refer to and around which issues do they 
emerge? Are they perceived at the local, national, European or international level? Are they 
similar or different? Secondly, regarding discursive performance, what do participants 
accomplish with their discursive constructions of crises? Since crisis constructions are essentially 
narrations of failure (Hay, 1996), who do participants hold responsible for these problems? 
Which explanatory arguments do they present as self-evident and which ones do they silence as 
irrelevant, and why? Thirdly, with respect to subject positioning, as crisis constructions are 
intimately related to perceptions of history, political culture and shared collective identities 
(Stråth & Wodak, 2009), how do participants in the two countries position one another – as 
allies or opponents in Europe? What type of stereotypes are emerging? What kind of Europe is 
constructed? The chapter consists of three parts introducing the comparative analysis of social 
construction, discursive performance and subject positioning, followed by a general discussion of 
the findings in the two cases.  
5.0. Social construction of the Greek and German crises: Economy, refugees and politics 
It is surprising that although the focus groups were conducted in the same period (October–
December 2015), participants in the two countries portrayed the crises in very different ways. 
While in Greece “the crisis” was discussed as a serious economic crash that triggered a political 
crisis, in Germany it was portrayed as an intimidating refugee crisis that also generated a major 
political crisis. The post-democratic crisis of representation underlying the financial and refugee 
crises was narrated in very similar ways and appeared focal in participants’ discourse. To go one 
step further, it is to the extent that politicians were seen as unable to tackle economic and socio-
political threats over a critical period of time, and represent citizens’ interests in political decision 
making that transformed these threats into crises. 
Furthermore, even though participants started the discussion with country specifics of the 
crises, they quickly introduced a European and international dimension. The financial crisis in 
Greece may be the outcome of economic mismanagement, yet it was seen as part of the American 
and European capitalist crash. The refugee crisis may have affected Germany predominantly due 
to its powerful position in Europe, nonetheless it was perceived as part of conflicts in the Middle 
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East and climate change. The post-democratic crisis of representation was related to political 
corruption and lobbying; yet also to globalization and the proliferation of international 
governance institutions such as the EU and NATO.  
Thus, participants introduce a multilevel structure when discussing the crises, highlighting 
the national and European dimension depending on the issue under scrutiny. The financial crisis 
in Greece was described as taking place primarily at the national level, while in Germany it was 
perceived as the problem of countries in the European periphery. Participants in Germany 
discussed the refugee crisis as affecting them disproportionally at the national level, whereas in 
Greece they underlined the European dimension of the issue. The post-democratic crisis of 
representation was portrayed as taking place simultaneously at the national and European level, 
and narrated vey equivalently by both the Greeks and the Germans. 
I will now proceed with evidence from the focus groups. Participants discussed several 
issues triggering concerns among the citizenry, but these can be categorized more broadly into 
the financial, refugee and political crises. Each section begins with the case that was most 
affected by the crisis under discussion. 
5.1. The financial crisis 
5.1.1. Social construction: Mode of survival in Greece, hamster wheel in Germany 
The financial crisis was predominantly problematized in Greece as it placed large segments of the 
population at risk of poverty and precarity. During the 2010-2015 bailout period, the country’s 
GDP dropped 25%. Wages and pensions were halved in most cases, while commodity prices 
remained high; poverty and unemployment escalated, the latter reaching 50% among the youth; 
layoffs in the public sector and closure of small business were common; welfare benefits were 
slashed; public healthcare and education was dismantled (Karyotis & Gerodimos, 2015). The 
intensity and severity of the crisis is portrayed by the themes discussed: pauperization and 
precarity; lack of social security; unemployment, work exploitation and flexibility; depression, 
homelessness, drug abuse and suicides; emigration and brain drain. Contrary, participants in 
Germany acknowledged the resilient state of the economy at home, especially in comparison to 
southern European countries. Participants expressed concerns about life quality due to the 
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recession, but did not construct a financial crisis per se. When discussing the financial crisis, they 
would refer to the “Greek crisis”, affecting them indirectly due to the bailout agreements.  
In 2015 with Greece still in recession, the crisis was defined as a process of continuous 
pauperization for the majority of the population, filling participants with uncertainty, insecurity 
and fear for further reductions in life quality. Participants introduced a particular interpretative 
repertoire, “mode of survival”, to refer to the process of gradually becoming poorer every time 
the Greek government signs a MoU with the Troika of lenders [EC, ECB, IMF].  
Mihalis: What I’m saying is that when you earned 1500 euros and they cut it down to 1000 or 1200 euros, 
you went out to protest. Now that from 1500 euros you end up getting 500 euros and you’re in danger to go 
to 400 euros you don’t protest, because you’re genuinely afraid that you’ll lose even the 400 and you’ll 
really have nothing. What I’m saying is that when you were at 1500 euros it wasn’t a matter of sustenance, 
but of life quality – well now, you don’t have life quality anymore. There’s a big majority that is either 
unemployed or under-employed or whatever, and from receiving 1000+ euros pensions, now they’ve 
reached 700euros etc. These people who have lost so much, normally now that they’re in danger of losing 
even more (with the 3rd MoU), rationally speaking, if they were protesting in the first phase (1st MoU), now 
in the third phase (3rd MoU), people should go crazy, crazy! 
Giorgos: Why aren’t people going crazy? 
Mihalis: They aren’t because simply, this is what I’m saying, people have become passive. To go out in the 
streets and do what? Lose even the few things I have? […] When one doesn’t have food to eat, really, I 
don’t think they care, they get into survival mode. And it’s not individualism, it’s not indifference, it’s like if 
I don’t do what I’m doing now, which is perceived as individualism and indifference, I have nothing to eat. 
Hence, there’s an issue, why should I change [something], since till something changes, I’ll be dead, if I 
have nothing to eat.       (Greece, 18-25HE) 
In this mode of survival, Greek participants are mainly preoccupied with their individual 
sustenance instead of overthrowing the regime, because they lack basic resources such as food, 
money or accommodation. With the first austerity package citizens in Greece had to learn to live 
with less. Yet, as they suggest, there is a threshold below which people have no life quality 
anymore. Instead, they stress constantly to make ends meet, preoccupied with survival and basic 
material needs. Participants concede that this threshold has been surpassed. In this excerpt 
participants intuitively discuss the relationship between grievances and political mobilization. A 
certain level of grievances is necessary for people to get out of their comfort zone. Yet too many 
grievances may lead citizens to disengagement due to fear for their survival. Thus, grievances are 
necessary for mobilization, but a certain level of resources is required. 
This mode of survival emerged also behaviourally. Participants in five out of the nine 
discussions in Greece (26-40HE, 26-40LE, 41-60HE, 41-60LE, 61+LE) expressed great 
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discomfort at being unemployed already when introducing themselves and in one case asked 
explicitly for reassurance to receive the participation fee. As a result of austerity policies and 
budget cuts, participants lack basic welfare provision in education, healthcare, housing, and 
employment. In the following excerpt participants describe a state of generalized and multiple 
crises taking place in Greek society and its psychological effects on the population. 
Stamatis: Ok apart from the financial problem, there’s sadness, depression I’d call it. 
Athanasia: Yes, pessimism 
Aggeliki: There’s a term for this, national depression. I remember watching a documentary about Argentina 
after 2001. They conducted a survey to examine how much cases of depression and heart attacks increased 
during the crisis and they had gone up by 70%. 
Vivi: Yes, this is what we see with the rise in drug addiction in our country. I don’t know the statistics 
exactly, but based on what I see out in the streets, I see young kids, 25 years or younger, totally wasted. So 
yes, I believe that there has definitely been an increase in drug addiction. 
Aggeliki: Yesterday I was reading about the EU prevention strategy for depression and suicides, and it said 
that every nine minutes a European citizen commits suicide, I found that socking. 
Vivi: Also, in the healthcare sector, there’s serious lack of medicine and doctors in the hospitals. The 
situation is very, very serious. And doctors now get a reduced salary… there will definitely be a decrease in 
quality eventually, plus they’re missing medical supplies. 
Athanasia: Education is also underfunded. 
Anna: Indeed, education is terribly underfunded. 
Makis: Basically, we start with the economy, and we discuss each public sector, because they all depend on 
the economy. 
Vivi: It’s also a crisis of values. The next generation will be super individualistic and cynical due to the 
crisis. People will care only for themselves and their survival. 
Stamatis: Yes, I see the individualism and dehumanization that you mention, but I think there’s also a 
parallel movement, that of solidarity, charity, however you may call it. It’s an attempt, since we cannot rely 
on politicians anymore, we’ll do some small things to help each other.   (Greece, 26-40HE) 
Participants in Greece associate the mode of survival they experience with lack of social 
welfare, unemployment, sadness, pessimism, (national) depression, homelessness, drug abuse and 
suicides. Aggeliki (26-40HE) brings the example of the financial crisis in Argentina to 
substantiate their argumentation and contextualize the effects of the crisis in Greece. Participants 
suggest a state of multiple crises taking place. It is an economic crisis, but also a political crisis; a 
crisis of values, as well as a crisis of Europe. Although participants are positioned both on the left 
and right of the political spectrum, they reach consensus with their narrations of crisis severity. 
The financial crisis triggered individualism and survivalism, as indicated in the previous excerpt. 
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Yet, it also brought citizens together in solidarity, because they cannot rely on politicians and the 
state anymore to provide a basic level of social security.  
References to sadness, depression, suicides and violence increasing with the financial 
crisis were unique to the Greek case (Arapoglou & Gounis, 2015). One participant (41-60HE) 
even shared his experience with suicidal thoughts, when, fired at age 55, he could not find a job 
at this age and provide for his family. Unemployment does not only affect young people, but also 
older groups due to layoffs in the public sector and closure of businesses. Unemployment, 
austerity and lack of social security are perceived as systemic violence, that is either expressed 
inwards as depression, or outwards as violence against others. Participants referred also to the 
“new homeless”. People who used to have a “normal life” – a job, a home and a family – but 
made the “mistake” of getting a loan, starting a family or business just before the crisis hit. 
Liza: These homeless were once very respectable people, they had jobs and businesses. I’ve seen people that 
used to own shops and found themselves homeless, very respectable people. So, we shouldn’t talk about 
them like they were homeless, because you don’t know who these people were… they weren’t born homeless 
the crisis made them homeless, neither were they lazy. 
Kyriakos: Yes, like I don’t know these people? They worked somewhere, the business closed down, the end. 
Within 24 hours all bad can happen. 
Kiki: And there are suicides in my circle. 
Liza: There are more than 10.000 suicides.     (Greece, 61+ LE) 
Participants present stories of how “respectable people” can end up being homeless. 
Stories that they did not only hear in the media but also “know from their circle of friends and 
family” (Liza, 61+LE). In this dire situation, young people feel that they have no future, without 
prospects of finishing their studies, finding a meaningful job, or starting a family. Even parenting 
discussants suggested that it is better for their children to emigrate because “they cannot live in 
their own country” (Kiki, 61+LE). 
On the other hand, discussing the financial crisis participants in Germany differentiated 
between the resilient state of the economy at home and the Greek crisis [Griechenlandkrise]. 
Participants reached consensus that the level of prosperity in the country was satisfactory, 
especially in comparison to southern European countries. With regards to the “Greek crisis”, 
discussants described time and again a fundamental sense of injustice – that of having played by 
the rules, but paid repeatedly for other people’s irresponsibility. Although critical repertoires 
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highlighted the role of the banking sector, participants in Germany overall described the “Greek 
crisis” as a “homemade” problem of corruption, tax evasion, lack of productivity, laid-back 
culture and early retirement (see subject positioning in the FC).  
Regarding the state of the economy in Germany, participants acknowledged the country’s 
powerful position. Nonetheless, in times of crisis, they raised concerns with keeping up their 
good performance.  
Konstantin: I think that a little bit us Germans, I’ll say now, we are doing well, insofar we have something 
to eat, we have something to drink, we drive a car, we have a mobile phone, why should I change anything? 
Many people think so, they don't have serious problems... 
Christine: Are we really doing that well? 
Jennifer: We have a basic level of social security. 
Christine: Well, you just have to look around Köpernick, there are now ten people who live under the 
station. 
Konstantin: Sure ok, but as I said before in the introduction, I really like to travel, and I like to travel to 
 southern European countries. When I see the situation over there, then [I think that] we're doing well. 
 They’re extremely poor.        (Germany, 41-60LE) 
Participants introduce a notion of relative deprivation. Germany is doing well, but not 
great. They were concerned with budget cuts in social services (Hartz IV reforms), increase in 
poverty and homelessness, employment flexibility and precarity, difficulty in family formation 
and child rearing, inflation, rising prices in the housing market and gentrification, imbalance 
between working hours, wages and citizens’ purchasing power after the introduction of the euro 
(26-40LE). Compared to southern Europeans, participants in Germany suggested they were 
relatively well off, but in comparison to past times or Scandinavia’s “social system”, they felt 
they lagged behind. 
Reinhardt: We're doing well in Europe, not only in the EU, we are by far the best, there's not so much 
distance between old and recent times. 
Hugo: The Swedes are doing best. The best social system. 
Doris: They still have that. 
Ursula: But inflation, economic performance, also what you work for and what you earn. Berlin is 
extremely affected by this… 
Hugo: People work stupid hours and they can no longer afford their apartment. With two incomes, if you 
have kids, you are poor. 
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Ursula: And that, I find it actually frightening [the fact] that you can no longer afford the luxury of having 
children. So, with two children you're poor, that's frightening. Thus, you probably need immigration, 
because the Germans cannot afford having kids anymore, because they don’t earn enough, yes. 
Reinhardt: With 1.100 or 1.300 (euros).     (Germany, 61+HE) 
Concerns with raising a family and paying the bills were common themes in Germany. 
Wages appear triple those in Greece (450 euros). German participants may not experience the 
“mode of survival” Greek participants referred to, but they introduced their own interpretative 
repertoire, “the hamster wheel” [Hamsterrad], to describe a stressful individualistic lifestyle that 
leaves them with no time to think out of their bubble and engage in public affairs. Working non-
stop, taking care of the family, paying the bills, too many worries and too little time. In the words 
of Doris (26-40LE): “I think a lot of people are busy with their everyday lives, they have children, 
they have to take care of their home. Some people may not have the convenience, and maybe they 
don’t have the time either, because they’re in their hamster wheel, doing other things”. Yet, 
participants overall reached consensus that the level of prosperity in Germany was satisfactory.  
Alexander: I believe that it simply takes a certain amount of suffering to get out of your comfort zone and 
 become active, and many people don't have that pain, they're fine, they have a secure job. For instance, if I 
 don't kill anyone, I’ll be able to do my job until retirement, yes, I earn well, I don't have to get involved, I 
can really do without. But I also find it annoying when people say I don't even want to talk about it, I'm not 
interested, I don't watch the news, I don't read the newspaper, I don't give a shit about anything. I always 
think, where do you live, in such a vacuum? So, you live in society and it’s run by politics, it concerns you 
after all. Nope, they just say nope, it doesn't concern me…  
Konrad: Yes, I think they’re trapped in their daily lives, in their personal problems. The ones I see now they 
say I don’t understand net neutrality and refugees are shit because they take away our jobs. Then comments 
emerge like, but have you seen anyone like that in your life? Have you been to a refugee home before? No. 
They have children, I don't know, or they’re single parenting and that's their focus in life, yes. How do I 
raise my kids, how do I avoid getting depressed, there’s simply no time and intellect [to think about 
politics].        (Germany, 41-60HE) 
The absence of “a certain amount of suffering”, the hamster wheel of everyday life, and 
widespread political disenchantment is seemingly triggering individualism and passivity instead 
of communitarian sentiments and engagement. Participants perceive that the problems of others 
“don’t concern them directly” (Suzanne, 26-40HE). Instead, they are preoccupied with own 
worries. Contrary to the Greek case (too many grievances), participants in Germany underline 
that a certain amount of suffering is needed for people to engage in political action. Too many 
resources may lead to disengagement.  
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All in all, with regard to the economy it is participants in Greece that construct a state of 
generalized crisis at the national level. The intensity and severity of the financial crisis is 
exemplified by the use of notions relating to life and death. Greek politicians are seen as 
imposing poverty on citizens instead of representing their interests. Participants in Germany 
portray a resilient economy, but also express concerns over budget cuts, employment conditions 
and life quality. The financial crisis is perceived mainly as a matter of Greece and other southern 
European countries that “behaved irresponsibly”. 
5.1.2. Discursive performance: Global capitalist crash in Greece, Greek particularity in 
Germany 
Participants in Greece would avoid the “Greek particularity” argument that the economy was 
traditionally in bad shape. They instead underlined the claim that the financial crisis was 
triggered by the American and European capitalist crash in 2008 and 2010 respectively. They 
scrutinized the choice of austerity as crisis management strategy, while silencing the “fairness 
and equality” argument with respect to the Eurozone criteria and the compliance of other 
countries to the rules. Left wing participants portrayed austerity as a neoliberal scheme and 
punishment mechanism so that citizens, not only in the country but the rest of Europe, know that 
“There Is No Alternative” (TINA doctrine). Right-wing participants would suggest that there is 
an organized plan behind austerity to subordinate small nations to the “new world order” drafted 
by powerful nations. Hence, left-wing and right-wing participants in Greece portrayed austerity 
as a subordination strategy staged by powerful players, the markets and capitalists in the first 
case, dominating nations and cultures in the second.  
Olga: It was meant to happen this way. It was probably a political strategy, so that the Greek people seem 
to have spoken [with the EU referendum] and then punished because we cannot do otherwise. There’s no 
debt in my view, and in many others’. 
M: Why can’t we do otherwise? 
Olga: Because in papers we’re in debt, but basically, we’re the guinea pigs 6 years now, who have to be 
punished paradigmatically so that all peoples in Europe who want to do otherwise learn to act accordingly, 
this is what I believe. 
Eleni: Yes, there are specific interests in the region. 
Evaggelia: I never believed in this referendum. I knew from the beginning what was bound to happen. They 
have vested interests [in keeping the situation as it is]. He [PM Tsipras} pretended to give people a voice, 




Olga: Yes, there’s definitely a plan.  
Giannis: Who’s plan is it?  
Eleni: It’s the invisible world that pulls the strings.    (Greece, 41-60 LE) 
Not all participants in Greece were persuaded by SYRIZA’s proposed referendum on 
austerity. Some saw it as blame avoidance strategy. However, among supporters and non-
supporters of SYRIZA, the conclusion was the same: foreign powers control the political 
environment in the country. Participants often brought the example of Iceland to substantiate 
their claims that there is an alternative way of dealing with the crisis. 
Valantis: I can present an example of a country that rejected that political and economic propaganda [of 
austerity] and at the time being minimum wage is 1200 euros – minimum wage per month – but in Icelandic 
Corona. I talk about Iceland. The population is 300.000 and they decided for themselves, even without 
foreign exchange reserves to cover their expenditures.   (Greece, 26-40 LE) 
Takis: Like in Iceland, where citizens revised their constitution collectively after the crisis, and sent the 
bankers to jail first thing.        (Greece, 41-60 HE) 
As regards blame attributions, Greek politicians were widely seen as responsible for the 
financial collapse, since they have access to expert information on macro-economic performance. 
As Lena (activists) suggested, echoing many participants, “it’s impossible for ordinary citizens to 
know the specifics of the country’s GDP to debt ratio”. The EU and the Troika were also blamed 
for putting the burden on people’s shoulders, while hiding the root causes of the financial crisis, 
which in their view lay with the European and world economy.  
Participants in Germany referred to economic threats generated by budget cuts in social 
security, reduction in life quality, and economic pessimism, but did not construct a financial crisis 
per se. The financial crisis was related to the Greeks and other Europeans who did not follow the 
Eurozone rules. Participants would frame the financial crisis as a “Greek particularity” and 
blame, implicitly or explicitly, the Greeks for their profligate lifestyle. In this repertoire, the 
Greeks received funding multiple times for a problem that was seen as caused by their own 
irresponsible behaviour (tax evasion, corruption). Participants lacked understanding of the 
politics in another country and believed that solidarity was provided with the MoUs. They instead 
introduced a notion of relative deprivation to suggest that they also have problems. They argued 
that the economy is doing well but not great, and this is due to their responsibility and sacrifices. 
Igor: Italy doesn’t have a surplus, Spain doesn’t have a surplus either, they simply lived quite differently 
and they had a boom in construction or something, my mother lives in Spain. And it’s difficult to make 
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concessions to the Greeks. Then the Spaniards will say, ‘wait a minute, we need to save money, but they 
don’t have to’? Germany is simply somehow well positioned in Europe and the difficult thing is to project 
this on other countries… And it’s difficult, if other countries have wasted money and we balanced the 
budget, so to speak, in any case better than other countries, then it’s difficult to tell the German people ‘Yes, 
by the way, we need to pay for others, because they didn’t keep within budget as we did’. 
Armin: I don’t know what you mean, ‘keep within budget’? German public debt is by now at over two 
trillion, yesterday I [saw] something in the news. Only in the last four years funds for education have been 
cut by 40 percent due to administrative bloat. Germany is not doing well, [although] it’s always portrayed 
like it was. Eight million low-wage earners. There’s much talk instead of looking at the facts. 
Igor: Sure, so let’s put it like this: Germans, we are not doing badly, but of course we’re also not doing well 
either if you consider how many billions should be invested in infrastructure, education and schools, that 
children have to paint [their classrooms] themselves, because there’s no money available. Let me put it like 
this, probably there’s enough money available, but it’s just badly distributed. (Germany, 26-40LE) 
In this excerpt participants elaborate on the interpretative repertoire of injustice – that of 
playing by the rules yourself, but paying repeatedly for other people’s irresponsibility. In this 
repertoire Germany appears as “somehow well positioned” in Europe (Igor, 26-40LE), and this is 
due to citizens’ responsible behaviour. Greek citizens, as well as Italians and Spaniards, are 
portrayed as living beyond their means. The repertoire resonates with the cultural tradition of 
protestant work ethic and individual responsibility (e.g., the thrifty Swabian housewife) (Helms, 
Van Esch, & Crawford, 2019). In contrast to Greece, the topic of austerity or crises in capitalism 
is not problematized thoroughly in the discussions. Participants employ a mechanism of relative 
deprivation, “eight million low wage earners, 40% cuts in education”. This way they shield 
themselves from accusations of selfishness and unwillingness to share their good fortune with 
others. In times of crisis, German citizens also suffer from budget cuts and uncertainty.  
Therefore, with respect to blame attributions, German participants underlined the “Greek 
particularity” and “fairness and equality” argument while relativizing their dominant position in 
Europe. The influence of Germany on Greek politics was sometimes acknowledged, and mainly 
presented as economic assistance rather than economic and political subordination. Greeks were 
seen as responsible for their predicament, and the EU was also blamed for not identifying the 
underlying problems of corruption in the Greek economy.  
5.1.3. Subject positioning: The Greek underdog and the German responsible European 
Participants in Greece positioned themselves as the underdog in Europe, who is in this position 
due to unequal distribution of resources and power. They portrayed as allies predominantly 
citizens in the European periphery and the global South. Contrary, citizens in the European and 
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global North were seen as “others”, especially residents of wealthy and powerful nations. 
Germany was perceived to be waging an “economic war” against Greece and other peripheral 
countries. Discussants expressed a certain inferiority complex regarding notions of Europeanness 
and strong wealthy economies in the Northwest. They would self-stereotype themselves as being 
part of the “poor Balkans” instead of the “rich Europeans”, especially the French and the 
Germans. They argued that this inferiority/superiority positioning was reciprocal, because this is 
how the “rich Europeans” approached them in the Eurozone crisis, like they don’t belong to 
“civilized Europe”.  
Kiki: Does anybody ask why we have the Euro since our statistics were fake? We are a poor country. 
Lisa: We have nothing to do with Europe… 
Kiki: … with the organization of European countries. Look at France, or Germany. There’s no 
resemblance. We are an Eastern-Western mess... 
Lisa: … Balkans, like the foreigners call us, that we shouldn’t have entered (the Eurozone), because we are 
Balkans.  
Kiki: Exactly. So, we entered the Eurozone, we were proud, PM Simitis [former prime minister] was proud 
holding the Euro in his hand… how long did it last? 12 years, 13 years not even. 10 years. 
Kosmas: Well, they treat us like Balkans now.  
Kiki: Yes, but does anyone ask why we entered the Eurozone? Because everything started back then. 
Savvas: They wanted us in the Eurozone though. 
Liza: But they didn’t ask us if we wanted to join the currency union. 
Kiki: I don’t care what they wanted. How was the financial situation in our country? 
Kyriakos: There should have been a referendum which never happened. We changed currency and nothing 
happened. Tell me in which civilized country can something like that occur? (Greece, 61+ LE) 
This inferiority complex appears to be an integral component of the Greek national 
identity, balancing between Western and Eastern influences – “we are an Eastern-Western mess”. 
Participants could see this geographical positioning and mixed identity as a resource. However, 
they tend to perceive their Balkan roots as an indication of their deficit in economic, cultural and 
political development. Once again, the Europeans are portrayed as taking important decisions for 
them, without them, like with the Eurozone membership. As discussed already, the Icelanders 
were approached as allies and an example of political self-determination. They put corrupt 
bankers and politicians in jail and they collectively revised their constitution. Participants 
discussed also the Argentinian case as a similar environment in the South where bankers and 
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politicians attempted a financial coup against their people. Argentinians were perceived as 
courageous people that resisted the TINA doctrine, but suffered alike. 
On the other hand, German participants presented themselves as responsible, hard-
working Europeans, who keep a balanced budget and even assist others who have behaved 
“irresponsibly”. They take all the burden on their soldiers and place community before individual 
interests. The Germans are thus good Europeans. The Greeks and other Southerners (Italians, 
Spaniards in the discussions) were seen as relaxed and fun-loving, yet lazy and corrupt. The topic 
of early retirement in Greece triggered intense and recurring debates.  
Sascha: It’s a bit like raising children. I cannot just give them money and say, “here buy something to eat”, 
I have an educational mandate. And it’s almost the same, I cannot just give money to Greece and say 
‘protect the borders now, but how you do it doesn’t interest me as long as people don’t cross your border’. 
Jennifer: Yes, we’re talking about Greece again, but how can somebody address the issue of corruption in 
Greece, and Greece isn’t alone in this. I bet the ordinary German citizen wasn’t surprised to hear the news. 
Christine: Yes, but maybe us Germans appear a bit too naive here. So, I like going to Greece, I like the 
Greeks, and if you look at yourself, why are you there for? They have a certain cosiness, they have a 
completely different culture, they have a completely different temperament.  
Jennifer: They have a completely different social system.... So, if you talk about the EU, you also have to 
 talk about the social system and you have to ask yourself, why do people there retire at 42? And I miss that. 
Sascha: Yes, but it's quite ambivalent whether they really retire at 42. 
Jennifer: I only heard that from Greeks. 
Sascha: Yes, you’re right. But then you have to get straight to the point and ask: Why couldn’t we overcome 
ourselves and say: People, yes, you’re the inventors of the word “Europe”, I think it's great, and you also 
invented democracy. Yes, it's all quite fair, but take a few more years and then you're welcome to join us (in 
the Eurozone). But then the first mistake was made. Neither the Greek nor the German people could do 
anything about it. The decision was taken on another level, and it was wrong. It’s just as wrong to include 
countries like Romania and Bulgaria, because you know exactly what the problems there are.           
         (Germany, 41-60LE) 
Participants refer to the Greeks as kids that require supervision with financial issues, 
while the Germans appear as mature and responsible adults. They express frustration with the 
Greeks retiring earlier and receiving supposedly the same pension as German citizens. The 
politicization of the topic of retirement in the German discussions and the contrasting factual 
information provided indicates media influence. This confusion around retirement age – it used to 
be 57 and now it is 67 – is introduced to suggest that German citizens work harder than Greek 
citizens. Participants’ image of the latter is related to holiday images, and not to the deprivation 
and suffering triggered by the financial crisis. As shown in this excerpt, stereotypes, as 
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oversimplifications of diverse social groups and complex behaviour, contain a positive and a 
negative pole. Christine (41-60LE) introduces the positive characteristic of cosiness and 
hospitality, followed by Jennifer and Sascha underlying the negative aspects of laziness and 
trickiness. This negative description extends to characterize Greece’s political history and current 
predicament. Although the former is presented as important in the past (Europe, democracy), the 
latter is categorized as corrupt and problematic (Balkan). The repertoire of the EU as a distant 
post-democratic institution will be elaborated further in the refugee and political crises. 
Therefore, participants in Greece and Germany seem to agree that there are inferior and 
superior positionings of Europeanness in the financial crisis that trigger disunity and competition 
instead of alliance and solidarity. They introduce specific dividing lines between the north and 
the south, the west and the east, portraying a divided European environment.  
5.2 The refugee crisis 
5.2.1. Social construction: Foreign invasion in Germany, humanitarian crisis in Greece  
If the financial crisis and austerity was mainly politicized in Greece, in Germany it was the so-
called refugee crisis and particularly the question of integration and multiculturalism. The focus 
groups were conducted two months after Chancellor Merkel announced that the country will 
receive 1.5 million refugees, the largest quota in Europe, with the famous declaration, “We can 
do it!” [Wir schaffen das!] (Mushaben, 2017). In that speech, German citizens were portrayed as 
strong and resilient, having been through large migration flows in the past, and yet managing to 
pull through. However, participants in the focus groups were of another opinion. They repeatedly 
stated that this was a mistaken decision in times of crisis, which did not take into account public 
opinion and relative fatigue with multiculturalism (El-Tayeb, 2015). On the other hand, in 
Greece, the refugee crisis was portrayed as an international humanitarian crisis that presented 
another indication of solidarity deficit in Europe. Although it affected disproportionally a crisis-
hit country at the southern border of Europe, there was general consensus that refugees target 
Germany and other “wealthy” northern European countries as a safe haven where they can start 
over their lives.  
Indicative of its significance, in five out of the nine focus groups in Germany (18-25HE, 
26-40LE, 41-60LE, 41-60HE, 61+LE), participants referred to the refugee crisis at the beginning 
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of the discussion while introducing themselves (like their Greek counterparts in the financial 
crisis). Participants acknowledged the life-threatening conditions refugees face in their countries 
of origin (war, famine, totalitarian regimes). Yet, they expressed frustration at the large numbers 
to be received, portraying an environment of “foreign invasion” – “they are too many” they said 
repeatedly. They were annoyed by the chaotic, disorganized state response in accommodating 
them relying heavily on the responsibility of volunteers, and the fact that citizens’ compliance 
was taken for granted. It was the junction of the two, the large numbers of people and the lack of 
systematic long-term refugee policy, that was suggestive of the discursive crisis situation.  
Jennifer: At the moment I think it’s the breeding ground for everything terrible, because people are working 
with fear on all sides. I must honestly say that I’m a bit afraid of the near future. 
Sascha: And detailed information is missing. So, it's nice that Mrs Merkel stands up and says: We can do it. 
In an interview where the moderator did not dare to ask any questions or was previously briefed: Ask 
questions and you will never see this woman in front of you again, probably that was the message. But to 
stand up without offering any solutions, but simply say, we can’t do this and we can’t do that. And then I go 
abroad to talk to Mr. Erdogan, so that the refugees won’t come to us anymore. Yes, but what are you doing 
there? And it's honestly about that, we already had foreigners [in the past], and that includes my 
background, my grandparents were the first generation and a lot went wrong. Now we're starting over 
again and we have actually the possibility to do it right this time, but there’s no way. 
Jennifer: We're only looking for accommodation, we have a doghouse, but what takes place in there is 
insane. I don't want to spend two hours in that place. I haven’t experienced something so crazy, something 
so stupid.  
Konstantin: And the situation in the Tempelhof is the same, it’s inhumane. 
Jennifer: The situation cries out for violence; it cries out for aggression. 
Marko: And then there are eight, nine, ten people, in twenty square meters. 
Jennifer: Most traumatized people living under these circumstances.  (Germany, 41-60LE) 
Participants in Germany underline the lack of state provision and the inhumane conditions 
in the camps that refugees experience in an advanced democracy. They express fear and 
frustration at being silenced in this important political decision that will affect future generations. 
The refugee crisis was discussed as activating previous experiences with immigration in the 
1960s–1970s. Participants referred to the “large presence” of former Turkish “guest workers” and 
“Muslim” migrants in society. A common interpretative repertoire indicated that “Germans felt 
like foreigners in their own country”, especially in a multicultural city like Berlin. Particular 
neighbourhoods (Kreuzberg, Neukölln) were presented as ghettos, where people spoke foreign 
languages and did not conform with liberal German norms. Participants would argue that their 
objections are based on lived experience and not just opinion. In this excerpt Sascha (41-60LE) 
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addresses her own positionality as second-generation migrant to suggest that integration in the 
country of residence is necessary so that the formation of parallel societies is avoided. Overall, 
German discussants argued for a welcoming but realistic and responsible approach, which would 
treat refugees with respect and would avoid repeating “mistakes of the past”.  
The common theme around which the refugee crisis was constructed in Germany was 
integration, which triggered economic (job market, welfare state), cultural (religion, radicalism) 
and political (terrorism, authoritarianism) threats to participants’ well-being. Although 
discussants appeared sympathetic to refugees’ troubled life stories, they also perceived them as 
culturally distinct and potentially problematic if particular criteria were not set beforehand with a 
viable refugee policy. Their stances ranged from empathetic solidarity and compassion; to 
realpolitik approaches of relative control over immigration (less people based on specific 
language and education criteria); differentiation between refugees and economic migrants; to 
fears of lawlessness rising among unintegrated “foreigners”; implicit and explicit sentiments of 
Islamophobia and racism. The level of politicization of “Islam” and “cultural differences” in 
Germany was considerably higher than in Greece, where most attention was directed to 
“austerity” and “economic inequalities” in society and Europe. 
Igor: I’m annoyed at the moment with the media on the refugee issue, it’s everywhere. Not in the sense that 
the refugees annoy me, for God's sake, it’s clear that the people need help, they’re always welcome and also 
the solidarity. It’s just the way the whole thing is now being pursued by politicians. Everyone blames the 
other and nobody moves in the same direction, it’s a very difficult topic at the moment.  
Armin: I agree with you. I cannot hear the word refugees anymore; you see how the situation failed terribly. 
Above all, everything was foreseeable, but now they [politicians] pretend like they didn’t see it coming… 
M: Frustration and being annoyed 
Doris: Well, a lot of fear too, I have a colleague in my office who grew up in the GDR and he has the same 
feeling at the moment like when the East was decaying back then. He’s also gay and many people come 
from countries where there’s death penalty, and thus, everyone really has their individual fears. Everyone 
has different opinions because everyone has different experiences, and this is what makes it so difficult. 
Igor: Everyone has a different culture, of course, and a different opinion, and that’s ok. But I think that if 
you go to another country, then you have to adjust your behaviour accordingly. I cannot go to Turkey and 
behave however I want; I have to show respect… 
Armin: Of course, I also have such fears of cultural alienation. Where I live it’s desperation of humanity 
anyway. I only have to walk three meters in the street and it’s enough for me already. Berlin is so culturally 
overcrowded, especially Neukölln. 
Doris: Yes, I also live in Marienhof, Tempelhof. It’s too much in some areas… And yes, you can't do 
anything yourself, you're not even asked. Merkel says ‘we can do it’, the question is though: do we want it? 
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So many people think they don't want it. It’s not about whether we can make it, but whether we want this at 
all. Some say they want it, some say they don’t, and there’s simply no consensus, so you’re being silenced. 
Armin: I think you’re absolutely right. I personally think that it's ruining our country. We can't make it. 1.5 
million, it’s madness! I have nothing against foreigners, but they’re too many. And we are not responsible 
for the Syrian civil war either, there must be an end somewhere.    (Germany, 26-40LE) 
Participants in Germany expressed frustration with politicians’ handling of the refugee 
crisis and the “government-controlled media” on the issue. The liberal refugee policy that 
Chancellor Merkel endorsed went against the discursive opportunity structure on the issue 
(Engler, Bauer-Blaschkowski, & Zohlnhöfer, 2019). The centre-right CDU/CSU traditionally 
promoted a more conservative approach to immigration, and even prominent party members 
(e.g., Horst Seehofer) contested this policy. Moreover, Merkel’s address that multiculturalism has 
failed in 2010 was at odds with her humanitarian call in 2015. Although some were inspired, 
most participants engaged in an intense argumentation why overall “we cannot do it” – that is, 
integrate 1.5 million refugees. Fear and anxiety feature prominently in the discussions. Fears that 
Germany is moving backwards to its poor eastern European past (GDR). Fears that in times of 
crisis, fewer resources will have to split between locals and foreigners. Fears that LGTBQ+ 
citizens will experience sexism and discrimination. Fears that refugees come mainly from Islamic 
countries and will radicalize a secular society. Fears that ISIS fighters may be among them 
preparing terrorist attacks (see subject positioning in the RC). Participants also underlined what 
they perceive as “lack of European solidarity” on the issue, with countries like Germany being 
overburdened with people, while other Europeans (Luxemburg, Hungary, Poland, the UK in the 
discussions) turning a blind eye or even building fences to stop any people from coming in (see 
Political crisis at the European level p. 113).  
Critical repertoires in Germany pointed out the life-threatening conditions refugees face in 
their countries of origin. These participants mainly on the left, criticized the involvement of the 
Bundeswehr [arms industry] in conflicts in the Middle East, suggesting disengagement from the 
region and the end of warfare. The real cause of the refugee crisis for them was war and climate 
change. Contrary, right wing participants argued that the refugee issue was the outcome of 
“homemade problems” in these regions, referring to dictatorship, corruption and religious 
radicalization. They suggested that refugee camps should be built in these regions (e.g., Lebanon) 
instead of allowing people to come to Europe to avoid “cultural clashes” in the host societies.  
103 
 
On the other hand, participants in Greece referred to the refugee crisis briefly, as 
contributing to the financial and political collapse in the country, which was arguably the main 
topic of discussion. The refugee crisis was portrayed as an international humanitarian crisis 
stemming from conflicts in the Middle East and Western Imperialism (e.g., War on Terror). A 
common interpretative repertoire referred to the European management strategy as presenting 
another indication of incompetence in dealing with a severe crisis in a humane manner, hinting 
towards their austerity/forced pauperization treatment. The EU was largely perceived as 
prioritizing monetary values to solidarity and humanity. 
Athanasia: The refugee crisis is a huge issue lately. 
Aggeliki: I read that the UN has recorded the largest migration flows in years, almost 60 million people are 
currently on the move. It’s terrible what happened with the refugee crisis, and not only, also what happened 
with Greece and the [financial] crisis. The EU has adopted the most irrelevant and inhumane position all 
these years, so did the UN. I’m very disappointed with this situation, the refugee crisis I think was the last 
incident that made me believe that the EU cannot move forward in this form at the moment, and the UN in 
general doesn’t do much about anyone.     (Greece, 26-40HE) 
Participants in Greece suggested that the refugee crisis affects them disproportionally due 
to the country’s geographical location at the southern border of Europe. Yet, they acknowledged 
that refugees approach Greece as a passage on their way to security and stability in north-western 
Europe, because of the crisis-ridden environment in the country. Like their German counterparts, 
discussants underlined the lack of European unity and solidarity on the issue: countries shutting 
down their borders so that refugees cannot proceed to their destination, remaining stuck in first 
host countries due to the Dublin European Regulation.  
Vivi: Yet Greece has a very specific role in the European Union, because we receive refugees. So, the 
situation in the country becomes even more complicated. It’s not enough that the country has a weak 
economy and a legacy of civil war. We receive refugees and this has to do with Europe’s interests. 
Basically, Greece has become a bit like the sewer of Europe. 
Anna: Once again Germany said it will welcome the refugees but, in the end, we got them instead. 
Vivi: For years now, I hear that refugees want to reach Germany. That was always the motto. What’s really 
happening though – I don’t want to judge the refugees now, whether they have families in Germany or they 
want to work there – is that they got stuck in Greece, where I cannot find a job being Greek myself, you can 
imagine how difficult it’s for them. 
Makis: But they don’t want to stay here, they only see it as passage. 
Vivi: Yes, but how easy is it for them to leave Greece? 
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Makis: Not at all since other countries have closed their borders… and they don’t care what happens to 
them or us, they are like “[since] you’re there, you’ll receive them now, [and] you’ll find out what to do 
with them”. 
Stamatis: What many people don’t know is that the Greek government signed a treaty [Dublin Regulation], 
not now, a few years ago, that the refugees who come here [as their first host country] will stay here. 
Anna: Yes, that’s why we receive some money, to build camps and refugee centres. (Greece, 26-40HE) 
Participants discuss the Dublin Regulation as protecting the interests of powerful nations 
like Germany. In this repertoire, small countries like Greece have a particular function that serves 
Europe’s interests, that’s why they receive “some money” to build camps and refugee centres. 
Greece for example operates as a filter so that capable and skilful refugees can reach their 
destination, whereas the rest remain stuck in the country. Northern Europeans, especially the 
Germans, are portrayed as lacking humanity and solidarity, they don’t care about the Greeks nor 
the refugees. The refugee crisis, like in Germany, was discussed as “immigration crisis” among 
right-wing participants, who would express xenophobic and racist attitudes towards “the 
foreigners”. In this excerpt we notice Vivi’s reference to Greece becoming “a bit like the sewer of 
Europe”, and the general problematization of refugee accommodation and employment in a 
crisis-ridden environment.  
All in all, the refugee flows seeking asylum in Europe were discursively constructed as a 
crisis at the national level mainly in Germany. Participants portrayed an environment of material, 
symbolic and political threats triggered by a sense of invasion and a potential cultural clash 
between the locals and the foreigners. At the same time, politicians appeared to silence citizens 
instead of opening the debate on the issue. In Greece, the refugee crisis was portrayed as a 
humanitarian crisis affecting Europe as a whole. It was perceived as adding further complexity to 
the ongoing financial and political crises in the country. 
5.2.2. Discursive performance: Cultural clash in Germany, discrimination against wealthy 
Europeans in Greece 
The refugee crisis was discussed as affecting disproportionally the German people due the strong 
economy and quality of democracy in the country. Participants raised concerns over refugee 
integration based on previous experience with mainly Muslim populations that in their view 
would not adapt to the host society. They reached consensus that “either we can’t do it, or maybe 
with less people, or actually, we don’t want to”. Participants introduced the “cultural clash” 
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interpretative repertoire to underline concerns over the large numbers to be received, the lack of 
state provision, and the problem of integration. In this repertoire, a relatively small village 
receives multiple times its population in refugees/foreigners (depending on the ideological 
orientation of the discussant) (18-25HE, 26-40HE, 61+LE). The repertoire was inspired by real 
events in lower Saxony, where the government’s plan to build a refugee centre was met with 
intense anti-refugee mobilization.  
Susanne: So, if you now have a certain area or region or village, I don't think it's right to say that we're 
going to bring 1000 refugees here, in a village of 300 people, no, that's also wrong, in my opinion. You need 
to ask the people beforehand, how do you find this plan, can you deal with it? Or up to what number would 
it be okay for you? 
Jasmin: But nobody asked me or stopped me from moving to Berlin. I didn’t ask the Berliners, ‘hey how 
 would you like it if I moved here’. 
Susanne: No, I just meant a small village, where everyone knows everybody, you know. And if there are 300 
 people and they say... 
Jasmin: But this number is quite controversial. 
Susanne: Well, I think it's just difficult, you know, if you've never seen anyone like that in your life. 
Anton: Yes, I understand, I also understand the people [in the village]. 
Jasmin: Well, if I was a refugee, I wouldn’t like to live in a 300-people village either. But these are also 
temporary matters, because when the war is over, this is also what the government hopes, then the people 
will be able to return to their countries. 
Gudrun: Yes, that won't be the case, we’ve seen the same with the guest workers [Gastarbeiter], the 
government hoped a lot back then, but in the end, it didn’t turn out to be like that...  
Jasmin: Yes, and they did Germany good. 
Gudrun: I'm not saying that they didn't do Germany any good, or that they didn't enrich the country in any 
way, but they thought about it differently back then. And it’s now that we see the effects [of this policy] in 
our schools, so nothing is fixed and new challenges are coming. So, I find this view a bit naïve to be honest. 
          (Germany, 26-40HE) 
Participants exaggerate the ratio between the numbers of refugees to be received and the 
population of the small village to suggest that the refugees are too many and the locals have the 
democratic right to decide if and where they want to host them. One participant (Jasmin) attempts 
to counter anti-immigration discourse but the rest provide arguments why in general “they had 
enough”. Some participants, mainly left-wing, agreed with Chancellor Merkel that “we can do it” 
and urged to open up empty spaces for refugee accommodation. The majority, however, and 
especially right-wing participants, expressed sentiments of Islamophobia and constructed an 
environment of “cultural clash”. Muslim culture was portrayed as religious, radical and 
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intolerant, and thus incompatible with German culture. These expressions were often introduced 
with the structure, “I have nothing against refugees, but…” as to shield discussants against 
accusations of discrimination and racism (Van Dijk, 1992). In general, participants highlighted a 
pro-refugee consensus, marginalizing or silencing opposite views on the matter. Chancellor 
Merkel, the EU and other Europeans not showing solidarity were blamed for the crisis. 
On the other hand, participants in Greece expressed sentiments of solidarity with the 
refugees. They identified with the weak since they perceived themselves to be powerless in 
Europe. This was also a strategy of positive differentiation from “the rich but insensitive 
Europeans” who do not share their good fortune with people in need, as was indicated in their 
view, with the financial and refugee crises. Participants portrayed the refugee crisis as a European 
matter related to oil-wars in the MENA region and imperialism. In this repertoire, super-powers 
like America, Russia and Europe engage in conflicts in foreign regions, but then complain when 
refugees ask for asylum. Discussants presented a culture of hospitality in the country, deflecting 
accusations of racism to the “wealthy northern Europeans”. They repeatedly brought examples of 
what they perceived as “the rise of fascism” in northern Europe, even though the way they 
referred to refugees indicated also racist attitudes (Greece as the sewer of Europe, refugees taking 
jobs, being a burden).  
Vivi: I think that the educated and civilized Europeans, who have nothing to do with the lack of organization 
and governance in Greece, the only thing they wish is to keep the refugee hordes away from their clean 
homes, and they don’t care where they end up. 
Aggeliki: Their geographical location is also such that they don’t care. If I lived in Austria now, with high 
mountains all around that nobody can cross, I wouldn’t care either what the refugees are doing in Greece. 
Vivi: This is true, they only care when they want to use them as cheap labour. 
Aggeliki: For the same reason, I’m not afraid of terrorist attacks, because I don’t live in Spain or France. It 
may happen here too at some point, but this is not my biggest fear when I enter the metro. Because I don’t 
send army in other countries to bomb people.            (Greece, 41-60HE) 
Participants in Greece discuss the refugee crisis as related to the arms industry, warfare 
and consequent rise in terrorist attacks. Discussants propose that they are not afraid of terrorism 
because they show solidarity with the refugees. They instead take the opportunity to discriminate 
against the “civilized Europeans”, who don’t share their good fortune with others. What is 
missing from the argumentation, however, is that Greece also participates in these wars since it is 
a NATO member and exploits migrants for cheap labour. There is xenophobia and racism in 
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Greek society too, but it is silenced and projected onto others (Galariotis et al., 2017). Even 
though sentiments of Islamophobia were not prominent, a bias towards western civilization and 
its supposed connection to Greek philosophy and democracy was present in most discussions. All 
in all, responsibility for the causes of the refugee crisis in Greece was by and large attributed to 
powerful nations. The EU was blamed for not protecting the rights of the people, while 
promoting the interests of big nations and corporations.  
5.2.3. Subject positioning: Germans as foreigners in own country, Greeks as traditionally 
hospitable people 
Participants in Germany overall constructed an environment of “cultural conflict” caused by 
years of mass immigration. They engaged in fine-grained distinctions between poor and rich 
refugees, “worthy” fugitives and “unworthy” economic migrants. Yet, it was the incompatibility 
of “Muslim” refugees with Christian liberal democracies that was underlined. There was general 
consensus that refugees need to integrate by speaking the language and behaving in accordance to 
tolerant, secular, German norms. 
Anastasia: People always say that the refugees must integrate and so on, but what kind of torture they’ve 
left behind, sometimes they’re on the road for four years, through the desert, across the sea, and now they 
have finally solid ground under their feet and suddenly everybody shouts: but they don’t speak our language 
Doris: Yes, but I think everything is happening too fast. They always talk about the German labour market 
and I know that the people are traumatized, they have to get here first, they need a warm bed. But if one gets 
food or accommodation faster than the other, they become disrespectful and you see these conflicts in the 
camps, because they may not attack us, but they attack each other, the Christians against the Muslims, 
women against men and so on. Because they are dissatisfied. As Brecht says, when one is hungry…  
Armin: Exactly, you need integration, you need to make sure that they speak German. In my neighbourhood 
of 100 people, I’m the only one who speaks German. I find it important that they get German language 
courses, because without the language, it’s just impossible. 
Anastasia: But you need to treat people with respect and acknowledge the value of each person, my god, not 
because they are here but because they are human beings… And you need to enlighten people and explain 
to them that these are not just poor people who come here but also educated people and young people who 
have dreams… 
Armin: Article 1 of human rights: The dignity of a human being is inviolable. 
Doris: But they aren’t supposed to bring their conflict here, it’s such an extreme religious conflict. I have 
nothing against refugees, but I don't like any radicals here in general, any people radicalizing themselves. 
And that's the fear many people have I think, because Germany isn’t a religious country, religion has 
nothing to do with our politics.  
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Igor: But of course, it’s difficult for us to communicate these things. There are of course many who are well-
behaved, nice and friendly, but there are also some, nobody knows if there are ISIS fighters among them, 
you always don’t know, because meanwhile Germany has become a target and of course people are scared. 
         (Germany, 26-40LE) 
Participants empathize with refugees’ tormented life stories on their way to safety and 
stability in Europe. In particular Anastasia (26-40LE), representing left-wing discourse, 
introduces a humanitarian repertoire arguing for the undeniable value of human life. She 
identifies with the weak and attempts to confront stereotypes by reminding discussants that 
refugees are “people like us”, who worked hard to pursue their dreams but because of war and 
famine had to leave their homes. Although participants agree with her position initially, they 
present numerous “rational” objections (job market, language, education, culture, religion, social 
cohesion) to unconditional reception. The biggest issue refers to the cultural clash between the 
locals and the foreigners. The Germans are portrayed as secular, moderate, law-abiding and 
ordered citizens that welcome refugees, but at the same time feel threatened. The foreigners are 
described as cultural norm breakers, unwilling to integrate in the host society, and in extreme 
cases potential criminals and terrorists. Critical repertoires in Germany differentiated between 
poor and rich refugees, arguing that whereas rich cosmopolitans and corporations evading taxes 
are not portrayed as problematic in media and political discourse, it is the poor, those that 
actually need aid and solidarity, who are depicted as burden. Other Europeans were also 
perceived as lacking solidarity and responding with racist policies, especially the Eastern 
Europeans and the British. The Greeks were once again discussed as receivers of solidarity funds 
in order to manage the refugee crisis. 
On the other hand, participants in Greece described the population as “traditionally 
hospitable people”, who may be poor but share their few resources with people in need, even 
amidst the crises. Instead, they accused the “wealthy northern Europeans” of selfishness and 
discrimination. Right-wing participants justified hospitality by rooting it to national culture, 
whereas left-wing participants underlined solidarity motives. Although specific references to 
Muslim refugees and Islam were uncommon, othering expressions like “these people”, 
differentiation between legal and illegal status, refugees and economic migrants, were present. 
However, it was once again the “wealthy Europeans” that were approached as “others”, placing 
money higher than human life.  
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Minas (to Lina): Even though you mentioned the [top-ranking] education system in Sweden, and despite the 
fact that the Swedes are highly educated people, you also notice the rise of the radical right over there, and 
indeed the Swedes are very nationalist, like we are. 
Lina: I don’t agree that the Swedes are highly educated people. 
Olga: We are not nationalists. 
Minas: We are very much nationalists. Otherwise, Golden Dawn wouldn’t be the third party in the 
parliament. It shouldn’t even be in the parliament. 
Olga: I think this was just a reaction. If we were nationalists, we wouldn’t go to the islands and the cities to 
help these people. We wouldn’t care if they’re cold, if they’re hungry, if they suffer, if they’re ill. We Greeks 
are traditionally very hospitable people, that’s why you cannot call us nationalists. The real meaning of 
nationalism is something else. 
Minas: Anyway, indeed there are those who aren’t nationalists. But there are also the others, I know it very 
well, I feel it as a German. Every time I mention that I’m half German, I’m scared. (Greece, 41-60 LE) 
The northern Europeans were categorized as more nationalists than the Greeks, despite 
their supposed wealth and education. Especially the Germans were commonly perceived as 
historically flirting with authoritarianism. When accusations of racism and nationalism were 
brought to their attention, like with the rise of the far-right party Golden Dawn, participants 
would present this development as a reaction to the severity of the crisis to minimize its appeal 
(Angouri & Wodak, 2014). They would also switch the discussion to the numerous solidarity 
initiatives for refugees in Greece. However, a rise in solidarity can go hand in hand with a rise in 
nationalism in a polarized political environment. Participants seem to silence this ambivalence.  
5.3. The political crisis 
5.3.1. Social construction: Corruption and post-democracy in Greece and Germany 
Participants in Greece and Germany discussed the post-democratic crisis of representation in 
their countries and Europe in very similar ways. The corruption of mainstream labour and 
conservative parties, losing their representative function, was a common interpretative repertoire 
(cartel party thesis, Katz & Mair, 1995; 2009). As mainstream parties moved to the centre, their 
long-time supporters were unable to find meaningful programmatic differences between the 
centre-left and the centre-right, and were contemplating endorsing more ideologically distinct left 
and right-wing parties. This cartel party alliance and lack of substantial options in electoral 
politics signified corruption and a democracy in crisis for the majority. The post-democratic turn 
was common in Greece and Germany, with Greece of course facing a more severe crisis due to 
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pre-existing problems of clientelism (Pappas, 2003). Participants defined post-democracy 
(Crouch, 2004) as a secret alliance between politicians, business and the media that has led to the 
de-politicization of democracy. Political decisions are taken by a group of experts behind closed 
doors, while citizens’ demands are approached as “populist” in the public debate. Discussants 
expressed from mild to severe sentiments of political disenchantment and Euroscepticism, with 
the level of discontent in Germany emerging as a surprising finding.   
I will start with Greece where the political crisis erupted earlier in 2010. Politicians were 
seen to be imposing poverty and misery on the population without offering any meaningful 
justifications for their course of action. They were blamed for breaking promises and prioritizing 
economic interests at the expense of community and society for years. Participants constructed a 
crisis of responsiveness, since irrespective of citizen mobilization against austerity in the streets 
and the ballots (Indignant movement, SYRIZA, EU referendum), they received the same austerity 
policies. They suggested also a crisis of responsibility, because no political power prepared them 
for the severity of the financial crisis, took responsibility for the situation, or proposed an exit 
strategy to tackle the problem. In the words of Kostas (41-60HE), “it has been already 6-7 years 
that we haven’t formed our own opinion about the crisis, and propose our own rescue plan. 
There’s obviously a problem of responsibility, representation and governance”. 
The crisis of democracy in Greece was attributed to the two mainstream parties (labour 
PASOK and conservative New Democracy) establishing clientelist relations with the electorate, 
which minimized their programmatic differences. As a result, both parties were delegitimized and 
punished in the critical elections of 2012 and 2015, with the labour PASOK receiving harsher 
punishment and being practically replaced by the radical left SYRIZA. Although participants 
acknowledged the problem of political corruption in the country, they suggested that the trend in 
western democracies is similar. The problem lies in the exploitation of positions of great political 
and economic power.  
Savvas: In my view it’s democracy that doesn’t work. If democracy doesn’t work then nothing else does. I 
agree with all of you saying that there’s no rule of law, no justice. I think it’s an outcome of politics as it 
was practiced till now. It’s a matter of culture and education. Because we were raised in a situation that we 
all asked for [political] favours. 
Kiki: Not all of us 
Liza: Not everybody 
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Savvas: I’m not referring to you personally. 
Liza: These are specific people, not all people. 
Savvas: I’m just saying that there were many people participating in this situation. One big group is the 
public sector. These people were the clients of the two big parties [PASOK, New Democracy] 
Kiki: Exactly 
Liza: Otherwise, they wouldn’t get elected. 
Savvas: That’s why I say that this is a crisis of democracy. Democracy doesn’t function properly. There’s 
no meritocracy, no equality, no justice, there’s nothing, nothing. 
Liza: Yes, democracy has been jeopardized, don’t you think? 
Kiki: How is it possible to usurp public funds [reference to major political scandals] and nobody can touch 
you? Please tell me in which [civilized] country is this possible? 
Savvas: Well, I believe that politics works in a similar way everywhere. Because you referred to Europe for 
instance, there are lobbies everywhere. 
Kiki: Like in Greece? [participants laughing] 
Savvas: Yes here of course it’s more obvious because we live in a country that has neither achieved great 
[economic] development nor exerted great influence on the global capitalist system. Yet these things happen 
everywhere, look at France and [the scandal with] the mirage jets.    (Greece, 61+LE) 
Clientelism resulted in the two mainstream parties getting re-elected despite the large 
corruption scandals involving them. Citizens were also hired in the public sector even though 
they may have lacked the skills for these positions. Participants appear conscious of pre-existing 
problems that led to the financial and political meltdown. Yet there is an issue of justice as they 
point out straight away. Not all citizens and politicians were engaged in clientelism and 
corruption. By blaming everyone for the crisis (“we’re all in this together”), the real perpetrators 
remain unknown till present time. This lack of justice and responsibility in Greece leaves the 
door open for all sorts of blame attributions because citizens are deprived of crucial information 
that has empirical basis. In this environment of constant pauperization and democratic 
degeneration, the “Troika” was perceived as a “foreign” technocratic institution that imposed 
misery from afar by dictating policies that went against the interests of the majority (wage and 
pension cuts, tax increases, public sector layoffs etc.). 
Anna: I believe that not even these people govern Greece, everything comes from higher levels. PM Tsipras 
organized the referendum, I really believed in him, even though I didn’t vote for him. He triggered hope, 
there was hope again. Definitely they didn’t let him follow the NO vote [61% voted NO to more austerity]. 
Vivi: Yes, he had a problem. 
Anna: Neither Greece has the final word, nor political leaders anymore. 
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Vivi: You suggest that there are secret lobbies pulling the strings. 
Anna: They are not secret. The EU and all these institutions don’t let you get back on your feet.  
Vivi: Yes, but these things are known for the EU. 
Anna: The same happened with PM Karamanlis [former prime minister], no? 
Makis: The same happens with everyone [participants laughing]. Earlier it was the NATO bothering us, 
then it was America, now it’s the EU. There were always influences [on Greek politics]. 
Anna: Actually, we always had corrupt politicians selling out the country. 
Vivi: Yes, this has happened since the establishment of the Greek state. 
Aggeliki: It’s not only a problem of Greece, it’s a problem of all countries. It’s not that they have targeted 
Greece these lobbies from abroad to manipulate politics. It’s the way things work at the moment. 
Makis: Exactly. This is the situation and whoever can deal with it now.  
Vivi: After all these institutions after all these Unions, I mean the European Union with the high ideals, [we 
see] that it’s basically an interaction among countries that reminds us of previous relations between the 
strong and the weak.        (Greece, 26-40HE) 
Among the few times Greek participants used the word “hope” was to refer to the 
unexpected election of the left-wing party SYRIZA, and the proposed referendum on austerity – 
even among those that did not vote for the party. They believed that austerity can be resisted and 
citizens can have a say on how politics works in their country. Yet the inability of the party to 
materialize the outcome of the referendum and the EU’s indisputable stance on the matter made 
participants believe that external forces control their future. These forces want them poor and 
dependent on powerful nations (America, Germany). Participants argue that “this is how things 
work at the moment”. Politicians don’t pull the strings, but lobbies. Left-wing and right-wing 
discussants conceded on the democratic deficit triggered by the crisis. A common interpretative 
repertoire suggested that “important political decisions about Greece are taken in the offices of 
Brussels and NATO” (Activists). 
Corruption, moneyed interests, and the EU were also major topics in Germany. 
Participants introduced a crisis of responsiveness, as Chancellor Merkel and the grand coalition 
proceeded with bailing out Greece and receiving large numbers of refugees without taking into 
consideration citizens’ views on the matter. They expressed repeatedly the feeling that they are 
silenced, and that everything that has to do with the future of the country is decided on higher 
levels, echoing their Greek counterparts. Participants discussed in length the lack of political 
options in the electoral arena, with the grand coalitions between the conservative CDU and labour 
113 
 
SPD leaving citizens on the moderate right and left unrepresented in the public sphere. A 
common interpretative repertoire referred to German politicians being too far away from the 
“little people” [Bürgerfern] yet very close to business interests. They brought repeatedly the 
example of the “secret TTIP negotiations” between the federal government, the EU and the US to 
support their position. “Puppets of the economy” and “money-oriented politics” were particular 
terms used to exemplify political corruption.  
Konrad: But why is the TTIP completely ok for the Federal Government? And why is the chlorinated 
chicken not so bad for them? Because they can afford the eco-chicken anyway? Or why does the Federal 
government allow such thing to be negotiated in secret? The whole population, I think two thirds, are 
against it according to the latest opinion polls. That's a clear result, isn't it? 
Pauline H.: Because they want to promote their interests. 
Konrad: Yes, the question is, where do they live, what do they eat, where do they move, what are they afraid 
of, right? I refer to all topics now, TTIP is just an example. I believe that the federal government is trapped 
in lobbyists’ associations. I don't want to say now ‘puppets of the economy’ but this is the direction. 
Pauline H.: Yes, you see that when they say something, now also with the refugees and so on, you always 
have the feeling that in the back of their mind they only think: How do I save my post? They don't care about 
the matter itself, it’s always about not saying the wrong sentence, not saying the wrong word. You see the 
same with Gabriel [the Vice Chancellor at the time], he wants to become the next Chancellor.  
Ingrid: Yes, and you notice that when someone from the political life loses his/her post in the Bundestag or 
is retired or something, they somehow end up in the economy, as advisors or something. We have seen this 
many times before. 
Otto: They earn a lot more there. 
Alexander: The best example is Schröder… 
Ingrid: And Gazprom… 
Alexander: That's totally embarrassing, but not for him.   (Germany, 41-60HE) 
German politicians are portrayed as corrupt and selfish. They make electoral promises that 
they never keep, and are essentially the same people in power (SPD and CDU like PASOK and 
New Democracy). Participants seem aware of the post-democratic state of affairs. As they argue, 
“most of them somehow end up in the economy” – the “revolving door” interpretative repertoire. 
The example of Chancellor Schröder (from SPD) and his close ties to the Russian energy 
company Gazprom was brought up recurrently to indicate corruption. These political scandals 
and neoliberal reforms introduced by the left-green coalition in 2002-2005 appear to have 
weakened the labour SPD and delegitimized left-wing alternatives to austerity (Saalfeld & 
Schoen, 2015). In addition, the EU was perceived as contributing to these crises, instead of 
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providing solutions. European peace and lifestyle issues, such as freedom of travel, exchange of 
goods and services, meeting other Europeans, were positively evaluated. However, when 
discussing politics, German participants expressed deep dissatisfaction with current affairs. 
  
Walter: The EU, the Euro, the Greeks, nobody talks about the Greeks anymore who seem to have money 
again. But the topic will come back again. Well, before it bothered me that the Greeks were gagged like they 
weren’t a democratic country anymore, they cannot decide for themselves without the Troika or the 
institutions, or whatever is their name, telling them what to do. That’s actually a no-go. But what bothers 
me much more now with the refugees is that the EU is very much ahead with solidarity [Irony]. Some say 
they don’t want any, others say they only want Christians although it’s Muslims that are coming, there are 
hardly any Christians. The Hungarians will take two or three people, and so they cannot agree now on how 
to distribute the people. That’s not the solidarity I have in mind when I think of Europe, and the so-called 
values that are always held high in Europe, which quickly go down the drain, a heavy disappointment 
Jörg: Well, the EU is basically also one of these clubs where every country wants to push its individual 
interests, and that’s difficult I think, with so many countries that are partly so different. Maybe just as a 
train of thought, maybe the EU shouldn’t have evolved to this extent of the common currency union. 
Laurenz: So, if the UK or Poland want to fight for their national interests, they can do it; or if Poland or 
other countries regard the EU only as money supply, so they can renew their streets but mutual solidarity is 
not expected. Seeing everything as a one-way street mustn’t be the case. When those who pay the most are 
also burdened with the problems of others, at that moment something is wrong. (Germany, Activists) 
Participants in Germany appear disappointed with the way the crises were dealt with at 
the European level, bearing most of the burden themselves instead of sharing it equally and fairly 
among member-states. As shown in this excerpt, some left-wing participants sympathised with 
their Greek counterparts enduring post-democratic policies decided on higher levels. Europe as a 
peace project and political union of collaboration among member states is contrasted to the EU, 
an economic club where countries pursue their national interests and exploit wealthy economies 
as money supply. A sense of mistrust, lack of solidarity and common fate among member states 
is expressed, and disenchantment with the current form of the EU. 
Overall, the crisis of representation and legitimacy in Greece was known and expected. 
What was not expected was the level of political discontent and Euroscepticism expressed in the 
German focus groups; as well as the level of awareness and agreement among Greek and German 
discussants about the root causes of the political crises in their countries and Europe. The post-
democratic crisis of representation at the national level is caused by corruption and political 
convergence of mainstream labour and conservative parties. At the European level, the political 
crisis emerges from the lack of transparency, accountability and representation in the EU. The 
intensity differs though. Participants in Greece construct a situation of unofficial bankruptcy and 
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state collapse triggering a generalized crisis of legitimacy. The critical presence of an external 
supervising actor, “the Troika”, aggravates the sense of democratic deficit and loss of political 
sovereignty. Germany’s capacity to tackle the financial crisis in a relatively effective manner has 
prevented a legitimacy crisis of such severity. 
5.3.2. Discursive performance: Political disenchantment and Euroscepticism in Greece and 
Germany  
Although the root causes and intensity of the political crises in Greece and Germany differ, 
participants’ criticism of current affairs was rather similar. Discussants in both countries 
proposed that democracy is broken. Politicians and the EU were explicitly blamed for listening to 
the markets and their wallets more than the citizens. The level of political awareness was 
considerably high in both countries. Instead of engaging with a superficial anti-politics repertoire 
devoid of depth and rational argumentation, the majority of discussants provided extensive 
reasoning and real-life examples for their responsibility attributions. Citizens received their fair 
share of blame as well: for allowing politicians to exploit their vote for personal gains in Greece; 
and for being passive and complacent due to the wealth and prosperity in Germany. As suggested 
in Chapter 2, blame avoidance presents the speakers and their social groups in a positive light, 
but it is acknowledging responsibility that may assist with identifying the root causes of the 
problem. As Rosa points out in the following excerpt, by blaming others for the generalized and 
multiple crises in the country, Greek citizens could avoid realizing their own contribution to the 
problematic situation and how to refrain from repeating similar mistakes in the future.  
Rosa: I disagree when people say that they’re disappointed with politicians and corruption and the like. I 
wonder whether those participating in this situation are less or more than the non-participants. Yet they say 
in Greece today that all politicians lie and cheat, that they’ve destroyed us in order to pardon themselves, to 
pardon ourselves, because what was going on all these years is that we were voting for these people, I don’t 
say I’m good, but we were voting for these people because they’re our mirror, and we still vote for them 
because corruption has been passed down to our society. Since I graduated from university and I was hired 
in the ministry that was the approach, I’m not saying it was 90% of the cases, but that was the tone more or 
less in society. 
Koula: While they (politicians) held governmental offices. 
Rosa: Yes, they held governmental offices, but we were voting them in, right? 
Koula: People’s vote depended on what they get from politicians. Clientelist state. 
Rosa: So, I believe it’s time to blame ourselves. Because we always blame others, the foreigners, the 
government, [Chancellor] Merkel and so on, because we cannot admit this to ourselves, otherwise we’ll 
have to negate ourselves.       (Greece, 61+HE) 
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Politicians and citizens voting them in office were the first to be held accountable for the 
political crisis. Additionally, Greek participants expressed a critical repertoire towards 
globalization and to a lesser extent towards European integration. Globalization was portrayed as 
economic, cultural and political subordination of the global/European periphery to the global/ 
European centre, among left- and right-wing participants.  
Platonas: My problem is not so much with Europe as with globalization. A big deal of the problems that 
Greece is facing, and other peripheral countries of Europe, of the global South, is due to this violent 
adaptation. Meaning this violent homogenization of different countries, cultures and political systems. This 
is a race to the bottom for labour rights, social cohesion, health insurance, education, which in the name of 
globalization is differentiated in three broad cultures, establishes a global language and generates 
populations instead of nations. Thus, to be a citizen is neither to be Athenian, nor Peloponnese, nor Greek, 
nor European, it means to be a consumer.  
Andreas: I think the problem is the management of human labour. Because the way things work at the 
moment is that there are places in the world which have different capacity to manage their production. So 
“crusaders” come along, Americans, Russians, Germans etc. who are stronger and exploit other peoples’ 
production. What we experience [in Greece] is the continuation of this behaviour. Meaning that a leading 
group is managing the power of those who produce, since the latter cannot manage their own production, 
while others come and exploit it. For instance, they go to Africa and sell weapons and the people there 
slaughter each other and nobody says anything. Lately there was a terrible massacre in Syria. This is what 
they do in Latin America, Africa, everywhere.      (Greece, 61+HE) 
Participants portray globalization as a race to the bottom for labour rights, public services, 
social cohesion and democracy. These processes are presented to be driven by motives of profit 
and exploitation against poor peoples (core-periphery, north-south). This exploitation is 
facilitated by super powers (Americans, Russians, Germans in this excerpt) using politics of debt-
bondage and warfare to obtain resources from Africa and Latin America. The Greek crisis is 
portrayed as a continuation of this unequal development that now reaches Europe.  
Moving to Germany, participants blamed explicitly the mainstream parties CDU and SPD 
for not taking into consideration citizen disenchantment and representing their interests in the 
public sphere. They also held citizens accountable for passivity and complacency due to the 
country’s wealth and prosperity [Bequemlichkeit]. The multiple and multilevel crises appear to 
have underlined the representation gap between politicians and citizens in the financial crisis (no 
Greek aid), refugee crisis (less refugees), and political crisis (parties too similar, no alternatives).  
Susanne: So, I'm going to vote, but I feel so shaken every time, because in principle it’s always the same in 
power anyway. So, whether I go now or not, the result is always almost identical, with a few deviations. And 
if I now vote for a different party, I know very well that it will never be in power, or anyway in my lifetime. 
Jasmin: So I think there’s been a change of power in the last years, at the federal and state level.  
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Susanne: But it's always about the two, SPD and CDU. 
Jasmin: There’s a green-governed state, Baden-Württemberg, and it’s the second largest state. 
Anton: But in foreign policy, most of them, for example, in the case of Greece, most of them, the Greens, 
FDP, SPD and CDU agreed with each other… Almost unanimously. So, the majority of the SPD agreed 
with the financial aid to Greece and the majority of the Greens voted for it. 
Jasmin: Yes, that’s one example. 
Anton: One example, exactly. With foreign policy now, I say ok. 
Jasmin: Yes, there’s a difference whether one advocates for arms exports or not… 
Gudrun: Yes, but I cannot separate this position, this is the challenge. I cannot say unfortunately that in this 
policy area I agree with this party and in another area with another party, especially when they form a 
grand coalition.      
Anton: But I think the problem is not only with the voters but also with those who are voted upon. The 
supply of politicians is very important. 
 Gudrun: Yes there are no charismatic people [in politics] anymore. If you listen to them, you’re gone. 
There’s no rhetorician anymore, at most Mr. Gysi [prominent politician of the left Die Linke], who is also 
leaving now… So when I listen to Mrs. Merkel, she’s pure sleep and she probably wants it too.  
Jasmin: But that speaks rather, that’s an argument against her but she’s nevertheless still in power. People 
voted for a sleeping pill and one with terrible politics.   (Germany, 26-40HE) 
Participants in Germany referred repeatedly to the lack of viable alternatives in the party 
arena [Parteiverdrossenheit]. Politicians were seen as missing charisma and vision. Although 
some participants applauded Chancellor Merkel for her powerful leadership, generally, there was 
severe criticism over her policies. “A sleeping pill with terrible politics” as discussants suggest in 
the excerpt. Politicians make these grand coalitions and their programmatic differences based on 
which they are elected, disappear. A common interpretative repertoire indicated that citizens are 
fooled in every election and there was a strong tendency towards collective electoral abstention 
or punishment of mainstream parties, so that politicians get the message that people had enough. 
Participants blamed non-responsive politicians also in the EU. The level of Euroscepticism in the 
discussions was unexpectedly severe. Lack of information on the proceedings of the institution 
was perceived as deliberate and indicative of its democratic deficit. In Germany it was the issue 
of democratic representation and legitimacy in European and international institutions that was 
more thoroughly problematized than inequality and exploitation. 
Alexander: It's really abstract, isn't it? So, who, who is the EU? 
Otto: Far away, very far away. 
Konrad: A paper tiger, too big. 
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Alexander: So, the laws that are implemented in the member states are determined by the EU. Yet the 
officials of the EU are not elected but appointed by the governments, and I find this undemocratic. This is 
an organisation which, in my view, depends very much on lobbyists, and they’re relatively open about it; 
they decide something that the majority of the population may consider to be quite nonsense. 
Pauline C.: Wait a minute, the European Parliament is elected, but not in all countries or what do you 
mean? We elect our MEPs.  
Alexander: But what about all the officials who are there? 
Pauline C.: You have an administration, of course, but they are like two pairs of shoes. I think, I don't know 
exactly, but we have a European election. 
Alexander: I also have to admit, I don't know exactly, it's so far away. 
Konrad: There’s the European Parliament and then there’s the European Commission. We elect the 
members of the Parliament but the others are determined by the member states. 
Alexander: Well, we elect the parliament but the EU is a much larger organization. And I feel somehow... 
Ingrid: …That something is manipulated, that the EU is not determined by us. 
Alexander: Well, I have the sense that only a very small part is determined by us, yes this is what I think. I 
somehow have a bad feeling about it to be honest.     (Germany, 41-60HE) 
Participants in Germany seem confused about the bodies, instruments and processes in the 
EU. Although they vote in European elections, they perceive to exert limited influence on 
European matters, as was manifest, in their view, with the Greek bailouts and the refugee crisis. 
The EU is described as a lobbyist association oriented towards economic interests rather than 
European citizens. Particular distinction is made between the European Parliament, the European 
Commission and the European Council, with discussants referring to the “undemocratic 
procedure” of appointing officials instead of democratically electing them. The importance of a 
strong parliament was underlined for meaningful representative democracy at the European level. 
5.3.3. Subject positioning: The “little people” vs. the “rich corrupt politicians” in Greece and 
Germany 
Participants in Greece and Germany positioned on the one hand “the little people” that have to 
live in harsh conditions and face a pessimistic future; and on the other hand, the politicians, who 
live like “kings and queens” in closed communities and have become even richer amidst the 
crises. The little people seem to get fooled in every election to vote for political parties that 
appear different but share essentially the same interests. Banks, lobbies and multinationals are 
seen as part of the secret alliance between political and economic interests, while citizens are left 
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out of the deal. The following two excerpts from Greece and Germany respectively highlight 
participants’ shared subject positioning. 
Kosmas: It’s always the same in power. And they look after their families more than they care about society. 
Savvas: Yes, unfortunately a lot of hope is lost, hope that things could get better eventually.  
Liza: I feel disappointment. Great disappointment. Not only with politics in Greece, but also in Europe. I 
grew up with the word “austerity” since I was a kid. I’m getting old and I hear this word again, it’s 
imposed on me to live in austerity. And this austerity, from what I can recall, is worse than the austerity I 
encountered when I was a kid. In the 1950s and 1960s there were the poor and the rich. So, some people 
thought that the poor shouldn’t become middle class, there’s no need, they should go back to where they 
came from. So that there’s poverty and wealth, like in Venezuela or other poor countries. Hence, I don’t 
believe politicians. Nobody. I don’t believe that any of them loves their country so much as to improve the 
situation.         (Greece, 61+LE) 
Konstantin: You can imagine that there are also insane hierarchies in these parties and if you go there 
perhaps as a new, young, fresh thinking person, you cannot go very far. 
Jennifer: It's also about income... 
Konstantin: Yes, sure, definitely. 
Jennifer: You really have to say it. It's about income. It's completely independent of whether it's dark red, 
red, black, green, we can also add purple, yellow, it doesn't matter at all, it's about pay, who has B5, B6 and 
a fancy for federal politics. So, don't even think that our health senator would be very keen on what he’s 
doing. He just wants to work at the federal level. Well, that's what it's all about, and I find it disgusting, it's 
all about power.          (Germany, 41-60LE) 
Participants in Greece and Germany identify with a country of residence and a community 
for which they care about. Politicians on the other hand are portrayed as an international class 
that has no borders and love for their country. Their country is money. With regard to the EU, 
participants perceive the institution as non-transparent and non-democratic, promoting vested 
interests at the expense of the people and the common good (Europe). Discussants in both 
countries seem to prefer a union of member states that share a common continent and identity, 
and similar economic, social and political predicament. Despite their similarities though, there 
were also differences. Participants in Greece perceived the EU as promoting the interests of 
powerful member states such as Germany and France. Contrary, participants in Germany 
portrayed themselves as the biggest contributors in the EU sharing also the biggest burden, while 
other Europeans free ride. Hence, discussants in both countries were portrayed as the victims of 
Europe’s inequalities. 
Aggeliki: I think the EU has abandoned all pretence; it’s not needed anymore. That’s what I understood in 
the summer [with the referendum]. It’s very simple, guys this is the situation, whether you like it or not, 
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that’s life. It’s ok, you’ll be the first, your neighbours later, the Portuguese after, everyone will get a taste 
eventually. It may be that in 1830 [establishment of the Greek state] this behaviour was crystal clear, but in 
2015 it’s also very clear, even though we’ve become a bit more civilized Europeans, so to say.  
Makis: Every time we take a loan in Greece, we have to apply certain [austerity] measures. In a way you’re 
trapped and black mailed every time, in order to do what you’ve been told. This debt-bondage dependency 
on other Europeans is constant in Greek history, we always took loans since the establishment of the state. 
Moderator: Thus, the outcome of the referendum could not be applied? 
Makis: Yes, it was an illusion, it gave you the [fake] opportunity to express yourself. We saw that, we all 
voted NO [to more austerity], a defiant NO was elected, but in the parenthesis a YES was hiding. I don’t 
think this could have ever happened in Switzerland for example. 
Vivi: Anyway, Switzerland has a very different role in the EU. 
Stamatis: Switzerland is not even in the EU. 
Vivi: Oh, Switzerland managed this as well. You mean the currency union or the EU? 
Stamatis: Switzerland is neither in the currency union [Eurozone] nor in the EU. 
Makis: Switzerland has its own god. Well, I’m wondering all this time, why I wasn’t born Swiss after all  
 [participants laughing]       (Greece, 26-40HE) 
Participants in Greece argue that they are treated as second-class citizens in Europe. In 
2015, they were still not approached as autonomous people since stronger countries in the EU 
were seen to impose their will on weaker ones. This debt-bondage dependency on other 
Europeans is portrayed as a historical reality in Greek politics. Italian and Portuguese neighbours 
are perceived to experience similar discriminatory behaviour. In juxtaposition, the Swiss are 
introduced as a counter-example of differential treatment. They are autonomous to behave as they 
please, they are powerful, they have money, they have their own god, not the EU. Interestingly, 
participants in Germany expressed also annoyance with their unfair treatment in Europe.  
Doris: Well, Europe should actually be a fair distribution of burdens and benefits on all issues. But you 
always get upset when you have the feeling that it's not a uniform thing. One country becomes more 
powerful and yes okay, we have more money than other countries, but somehow it doesn't work out fairly. 
Armin. The EU was actually founded after the experience of the second World War, so the focal mistake 
was that it didn’t become a political union... Europe is good in principle, especially in a globalized world, 
because in the near future the centre of the world won’t be in Europe but in Africa and Asia… but as we 
said in the beginning, it's just difficult, 28 countries and every country is so different. Here, we don’t agree 
in Germany [with the federal states], how is it possible to agree in Europe? […] 
Doris: Yes, every country is different, and has different economic capacity, you cannot compare now apples 
and pears, yet they want to pull us all in the same direction. And if everyone is differently positioned in the 
economy, and in one country there’s so much VAT but in another there’s almost no VAT, then all companies 
go to Ireland, because it’s more pleasant there. 
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Igor: Or in Greece, for example, sorry, we’re again back in Greece. So I think they retire at 50 or 55 and 
here you just retire at 67. Either you say that we have one system and it can't be that in other countries 
people retire much earlier and then in the next country is 70. So how do you want to sell this to the people? 
I also understand the Greeks of course who say, but we always did that, why should we retire later?  
Doris: Yes, it’s their right, it’s their country. You cannot compare now, that’s the difficult part. 
Igor: But they retire earlier and they get the same money as someone who works 15 years longer here – in 
proportion of course.        (Germany, 26-40LE) 
German participants acknowledge the longer stretch of peace among European countries 
since World War II and the political influence that a united Europe can exert in a globalized 
world. However, they argue for a meaningful political union where costs and benefits are equally 
distributed among Europeans, who share similar economic, social and political systems. 
Compared to other Europeans – the Greeks and the Irish in this excerpt – German participants 
find themselves working more years and paying more taxes. They suggest that a united Europe is 
difficult to survive with such discrepancies between countries and they bring the example of the 
federal states in Germany to substantiate their argument. Participants in both countries 
distinguished conceptually between the Europe of united peoples/cultures and the EU as a 
technocratic economic institution. 
5.4. Discussion 
The chapter presented the social construction of the crises in Greece and Germany, allowing 
citizens to speak for themselves about the things they deem important. It highlighted complexity 
in crisis perceptions that is normally suppressed by multi-level comparisons and survey studies. 
The analysis explored the diverse lines of argumentation on the crises and highlighted the main 
interpretative repertoires that emerged across age and education groups. The analysis reported 
also on critical repertoires when these were discussed. That said, I didn’t find considerable 
intergroup variation in crisis constructions within each case. The analysed excerpts, in this and 
the next chapter, were selected from all focus groups. Arguably, the choice of analytical method 
– the selection of commonly reproduced interpretative repertoires – affected this finding. 
Discussion of possible intergroup variation is addressed in the concluding chapter (Chapter 7), 
proposing avenues for future research. Nonetheless, ideology emerged as a significant factor 
conditioning interpretation. For that reason, left-wing and right-wing repertoires were highlighted 
in the analysis. Tables A5.1 and A5.2 summarize the main findings of social construction, 
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discursive performance and subject positioning in the financial, refugee and political crises in 
Greece and Germany. 
 [ Table A5.1 about here ]   [ Table A5.2 about here ] 
The financial crisis affected Greek participants disproportionally. It is described as a 
“process of constant pauperization” for the majority that is imposed by corrupt politicians and the 
EU. Participants constructed the crisis as a major capitalist crash and problematized the 
“neoliberal choice of austerity” as crisis management strategy. They positioned themselves as the 
underdog in European politics who has to be punished paradigmatically so that other Europeans 
understand that there is no alternative to austerity and the new world order drafted by powerful 
nations. Contrary, German participants presented themselves as “responsible and hard-working” 
Europeans who pay again for others. The crisis is perceived as a matter of Greece and other 
peripheral European countries and is attributed to their “relaxed and profligate” lifestyle. Yet, 
German citizens were also affected, albeit to a lesser extent, due to the MoUs/bailouts and 
European interdependence. 
The refugee crisis was constructed as an intimidating crisis mainly in Germany, perceived 
as a second “foreign invasion” after the migration of guest workers in the 1960s–1970s. 
Participants introduced the repertoire of “cultural clash”, portraying the moderate, secular and 
tolerant culture of the locals as incompatible with Islam. German politicians and the EU were 
seen as “destroying” society with their misguided, short-sighted multicultural policies. 
Participants argued for a welcoming but realistic approach as citizens felt like “foreigners in their 
own country”. On the other hand, Greek participants acknowledged that refugees target wealthy 
economies like Germany. However, they were also affected as first host countries at the southern 
border of Europe. They identified with the refugees finding themselves patronized by 
superpowers and took the opportunity to discriminate against the “rich but insensitive” 
Europeans. Instead, they presented themselves as “poor but hospitable people”. 
Participants in Greece and Germany may disagree on the financial and refugee crises, but 
they agree on the political crisis in their countries and Europe. As argued in the introduction, it is 
rather because politicians are seen as unable to tackle financial and immigration threats, and 
represent citizens’ interests in the public sphere, that these problem-areas are perceived as 
“crises” per se. The democratic crisis of representation was constructed as taking place 
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simultaneously at the national and European level. At the national level it was attributed to 
corruption and political convergence of mainstream labour and conservative parties (cartel party 
thesis, Katz & Mair, 1995); and prioritization of business interests at the expense of the citizenry 
(post-democracy, Crouch, 2004). At the European level, the EU was perceived as a “technocratic 
institution” that incorporated and amplified this post-democratic state of affairs, due to deficits in 
transparency, accountability, and representation (Schmidt, 2013). Participants in both cases 
portrayed, on the one hand, the “little people” that had to learn to live with the crises, and on the 
other, the “rich and powerful politicians” that were safe in their secluded wealthy communities. 
Therefore, what did we learn in terms of social construction, discursive performance, and 
subject positioning in Greece and Germany from the focus group analysis? Starting with social 
construction, literature suggests that crises generate conflict in society – material, symbolic, and 
political – as they are characterized by scarcity of resources and uncertainty regarding the 
potential consequences of perceived threats (Kriesi, 2014). Yet, the threats that become 
politicized in the public debate depend on the resonance with citizens’ lived realities and 
discursive contestation in the public sphere (Hay, 1996; Stanley, 2014). The politicization of 
threats is not coincidental, but embedded in a history of socio-political struggles (cleavages) 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2018). The focus group analysis indicated that different threats were 
prioritized in Greece and Germany: namely the economy and politics; and refugees and politics. 
These threats activated the left – right (economic) and libertarian – authoritarian (cultural) 
cleavages in society, mainly the economic axis in Greece and the cultural axis in Germany. 
Centrist labour and conservative parties were perceived as corrupt and incapable of responding 
effectively to the crises. They were viewed instead as part of the problem. Moreover, Europe 
emerged as a “new” politicized cleavage, problematizing the locus of political power in complex 
multilevel polities (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019b). Pro-European and anti-European interpretative 
repertoires were discussed, but there was general consensus that the current form of the EU is 
problematic and disconnected from European citizens. 
With respect to discursive performance, as Colin Hay (1996: 255) argues, “power resides 
not only in the ability to respond to crises, but to identify, define, and constitute crises in the first 
place”. In this process particular interpretative repertoires may appear more effective in 
conveying citizen experience than others (resonance), providing the discursive foundations for 
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the interpretation of these problem-areas (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992). Overall, 
participants in Greece and Germany tended to construct versions of crises that portrayed them 
positively, especially when the crisis in question affected them indirectly and secondarily; 
meaning the financial crisis in Germany and the refugee crisis in Greece. Deferring responsibility 
may present discussants as the victims of a problematic situation, but takes away agency, power 
and control over the situation. Asserting responsibility may be intimidating, but restores agency 
to the speaker. When the crisis under discussion was predominant – the financial and political 
crises in Greece, the refugee and political crises in Germany – awareness of citizen responsibility 
was rather present. The severity and urgency of these multiple and multilevel threats raised 
consciousness among the citizenry. Participants did not excuse complacent citizens, neither 
corrupt politicians, while attributions of responsibility extended to the European (the EU) and 
international level (capitalism, globalization).  
Crises are often constructed as turning points in the history of a group, related to shared 
perceptions of history and collective identities that locate particular subjects as allies and others 
as opponents (Stråth & Wodak, 2009). In this process of collective positioning, acts of social 
comparison are important and purposive. Since people strive for positive identification, they tend 
to attribute positive characteristics to their reference groups and negative to the ones perceived as 
“others” (Tajfel, 1982; Turner et al, 1987). The greater the conflict between social groups, the 
greater the discrepancy between positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (Reese 
& Lauenstein, 2014). Overall, Greek and German participants approached each other as 
opponents in Europe rather than allies, introducing certain stereotypes (corrupt lazy Greeks, 
hegemonic authoritarian Germans), predominantly when the crisis under discussion was felt 
indirectly. In the political crisis, however, the Greeks and the Germans were echoing each other, 
discussing very similar problems. It is no coincidence that it was in the political crisis at the 
European level that Greek and German participants referred explicitly to one another as allies that 
suffered alike from post-democratic policies decided on higher levels.  
In political talk, stereotypes constitute parts of arguments used by the discussants to 
negotiate power, enhance self-representation and explain inequalities (Theodossopoulos, 2013). 
Thus, it is no surprise that in a period of scarce resources and uncertainty, citizens in Greece and 
Germany resort to stereotyping to gain control over a complex reality and present themselves in a 
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favourable light. Moreover, focal political figures in the two countries engaged in confrontational 
communication amidst the crises (Sternberg et al., 2018). However, the existence of stereotypes 
indicates also a problem of European integration at the citizen level and a lack of solidarity 
between the two publics. Certain dividing lines in Europe between the north and the south, the 
east and the west emerged in the focus groups. On the other hand, acts of social contextualization 
were also common. Discussants shared a considerable amount of information about their 
counterparts in other regions facilitated by the spread of the internet and social media, indicating 
an advancement of European integration processes. Which of the two tendencies will prevail, the 
politics of division and competition or alliance and solidarity, remains to be seen as critical 
junctures are long-term processes that can trigger significant alterations to path-dependent 
politics (Collier & Munck, 2017). 
Having discussed the areas Greek and German participants perceive to be threatening, the 
next chapter sheds light on their discourse about plausible political strategies to ameliorate this 














Chapter 6. Talking political strategies in the Greek and German crises: Injustice, identity, 
agency and alternatives. Evidence from the POLPART focus groups. 
The previous chapter examined citizens’ perceptions of crises in Greece and Germany in order to 
understand and explain their suggested political strategies to cope with these problem-areas. 
Distinguishing between financial, refugee and political crises in 2015, I showed that participants 
in both countries portrayed an environment of multiple and multilevel threats. However, their 
severity and predominance depended on the country’s structural position in the EU, socio-
political legacy, democratic quality, and politicians’ management capacity. Greece’s modest 
economy, peripheral position and debtor status in the EU has facilitated the emergence of a 
severe financial and political crisis, with the refugee crisis adding further complexity to human 
suffering. Greek participants reflected repeatedly on the possibility of revolution and radical 
social change to alter their grim prospects, as well as emigration opportunities, especially for the 
youth. Germany’s strong economy, powerful position and creditor status in the EU attracted 
immigration from crisis regions and rendered the refugee crisis and its political (mis)management 
the most crucial issue in society; with the financial crisis coming secondary. German participants 
advocated for moderate social change to retain their strong position, shying away from radical 
political strategies due to the country’s contentious history and current powerful status. Yet the 
crises, signalling a state of emergency, have polarized and radicalized politics in both countries. 
The EU was perceived as contributing to these crises instead of addressing the problems at their 
source, but disenchantment with domestic politicians was greater.  
As argued in Chapter 3, the way crises are discussed in the two cases introduces specific 
common problems citizens wish to address (discourse about grievances, injustice); brings in 
particular political actors citizens identify with to address those issues (discourse about 
mobilization, identity); and opens up certain possibilities for their remedy while closing down 
others (discourse about opportunity, agency). For a detailed analysis of citizen discourse about 
political strategies, I highlighted a number of influential mechanisms. In particular, the chapter 
will summarize the strategies participants suggest to cope with the crises, their subtleties and 
level of rupture with the status quo (social construction of political strategies). Within this 
framework, I will examine the targets of injustice and blame attributions for the crises (injustice), 
politicized collective identities and the actors they refer to as allies or opponents in the movement 
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and party arena (identity), levels of agency and efficacy when mobilizing for social change 
(agency), and plausible alternatives to the post-democratic crisis of representation at the national 
and European level. As Gamson (1992) argues, citizens are more likely to engage in action when 
they define a situation as unjust, are able to attribute responsibility for their predicament to 
specific actors, construct inclusive politicized collective identities, and make use of opportunities 
and threats in their political environment. In the event that citizens do not or cannot engage in 
these processes, they are more likely to resort to passivity rather than engagement.  
The rest of the chapter presents citizen discourse about the availability, legitimacy and 
efficacy of political strategies per crisis (financial, refugee, political), with a focus on repertoires 
of injustice, identity, agency, and alternatives. Each section begins with the case that was most 
affected by the crisis under discussion. 
6.1. The financial crisis 
6.1.1. Social construction: Alternative resilience networks in Greece, enough with Greek aid in 
Germany 
With regard to the financial crisis, which was felt predominantly in Greece and was perceived as 
part of the 2008 global capitalist crash, most participants were in search of radical revolutionary 
change that could alter their desperate situation of poverty, anxiety, insecurity and depression. 
They discussed the formation of consumer movements for taxation reduction, alternative barter 
systems and markets without middle men, even ideas of autarchy and independence from the 
global economy through multi-communitarian living. Novel strategies referred to alternative 
forms of resilience such as self-organized solidarity networks and collective civil disobedience to 
tackle austerity policies and their consequences like house evictions. Contrary in Germany, 
participants referred to the financial crisis briefly, without engaging in lengthy debates about 
austerity and capitalism. When mentioning the financial crisis, they tended to discuss the “Greek 
crisis”, as shown in the previous chapter. Participants expressed a certain fatigue with the “Greek 
crisis”. They discussed action by institutions at the federal and European level such as bailout 
packages and Grexit, but abstained from debating individual or collective action strategies. 
Perceiving the problem as “Greek particularity”, they suggested reformist strategies for the single 
currency union (Eurozone) and refrained from major anti-capitalist discourse.  
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 In Greece participants suggested a mix of governmental, individual and collective action 
strategies. At the institutional level, they referred to an introvert market, lacking competitive 
industries compared to northern European countries. They suggested restarting the economy with 
a focus on autarchy (producing enough to cover the population’s needs) and exports of signature 
products (wine, olive oil, biological products). At the individual level participants argued for a 
responsible and critical stance towards money, spending according to their capacity, while 
avoiding over-consumption and excessive borrowing. However, it was at the collective action 
level that novel practices were introduced. Five years of ongoing austerity and 25% GDP 
contraction triggered individualism and competition for reduced resources, but it also brought 
citizens together. Alternative forms of resilience such as self-organized solidarity networks, 
alternative barter economy, time banks, collective boycotts and civil disobedience were enacted 
out of necessity (starvation) and facilitated by a culture of associational networks and 
communitarian tradition (Kousis, 2017). Particularly interesting were the numerous stories of 
personal experiences with these initiatives, as providers or receivers of solidarity. The following 
excerpts discuss time banks and solidarity initiatives:   
Stamatis: I agree with Vivi about inhumanity and individualism, I see all this, and the degradation of 
politics, but I think there’s a parallel movement, which I don’t know if it’s that strong, that of solidarity, 
charity, however you may call it. It’s an attempt, since we cannot rely on politicians anymore, we’ll do some 
things, some small things, not overthrowing the regime, some simple everyday things to help. 
Athanasia: Yes, I’ve heard there are groups where you can exchange products and services.  
Vivi: Time banks? These things usually don’t work in Greece. 
Stamatis: But I know that they work. 
Athanasia: For example, if a plumber comes to your home to fix something, you may go to their home and 
help their kids with homework. 
Makis: Like an exchange of services     (Greece, 26-40HE) 
Evaggelia: I want to stress that nowadays in Greece there are many, many groups [that help] and they 
aren’t only charities. They’re voluntary associations that appear to do something specific but behind the 
scenes they do much more. And they [the media] don’t want to show their work, I know because I 
participate in many of these. We also collect clothing and food for several communities. 
Olga: I also know a theatre that did this. They collected baby food and clothes for refugees. There are many 
initiatives that are currently operating.  
Evaggelia: And they aren’t necessarily big organisations, even schools do it. Last year we collected money 
for two families that had no electricity. These aren’t charities, they’re voluntary associations that help 
people in need.        (Greece, 41–60 LE) 
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Participants in Greece debate the formation of new institutions that function as shock 
absorbers to the crisis, assisting increasing numbers of people in need, the poor and the homeless, 
crisis-hit citizens and refugees. Participants argue that it is a parallel movement to the crisis, the 
inhumanity and individualism that was triggered with the pauperization and precarization of large 
segments of the population. They point out that these institutions emerged out of necessity and 
solidarity, a necessary alternative to reliance on politicians. Although rooted in community and 
self-organization, participants suggest that this is not the revolution, highlighting the limitations 
of these initiatives. One participant (Vivi) is dismissing them as utopian with a generalization 
(these things usually don’t work) – she doesn’t doubt their presence but their efficacy – yet the 
rest provide personal examples of their function. Personal experiences and factual knowledge 
were more persuasive than generalizations and popular wisdom when disagreement emerged, 
especially when supported by more than one discussant. The dissenting participant(s) would 
either soften their critique reaching middle ground if persuaded by argumentation, or otherwise 
would keep their initial position (agree to disagree). In the excerpt, Vivi (26-40HE) softens her 
critique by adding the temporal adverb “usually” to her argument, leaving room for alternative 
positions. Overall, participants tended to agree on the significance of solidarity initiatives for 
Greek society.  
On the other hand, referring to the financial crisis participants in Germany would discuss 
the “Greek crisis”. They were annoyed with the multiple bailout packages that did not seem to 
solve the problem but increased their taxes. In the words of Alexander (41-60 HE), “I don’t know 
how much aid we’ve provided already, the fourth or fifth [package]? It’s an issue and it costs 
much more than the refugees.”. Greece received three bailouts by 2015, but Alexander 
exaggerates their number to express his frustration. German participants did not suggest 
particular strategies at the individual and collective action level in the financial/Greek crisis. Lack 
of information on the politics of another country, perceived corruption and the “Greek 
particularity” argument, personal problems and individualism were among the reasons provided 
for distancing themselves from acts of solidarity. The “Greek crisis” was seen as tackled at the 
level of institutions. In the nine focus groups there was only one reference to a possible solidarity 
initiative, which was rejected swiftly for the reasons mentioned. Indicative of the frustration with 
the matter, participants suggested that in the event of a referendum (a la Greek style) on the 
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financial aid to Greece, the most plausible outcome would be a resounding “NO” (Jan, 18-25LE) 
or Grexit (Sacha, 41-60LE).  
Jens: Donate to Greece [laughter]. A joke. 
Anton: You could go on holiday there and support tourism, you could.   
Gudrun: Yes, but the majority of their problems are homemade, over which we have no influence, on the 
financial or the tax system or the banks or the corrupt politics over there [...]    
Jasmin: There was this crowdfunding initiative, if every European donated a euro, then Greece would be 
saved four times somehow. But of course, on the one hand, this sounds a bit utopian, and on the other, not 
everyone can donate one euro while others can donate much more. For instance, a mother with four kids 
and one or more jobs cannot inform herself about the political situation, she has her own worries so to say. 
Anton: You also have the feeling that measures have been taken, that we are liable for our debts, and so you 
feel a bit freed from responsibility, a bit self-reliant. Anyway, they’ve already got so much money that I 
personally have nothing more to do now.  
Gudrun: I think it’s difficult, because you cannot understand the situation exactly, either due to lack of 
information or perhaps due to lack of interest, or due to your own concerns. Also, it's not so much that I 
cannot donate a euro, but I wouldn’t donate it, I don’t want to. 
Anton: Because I also don’t see the problem in Greece to be so dramatic either, even though we hear about 
the lack of medicine in the hospitals etc. Yet I don’t think the situation is so dramatic, as in other areas, as 
in Africa for example, because many Greeks still own their homes and so on…  
Jasmin: I find it always difficult to say where it’s worse, people can judge for themselves, but then one 
doesn’t need to look outside Berlin because we have so many problems, be it social, cultural etc. Yet, I don’t 
blame the people on the ground, I'm not saying that the Greek people are responsible for the crisis.  
Gudrun: Yeah right, that’s why a lot of banks there were saved with German money, but of course I still 
don’t understand how I could help [the Greeks] individually. 
Jasmin: So, it shouldn’t be the task of the individual to save a country, it should be dealt with at the foreign 
policy level, but in some cases it’s like an emergency situation, one might have to switch to other things. 
          (Germany, 26-40HE) 
Reference to Greece receiving solidarity funding triggers laughter among participants 
rather than approval. Participants engage in a long discussion why this is the case. Greeks have 
received funding multiple times for a problem that is not yet solved and is seen as caused by their 
own irresponsibility (tax evasion, corruption). The argument that “Greece has been saved with 
German money” was a common repertoire in the discussions, coupled with paternalistic and 
familial undertones (the German paymaster in the European family). In other instances, the 
Greeks were portrayed as kids that should not be trusted with money, while Germans have a 
parenting mandate (Sascha, 41-60LE). One participant (Jasmin) critically distances herself from 
blaming the population for the crisis. Left-wing participants in Germany appeared relatively 
131 
 
sympathetic to Greek citizens putting the blame not only on political corruption but also on the 
(global) banking system. However, the rest appear frustrated with the issue. The “multiple and 
multilevel crises” environment has triggered insecurity and preoccupation with own worries as 
material and symbolic threats loom on the horizon even for citizens in crisis-surviving countries. 
A new crisis may be on the way.  
6.1.2. Injustice: The mystery of bankruptcy in Greece, bailing out Greece in Germany 
There was widespread awareness in Greece that although citizens played a role in the financial 
meltdown, the latter was due to excessive borrowing predominantly at the country level rather 
than citizen indebtedness. The fundamental sense of injustice was built around the idea that 
politicians throw citizens indiscriminately into poverty, insecurity and depression, although not 
all of them borrowed money irresponsibly. Participants discussed the country’s dependence on 
money supply as political mismanagement, since it is impossible for citizens to know the 
specificities of macro-economic policy. Recurrent questions emerged addressing injustice 
regarding what they perceived as unofficial bankruptcy. 
Manos: My opinion is that we’re trying to change something which is fundamentally wrong. With small 
alterations the situation doesn’t change, there needs to be a revolutionary change of the system. I think that 
we rely on a value system that has been imposed on us. 
Nikos: Essentially, is the system or are we to blame?  
Manos: Because at the moment, they (politicians) try to make us feel guilty, that it’s our fault. 
Nikos: Well, I’m not sure whether it’s not our fault. 
Valantis: It’s the citizens’ fault for the situation we are in. 
Manos: So, will you tell a new-born child tomorrow, it’s your fault? Why is there huge public debt? 
Valantis: No, but maybe it is its father’s fault for engaging in corruption, it’s someone’s fault. 
Niki: Yes, but it’s also the fault of a kid that his father didn’t do such a thing, but its classmate’s did for 
example. 
Valantis: Everybody will pay the price though, this is the problem.  
Manos: So, you see there’s a logical fallacy here. 
Valantis: And it doesn’t comply with the rule of law. But this isn’t democracy, we don’t live in a democratic 
system, right? 
Manos: Exactly, that’s why I’m saying that we need a revolutionary, fundamental change of the system.  
                      (Greece, 26-40LE) 
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Participants address the need for a political revolution – a recurrent interpretative 
repertoire in the Greek discussions – because they find themselves unable to influence politics. 
Mobilizing against austerity in the streets and the ballots for five years (2010-2015), they see no 
actual change. Instead, the system appears in generalized crisis and deeply undemocratic, unable 
to provide solutions apart from making people poorer. Participants are aware of citizen 
contribution to the financial and political meltdown, that is by engaging in clientelism. There is a 
logical fallacy though as they point out quickly. Not all citizens and politicians engaged in 
corrupt behaviour. The question then is: Who did? These questions underline an important aspect 
in the Greek crisis, the fact that no justice has been served. Iceland was brought up as a counter-
example of a country that jailed politicians and bankers involved in the crisis (26-40LE, 41-
60HE). Even though citizens assume that their desperate situation is due to loans and corruption, 
the perpetrators of putting in debt present and future generations are still unknown. Instead, 
politicians accused citizens indiscriminately that “we were all in this together”.  
 Contrary in Germany, the fundamental sense of injustice was organized around the 
interpretative repertoire of “bailing out Greece” – that of having played by the rules yourself, but 
paid repeatedly for other peoples’ irresponsibility in a period of crisis. A minority of discussants 
highlighted the role of banks in the financial crisis, yet the majority blamed the “relaxed Greeks” 
and their “corrupt politicians” for bringing their problems to the EU (see Chapter 5, p. 98). 
Keeping a balanced budget requires sacrifices and adopting unpopular policies such as cuts in 
public spending. German citizens appear to understand that these sacrifices are justified by 
concern for the common good (German and European competitiveness). Contrary Greek citizens 
are portrayed as behaving in an irresponsible and selfish manner, placing life quality before long 
term collective goals. In the words of Igor (26-40LE, p. 96), “if other countries have wasted 
money and we balanced the budget, then it’s difficult to tell the German people ‘Yes, by the way, 
we need to pay for others’, because they didn’t keep within budget as we did”. Participants seem 
to presuppose that Greek citizens knew about the irregularities with the admission criteria, the 
unbalanced budget or the levels of sovereign debt, which as we saw in the focus groups, was not 
exactly the case. They employed interchangeably the levels of country, government/politicians 
and citizens in blame attributions (Greece=Greek government=Greek citizens), and didn’t seem 
to differentiate between diverse groups in society, for example rich and poor Greeks, law-abiding 
and corrupt citizens. Reinforcing stereotypes by over-simplifying intergroup differences within 
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countries was a common practice also in Greece, particularly in the refugee crisis, indicating a 
competitive European environment.  
6.1.3. Identity: The little people vs. the markets in Greece, responsible vs. irresponsible 
Europeans in Germany  
The extent of humanitarian crisis in Greece and the fact that austerity was imposed despite voting 
for a radical left party (SYRIZA) in government introduced a certain opponent, the markets and 
wealthy countries that were seen to be waging an “economic war” on Greek citizens. Thus, while 
acknowledging responsibility for the crisis, participants also employed a strong anti-capitalist and 
anti-austerity discourse, as shown in Chapter 5. Discussing political strategies, participants 
constructed collective identities like the (little) people vs. the markets/banks (multinationals), 
citizens of the European periphery vs. capitalists (politicians and business) of the European 
centre. These identities were politicized to the extent that the financial crisis was perceived as a 
collective problem rather than an individual wrongdoing (see Chapter 5, p. 94-95 & p. 116). 
Moreover, the financial crisis in Greece brought another aspect to the fore. That it is as much an 
economic issue as it is an indication of “Europeanness” and citizens’ capacity to participate in a 
common union responsibly. In the words of Zacharias (61+HE), “it’s a big issue for me the fact 
that on the one hand we consider ourselves Europeans and on the other we don’t behave 
accordingly”. Most discussants echoed this statement and were surprised to find out about the 
statistical manipulation and huge public debt. At the same time, they constructed a different 
Europe, that of humanism and solidarity, which was negated by current practice: the economic, 
cultural and political subordination of the European periphery to the centre.  
Presented as “Greek particularity”, most participants in Germany abstained from blaming 
the system – capitalism or the EU – as a whole. Rather they introduced certain distinctions 
between responsible Europeans that pay their dues and those irresponsible that lie and take 
advantage of others. Greek citizens were portrayed in general as living beyond their means, 
enjoying a relaxing, fun-loving lifestyle, lying and cheating, working less and retiring earlier than 
the Germans (see Chapter 5, p. 98). Thus, they were denied the status of “good Europeans”. On 
the contrary, German citizens were discussed as hard working, responsible individuals who do 
their utmost not only for their country but also Europe. The “German paymaster in the European 
family” was a common repertoire. In the words of Laurenz (Activists, p. 114), “when those who 
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pay the most are also burdened with the problems of others, well at that moment [you know that] 
something is wrong”. Although participants acknowledged their powerful position and high 
levels of prosperity, they also referred to groups in society that struggle financially. References to 
homelessness and poverty rising with the crises, parents stressing about raising kids, cuts in 
welfare benefits, rising rents and competition in the job market triggered sentiments of relative 
deprivation. “Yes, we are doing well, but compared to past times or Scandinavian countries we 
lag behind” (61+HE).  
6.1.4. Agency: Survivalism & collective resistance in Greece; nobody asked about the bailouts in 
Germany 
Participants in Greece expressed widespread pessimism and futility about the influence of the 
“little people” over banks and multinationals, especially among those with fewer resources 
(education, income). However, they left a window of opportunity open in the event that citizens 
unite and use their purchasing power strategically, by engaging in massive collective boycotts 
and civil disobedience (e.g., abstaining from paying taxes collectively) in the age of financialized 
capitalism. Participants shared numerous examples of personal engagement in alternative 
resilience networks. In many ways, ordinary citizens turned into activists out of necessity and this 
political capital socialized and empowered them. In some instances, even civil disobedience was 
proposed by participants that did not identify as particularly leftist to tackle poverty and 
dehumanization. 
Ionas: With respect to neighbourhood associations and citizen initiatives, maybe now that the house 
auctions will begin, maybe they’re also needed more for the local community and how it can react to this 
[situation]; let’s say that they come to take the neighbour’s home nearby, and I join or the neighbours next 
door, we go to the front and we let no prosecutor get inside, no police, nobody.  
Takis: Like we did with re-connecting the power supply 
Ionas: With electricity yes, like we did with re-connecting the power supply. So, this [action] has a locality 
in it, there is an acquaintance even if we don’t say good morning every day like we used to. But you see the 
neighbour across the street, you see him hanging clothes every day, you hear that they come to take his 
home and you say the poor fellah, guys let’s go ten people to the front [to stop the eviction]. There are also 
these voluntary associations engaging with such [solidarity] initiatives, but especially for us who live in the 
neighbourhood it’s even closer [to get involved].    (Greece, 41-60 HE) 
Due to the crisis some citizens lost their homes, or could not pay the bills anymore. As the 
state bailed out banks to keep the financial system alive, so did citizens help one another to 
survive the crisis. Resisting authorities foreclosing homes and cutting the power supply could be 
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considered illegal activities. However, participants present them as rational and humane reactions 
to an unjust situation. Discussants portray a strong local community that empathizes with the 
adversities of the neighbour, although the trend of individualism is also present. The motives for 
action are not all about smashing the system or bringing on the revolution – these motives were 
also present – but helping the “poor fellah”. Successful experiences with civil disobedience filled 
participants with empowerment, and worked as a guide for future action.  
Participants in Germany portrayed themselves as observers in the “financial/Greek crisis”. 
They argued that the bailout packages were decided at the federal and European level, where 
German citizens seem to have limited influence. They expressed bitterness at not being asked 
about the MoUs. Participants suggested referenda, opinion polls or public deliberative meetings, 
so that politicians are in line with the public sentiment. In the event of a referendum on whether 
Greece should receive aid though, the most likely response would be “NO” as Jan, echoing many 
discussants, suggests below.  
Norbert: [Debating further citizen inclusion in politics] And if we now voted in referenda, I think it’d 
be very good, although of course it also has its risks, so for example, if information is misleading and 
people vote on issues using their gut feeling. So this is also the problem, it should be that people 
actually inform themselves and then vote and decide on things, because you cannot be an expert on 
everything. And if you only look on the surface, this can also bring many problems. But if information 
is correct and people can deal with it and actually want it, I think it can also bring many advantages.  
Jan: I believe it [a referendum on Greek aid] would throw us into chaos. Because one has some kind 
of conviction, something like “Greece gets no more money, it’s their own fault. Full stop. End. That’s 
enough! And you cannot really see all the consequences related to this decision. Who is now exactly 
and how much involved in the situation, and who must pay and how much, and should Greece really 
lose all the money etc. Yes, it’s just too superficial and too complex a matter to simply say: ‘Yes, I’m 
against it, or No, I’m for it.’ I think, this is not helpful. Because we’re no experts on these matters 
either. For example, one simply says: ‘Well, this is unfair, they get into debt and we have to pay for it, 
in the end they should see where they end up’. Well, I believe, this was the message in the media, more 
or less. And if we now voted on this question, then the majority would decide to turn our backs on them 
perhaps without really thinking about the consequences. I believe, this would be very problematic. 
         (Germany, 18-25LE) 
Debating alternatives in political decision making, participants in Germany discussed the 
option of referenda on important issues. As will be shown in the democratic alternatives section, 
participants did not consider referenda as panacea to the crises. Some issues are too complex to 
be decided upon with a “yes” or “no” in the ballot box and may have unintended consequences. 
Here, implicit reference to the Greek referendum is made for not taking into consideration issues 
of responsibility for the common currency. Participants acknowledged the usefulness of advisory 
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referenda as “citizen barometers”, however, so that politicians are aware of people’s views on 
crucial matters. Overall, German participants did not express much agency and empowerment 
when discussing the financial/Greek crisis. Action at the level of institutions and by politicians 
such as Germany’s finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble and his famous “black zero” deficit 
policy were seen as adequate strategies. 
6.2. The refugee crisis 
6.2.1. Social construction: In search of moderate alternatives in Germany, solidarity networks 
and pro-refugee SYRIZA in Greece  
Whereas the financial crisis was predominantly felt in Greece, it was the refugee crisis that 
triggered serious concerns in Germany. Overall, German participants empathized with the 
refugees but appeared overwhelmed by the large numbers to be received and the chaotic, 
disorganized state response in accommodating them. As a result, they were in search of moderate 
alternatives to express their dissatisfaction with Chancellor Merkel’s open refugee policy. The 
latter went against the more conservative approach to immigration that her party, the CDU, was 
promoting for years. Some participants applauded her and were inspired to assist with the matter, 
but most felt the need to express their dissatisfaction in an attempt to influence this “terrible 
decision”. Processes of polarization and radicalization were discussed with the ongoing 
mobilization of pro and anti-immigration actors in the movement and party arena. In Greece 
participants discussed refugee solidarity initiatives operating in the sea and on the land and 
minimized the presence of the far-right party Golden Dawn as a reaction to the shock triggered 
by the financial crisis. The pro-refugee response was discussed as facilitated by the mobilization 
of solidarity networks emerging with the financial crisis, and the election of the left-wing 
SYRIZA that supported a solidarity-driven European response to the issue.  
 Starting with Germany, participants argued for a humane yet responsible approach to the 
refugee crisis. The federal government was severely criticized for not rising up to expectations 
even though it declared emphatically that “we can do it”. Action at the level of institutions such 
as speeding up the asylum process, opening up the labour market to accommodate the newcomers 
and offering language and integration courses were suggested by a majority. Left-wing 
discussants argued further that the origins of the refugee crisis should be tackled by ending the 
war in Syria and disengaging the Bundeswehr [arms industry] from the MENA region. Attempts 
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to keep refugees in camps in the region (e.g., Lebanon) were also proposed “as for them to feel 
comfortable within a familiar cultural environment” (18-25LE, 26-40HE). In the words of Jasmin 
(18-25LE), “my opinion is that the problem isn’t actually in Germany, but where the people come 
from originally. So, you should try to keep the people in their homes, thus you should try to stop 
the war somehow. Because, eventually we will have a cultural problem in Germany”. Perceiving 
a chaotic, disorganized state response, discussants provided numerous examples of solidarity 
initiatives. Solidarity cinemas, solidarity kitchens, welcoming events at schools, money 
donations, distribution of blankets, food and clothing were but a few examples of the “welcoming 
culture” in the country (Funk, 2016). Indicative of the polarization on the issue, solidarity 
references were often coupled with anti-refugee sentiments and practices by nationalist groups 
(NPD, PEGIDA, HoGeSa), like destroying refugee centres or bullying volunteers (18-25 HE, 41-
60 HE, 61+ LE). The tension between pro-refugee and anti-refugee discourse is presented below. 
Alexander: My dog trainer is totally committed [to the refugee issue]. The first days when the refugees 
arrived, she said: It cannot be that people have to spend the night outside, this is ridiculous, and the 
weather was still warm. So, she went there and served tea. I don’t know if it was meaningful, but people saw 
that someone cares. Nobody paid for it, nobody asked for it, nobody said thank you besides the people who 
were served. In the meantime, this [initiative] was organized through Facebook and now they are five of 
them. This group also collects donations and distributes them to the people who still camp outside, and 
they’re also handing out blankets, because now it’s really cold. I also find it unbelievable that adult people 
in Germany have to sleep on the floor outside some fucking authority, because they have to wait for their 
numbers [for an appointment with the services]. So, she’s engaged personally and feels good about it… The 
only thing she sacrifices is time and maybe some money for fuel or something. I think it’s great.[…] 
Ingrid: I’m also committed, but not in this area of refugees, I wouldn’t do that, definitely not. But I’ve 
recently given a package of my deceased partner’s clothes to my neighbour who runs a refugee home. And 
he wanted to take me there at some point, it was in the summer when it all started, and I said ‘no thank you 
I’m not interested’. He told me come with me to see with your own eyes and I said no. Meanwhile, his 
family has changed its mind about these people, who were always very pro…  
Alexander: I hear this relative often that people, who are in direct contact with them, at some point they say 
it’s enough. 
Ingrid: Sometimes he pours his heart out to me when we’re standing at the fence of the property, saying 
‘sometimes I'm really sick of it, I don’t want to go there anymore, the cleaners need more time than before’. 
I asked why is it so? He told me that they have to go there three times a day, because they behave in a very 
unclean manner… 
Pauline C.: Because this is how they behave in their countries. 
Ingrid: Yes, but we cannot do anything about it, they are with us now.  (Germany, 41-60HE)                                                                  
Participants suggested that the refugee issue triggered a polarized and emotional debate in 
Germany, with citizens expressing both empathetic and fearful sentiments. In this excerpt we 
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encounter Alexander’s (41-60HE) heartfelt reference to his acquaintance engaging in solidarity 
initiatives that welcomed refugees and assisted with basic needs and German bureaucracy. The 
motivation behind these practices is humanism, helping people in need, and is presented as a 
natural response to human suffering. This grassroots solidarity organizing was supported by 
volunteers and facilitated by social media. Groups in the public sector such as firefighters and the 
army were also mobilized to assist with practicalities like transforming unused buildings into 
refugee centres and building new camps. Ingrid brings a counter-example to show that solidarity 
practices can backfire when refugees are not urged to adapt to the host society. Despite his pro-
refugee example, Alexander agrees with Ingrid that this cultural clash can turn citizens away 
from solidarity practices. This recurrent interpretative repertoire posed that “foreigners” need to 
integrate if they wished to stay, by speaking the language and behaving in accordance to German 
norms.  
In Greece the refugee crisis was discussed as an international crisis triggered by oil wars 
in the MENA region. It affected the country predominantly due to its geographical location. 
Participants agreed with their counterparts in Germany about institutional, individual and 
collective action strategies, like stopping the war, donating and volunteering. Yet, they also 
problematized the lack of resources and infrastructure in the country amidst the crises, especially 
among right-wing participants. Novel solidarity practices were discussed, such as moving to the 
islands to assist the rescue teams operating in the Aegean Sea.  
 Kostas: [Referring to the pictures of political engagement presented to them] I would like to see a picture 
 with people saving lives in the Aegean Sea at the moment. It’s something very powerful, very important. 
Nikos: Yes, a picture from Lesvos [Greek island and major hot spot on the migratory route to Europe], 
because it’s a very recent and intense moment, seeing kids drown in front of you… it had a big effect on all 
of us emotionally, it got us involved… 
Takis: Related to what we can do as citizens, my point is that apart from participating in politics and 
becoming a better citizen, you need to do this directly and actively by rejecting delegation of your 
responsibility and political power. Because this makes you an active citizen. There’s a range of political 
activities I can engage with. In the refugee crisis for instance, I can start from liking a post on Facebook to 
going to Lesvos and help refugees. 
 Ionas: So, going to Lesvos is preferable to liking a post on Facebook? 
 Takis: I’m not saying it’s preferable, I’m just saying that liking a post is a passive activity that doesn’t 
 engage with your self-development directly – that is, to engage with the problem at its source, whether it’s 
 in Lesvos or anywhere. 
 Nikos: Yes, the more actively you engage with politics, the better for you as a citizen. 
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 Takis: Exactly, because you get a direct glimpse of reality, who are these people that come to your country 
 to find refuge; whereas with liking a post there’s no real interaction.    (Greece, 41-60HE) 
The refugee crisis appears to be an intense and emotional moment for participants that got 
them involved. The proximity of these tragedies, “seeing kids drown”, has activated Greek 
citizens, with many leaving the comfort of their apartments and social media to provide direct 
assistance. Participants suggest that active citizenship, engaging with a problem at its source, is 
key to transforming people’s consciousness and agency, due to empowerment and political 
responsibility that comes with real unmediated interaction. In this excerpt, discussants engage in 
a debate about online and offline solidarity practice. Online action is presented as a relatively 
novel form of engagement that comes with technological innovation. Information on international 
politics and connectivity with activists and political groups were positively evaluated. On the 
other hand, surveillance, fake news, individualism and passivity (liking a post) were presented as 
serious disadvantages 
6.2.2. Injustice: Foreigners in own country in Germany, Europe’s largest hot spot in Greece 
The fundamental sense of injustice in Germany referred to the idea that citizens were 
disproportionally burdened with the refugee crisis, becoming “foreigners in their own country”. 
Chancellor Merkel and the mainstream parties were blamed for not offering alternatives and 
silencing citizens on the matter. Participants expressed willingness to assist refugees from war-
torn areas and authoritarian regimes (as opposed to economic migrants). However, they 
suggested that a certain balance must be kept between the locals and the foreigners (see Chapter 
5, p. 105). They argued that receiving 1.5 million refugees was intimidating and threatened social 
cohesion. Participants expressed bitterness about what they perceived as lack of European 
solidarity on the issue: some countries receiving large flows, while others, placing their national 
interests first, accepted only few or built fences to stop any people from entering (Hungary, 
Poland, the UK, Luxemburg in the discussions). In the words of Walter (Activists, p. 114), “what 
bothers me now with the refugees is that the EU is very much ahead with solidarity [Irony]. Some 
say they don’t want any [refugees], others say we only want Christians although it’s Muslims 
that are coming... And now they cannot agree how to distribute the people, that’s not the 
solidarity I have in mind when I think about Europe. And the so-called values that are always 
held high in Europe, which they quickly go down the drain, a heavy disappointment”. 
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Participants in Greece portrayed the country as the largest hot spot in Europe due to the 
Dublin European Regulation amidst severe financial and political crises. The EU and wealthy 
Europeans were held responsible for dealing with another crisis in an inhumane manner. 
Discussants identified with the weak and employed the underdog repertoire, that the refugee 
crisis emerged from the same processes of capitalism, imperialism and colonialism that brought 
Greece to its knees (see Chapter 5, p. 116). Powerful wealthy nations, European and global 
centres, were perceived as dominating poorer ones, targeting their resources (oil, gas, gold, 
diamonds) or using whole countries for specific purposes. Greece for example was portrayed as a 
filter for skilful refugees to reach their first destination countries in the North, whereas the rest 
remained trapped in shameful conditions. In the words of Vivi (26-40HE, p. 103), “Greece has a 
very specific role in the European Union, because we receive refugees and this has to do with 
Europe’s interests. So, the situation in the country becomes even more complicated. It’s not 
enough that the country has a weak economy and a legacy of civil war. Basically, Greece has 
become a bit like the sewer of Europe”.  
6.2.3. Identity: Maybe Islamophobes but not Nazis in Germany, poor but hospitable in Greece  
In this polarized environment, participants in Germany made certain distinctions between “us” 
and “them”, referring mainly to the cultural clash between the locals and the foreigners. The 
most crucial distinction participants made was between Christian/Western/rich and Muslim/ 
Eastern/poor refugees. For right-wing participants this cultural clash extended also to the 
economic sphere. They expressed resentment that funds will be allocated to foreigners instead of 
“our people”. In the words of Pauline (41-60LE), “and suddenly we have money, but what about 
money for our children? In Kaulsdorf, a school had to close down due to potential collapse, but 
now all of a sudden we have money”. Left-wing participants distinguished between rich and poor 
foreigners, referring to rich multinationals that don’t pay their fair share of taxes as opposed to 
“fugitives” who flee their homes due to life threatening conditions. In the words of Wilma 
(61+LE), “at last, someone should do something, not against the poor refugees, but against the 
rich refugees, these companies that work here. These refugees are more expensive than those 
who are coming now”. Yet, the most politicized differentiation was between Christian and 
Muslim refugees. The former were portrayed as moderate, secular, egalitarian, law-abiding, 
aspiring to democracy and European social norms, “people like us”. The latter were presented as 
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religious, radical, authoritarian, potentially criminal or terrorist (“ISIS fighters”), threatening “our 
way of life”. In the following excerpt participants discuss the rise of the radical right as a reaction 
to the refugee crisis. 
Alexander: [Discussing further citizen inclusion in politics, and referenda in particular] I think it would be 
a good thing if politicians saw that what they consider in their ivory towers doesn’t correspond to reality 
sometimes and that the population perhaps has a completely different opinion on a specific issue.  
Konrad: Like with PEGIDA, the government said, there are just a few people in Germany, a few misguided 
people on the extreme right.  
Alexander: Yes, they are a lot.  
Konrad: I don’t count myself in, but I don’t think they’re just a few. And if you held a secret election now, 
there would come out numbers, I think, that would be very unpleasant for politicians... 
Ingrid: Yes, I believe that many PEGIDA supporters are pushed too far on the right, always on the far right, 
and I don’t think this is correct. Because I believe that there are a lot of people, who are just overwhelmed 
at the moment, overwhelmed in the negative sense, by the refugee policy and the fact that they want to 
defend themselves somehow, and they perhaps see it as the only way to express themselves. I, for example, 
don’t go there [PEGIDA demonstrations] out of fear somehow. 
Alexander: I also find it annoying when people who are engaged with the refugee issue hear someone 
expressing criticism, they don’t try to convince them with arguments, but simply say, you’re a Nazi. 
Konrad: Yes, they’re being pushed away. 
Ingrid: Exactly, that’s what I mean, you’re pushed towards the extreme right. 
Alexander: Of course, and then my reaction would be, you say I'm a Nazi, but do something. It feels like the 
people who don’t agree with us, are called out as Nazis. And I find this response too little at the moment.  
         (Germany, 41-60HE) 
Participants suggest that the large presence of “unintegrated foreigners” in Germany and 
the threat of receiving even more has led to polarization and right-wing radicalization, because 
citizens cannot find alternatives among mainstream parties. Although the federal government 
tried to minimize their presence, participants construct a majority that appears overwhelmed, 
annoyed and defenceless. As Konrad (41-60HE) suggests, echoing future developments with the 
rise of the AfD, if there was a secret election at that moment (Fall 2015), the radical right would 
receive large support among the electorate. Moderate left-wing participants agreed with 
Chancellor Merkel that “we can do it” and urged officials to open up unused spaces for refugee 
accommodation. Most participants in Germany supported a more conservative approach to the 
refugee crisis, but distanced themselves from the radical right. Yet, they suggested that the 
collective mobilization of the PEGIDA movement and parties like the AfD have managed to 
bring contestation to a policy that was presented to them as TINA. A common interretative 
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repertoire in the two countries indicated that citizens who express criticism over the 
unconditional reception of refugees tend to be approached as Nazis in Germany and racists in 
Greece instead of discussing the matter in a thorough and rational manner.  
Participants in Greece differentiated between “the hospitable people” that show solidarity 
with the refugees and “the insensitive Europeans” that don’t share their good fortune with others 
(see Chapter 5, p. 106 & 109). This was also a strategy of positive differentiation from the 
“wealthy but insensitive Europeans” who, in their view, treated in a cruel manner Greeks and 
refugees alike. Interestingly and stereotypically, most participants did not differentiate between 
diverse groups among “those Europeans”, such as citizens and politicians, progressive and 
conservative groups. In a situation of reduced resources and material deprivation, discrimination 
against “immigrants” as opposed to “refugees” was present. Othering expressions like “these 
people”, distinctions between legal and illegal status, and references to them being a burden on 
welfare services and the job market were expressed (see Chapter 5, p. 103-104). Left wing 
participants highlighted western interference in the MENA region to argue for a solidarity-driven 
strategy, while right-wing discussants underlined the crisis-ridden environment in the country to 
justify a more moderate approach. Yet, there was a tendency to deny accusations of racism and 
project them onto others, mainly the northern Europeans as will be elaborated in the next section. 
6.2.4. Agency: Citizens silenced in Germany, normalization of refugee solidarity in Greece 
Participants in Germany proposed repeatedly that they were silenced on the matter. The 
spontaneous welcoming initiatives were seen as partly successful at the local level but far from an 
effective national response. Whereas some discussants agreed emphatically with Chancellor 
Merkel that “Us Germans we are a large prosperous country and thus we can do it” (Konrad, 41-
60HE), the majority disagreed and proposed voting for conservative parties opposing open 
borders. Most participants distanced themselves from the PEGIDA movement and the radical 
right party AfD as too extreme on the right. Yet these political actors were seen as passing the 
message that “people had enough”. Another strategy participants discussed was holding referenda 
about the number of people to be accommodated and the location of refugee centres in the 
German states (26-40HE, 41-60LE, 61+LE, see Chapter 5 p. 105). However, they expressed 
concerns over creating more tensions between rival camps than reducing them. They brought the 
example of Switzerland, where a referendum on the construction of Minarets was seen as 
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dividing citizens, being hijacked by radicals who wanted to express anti-immigrant and anti-
Muslim sentiments. 
Participants in Greece referred to moderate levels of efficacy and agency, mainly at the 
local level of solidarity networks. The presence of a left-wing party in government was discussed 
as altering the discursive opportunity structure on the issue (visibility, resonance, legitimacy), 
with austerity being prioritized to cultural threats as explanation for the troubles in the country 
(Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Pro-refugee discourse and practice was relatively 
normalized as the following excerpt shows. 
Michalis: I believe that voting is important but not the most influential strategy, even though politicians 
want to make us believe that this is people’s ultimate voice in a democratic system. Something that we do 
once every four years!  
Petros: Look, we always talk about the [problematic] political system in Greece. But don’t forget that in 
Germany the first party, in 2015, is the Christian-Democrats, in the Netherlands they have the Native 
Dutch, in Austria they expect the extreme right, in France there’s Le Pen, in Norway the same, in Eastern 
Europe, in Poland the same... So, I think that for Greek standards we’re ok, the fact that we have this alt 
right that has an organizational capacity of 100 people in PanHellenic meetings in contrast with the 
marches of 15.000 angry dudes and daily arsons of refugee centres. In 2012 [in Greece] there was a rise [in 
racist violence], more than 1000 attacks in 6 months, but that’s it. This has to do with the political 
constellation in society. There are no daily arsons of refugee centres like in Germany, where we think that 
everything is ok…What I mean is that for example the last 1-2 years with the refugee crisis, you see that 
public opinion is oriented more towards solidarity, even hypocritically, compared to 2010 and 2011, when 
there was a rise in racist violence. Now that SYRIZA is in power you see that people start thinking 
differently about some issues. Like with the refugees, whenever a group posts that we need warm clothes at 
this particular place, the next day you have 35-40 boxes of clean clothes. What I mean is that people are 
active, there was passivity, there still is, but I think we’re in a better position than Europe regarding issues 
of consciousness. Necessarily we’re in a better position I reckon, lots of myths have crumbled down [with 
the crisis].         (Greece, 18-25HE) 
Petros (18-25HE) in this excerpt concludes a long discussion among the youth about the 
political system in Greece. Engaging in comparisons with moderate and radical right-wing parties 
in Europe, he argues that the presence of and support for the radical right in Greece is weaker 
compared to northern Europe (Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, France, Poland), because of 
the “political constellation in the country”. Whereas 7% voted for the Golden Dawn, 27% and 
36% turned to SYRIZA in the 2012 and 2015 general elections respectively. Petros suggests that 
it makes a difference when official governmental and media discourse does not blame refugees 
for the financial and political collapse in the country. SYRIZA shifted the locus of responsibility 
from cultural (immigration) to economic (austerity) causes for the multiple and multilevel crises. 
The people considered responsible for the crash were predominantly political and economic elites 
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in the country and abroad, not the fugitives of war and famine. This discursive framing triggered 
processes of identification with the weak and resonated with large segments of the population 
who found themselves at risk of poverty and precarity due to austerity. However, this strategy is 
not unproblematic either to the extent that it essentializes cultural differences and justifies 
discrimination and (reverse) racism towards the “northern Europeans”. In addition, solidarity 
with refugees can emerge at the same time with a rise in nationalism in a polarized political 
environment. Participants tended to minimize the fact that Golden Dawn, even though fringe, was 
one of the most extreme nationalist formations in Europe (Ellinas, 2015). 
6.3. The political crisis 
6.3.1. Social construction: Revolution in Greece, reform in Germany 
With centrist parties delegitimized due to corruption and irresponsible governance (clientelism) 
in Greece, and corruption and programmatic convergence (grand coalitions) in Germany, citizens 
turned both to the left and right of the political spectrum to find alternatives. In Greece where the 
main grievances related to the economy and forced poverty for large segments of the population, 
citizens supported predominantly the left in the movement and party arena that mobilized a 
comprehensive anti-austerity agenda. Support for the Indignant movement complemented voting 
for SYRIZA in the anti-austerity mobilization cycle (Karyotis & Rüdig, 2015). Contrary, in 
Germany where the main grievances referred to immigration and the cultural clash between 
locals and foreigners, citizens turned mainly to the right, expressing demands for relative control 
over the refugee issue. Participation in the PEGIDA movement went hand in hand with the rise in 
support for the AfD in the anti-immigration mobilization cycle in Germany (Arzheimer & 
Berning, 2019; Dostal, 2015). Here “mainly” and “predominantly” are of key importance because 
these differences are a matter of degree and not quality; the political constellation in Greece and 
Germany is more complex. What is observed in both cases is polarization, the mobilization of 
left-wing and right-wing discourses as opposed to centrist consensus ideologies. In this 
environment of multiple and multilevel crises, citizens’ preferences may shift from the left to the 
right depending on the type of predominant issues and the level of politicization by movement 
and party actors (Roberts, 2017). 
 Another important observation is the fragmentation of party loyalties triggered by 
disappointment with mainstream ‘cartel’ parties, as well as the radicalization of political 
145 
 
strategies as a reaction to system irresponsiveness (Katz & Mair, 1995). In both countries, 
mobilization in the movement arena (the Indignant and PEGIDA movement) predated 
polarization and radicalization in the electoral arena (SYRIZA and AfD parties). Support for new 
parties (e.g., ANEL, Pirate Party) and transformation of existing ones (e.g., KINAL/PASOK, 
SPD) was observed to offer alternatives to citizen discontent. However, in Greece the crisis of 
legitimacy emerged earlier in 2010 and was more severe due to the country’s unofficial 
bankruptcy. In Greece we encounter a struggle for material basic needs and the prerequisites of a 
democratic system. Consequently, participants’ discussion about political strategies was more 
radical and status quo-challenging than in Germany. Germany’s crisis-surviving status in the 
economy and Chancellor Merkel’s powerful leadership up until 2015 prevented a crisis of 
legitimacy, with citizens engaging in moderate reformist action to express their dissatisfaction. A 
post-materialist political environment emerges, with citizens stressing about life quality, work-
life balance, and leading a responsible life style. 
With these observations in mind, at the level of institutions, participants in both countries 
argued for the prerequisites of living in a fair state that respects the rule of law, treats citizens 
equally and provides basic social protection and quality social services in education, healthcare, 
employment and housing. Participants referred repeatedly to Scandinavian countries (Sweden, 
Iceland and Norway in the discussions), as examples of social democracies that provide for their 
citizens. At the individual level, being active, lawful citizens who consume ethically and 
responsibly, and treat people with respect were common repertoires. It was at the collective 
action level that numerous examples of political strategies in the movement and party arena were 
discussed. I will start with Greece where the political crisis erupted first. 
6.3.1.1. Mobilization in the movement arena 
Anti-austerity mobilization in Greece emerged in the movement arena when both labour and 
conservative mainstream parties were involved in the Eurozone statistics scandal and invited the 
Troika (EC, ECB, IMF) in 2010 to assist with the financial crisis. This decision delegitimized 
both parties in people’s eyes. Movement organizations were perceived as legitimate and available 
actors to mobilize against austerity. The Indignant movement camped symbolically in front of the 
parliament in Athens aiming to cancel the signed MoU and prevent politicians from ratifying a 
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second mid-term structural adjustment programme. The following excerpt discusses its effects on 
the political system. 
Giannis: Out of all the demonstrations I remember the only massive demonstration that scared politicians 
was the situation with the Indignant movement. That time everyone who looked at the politicians would 
understand that they were all scared, all the political spectrum. 
Evaggelia: They [Indignant movement] were persistent and had duration. 
Giannis: Because they [politicians] realized that a very large part of the population wasn’t represented by 
them. They couldn’t control this large group of people, and we see now how the political landscape changed 
when these same politicians controlled the people again. 
Evaggelia: Exactly 
Lina: But how did they control the people?  
Giannis: They brought these powers that absorbed this indignation, and then it [the movement] took 
another form of expression, the power constellation changed and the influence of political parties, even 
though I don’t know if we experience something different [from the previous pro-austerity government]. 
Despoina: Yes, the Indignant movement changed the political landscape. 
Olga: I agree with Lina that demonstrations don’t make a big difference, but because there are many 
injustices, I’d like to see this again. I’ve only been to a demonstration two times in my life because I don’t 
believe in this. 
Giannis: Don’t you believe that the Indignant movement changed the situation? 
Olga: We didn’t see it. 
Giannis: Centrist big parties disappeared, isn’t this a change in the political landscape? 
Olga: Yes, of course. 
Giannis: Of course! In my view it was an opportunity for new things to emerge. 
Eleni: And for other parties to join the parliament. 
Lina: The Indignant movement was in 2010-11, it wasn’t in 2015. 
Giannis: Yes, but big changes don’t happen in 5 minutes. Their views are expressed now, this ends (showing 
the picture with the Indignant movement), and we go to... 
Eleni: Elections        (Greece, 41-60LE) 
The use and repetition of the word “scared” with regard to the government and ‘all the 
political spectrum’ emphasizes the strength, popularity, and novelty of the movement. According 
to Karyotis and Rüdig (2015) 36% of the population participated in it and 70% expressed 
support. Recurrently, even participants (Olga, Lina) who disagree with demonstrations as a 
political tool ‘would like to see this again’, witnessing the efficacy and empowerment of united 
citizens. Participants argue that the Indignant movement instituted social change from below that 
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was later reflected in the party arena. Although two participants express reservations about the 
extent of impact on the political system – not about the impact itself – they are persuaded by 
intense argumentation. Discussants suggested that the movement raised awareness on the crisis of 
representation and the responsibility deficit of ‘big centrist parties’ in tackling the crises 
effectively. This awareness raising led citizens to punish the mainstream parties that ruled Greece 
for 35 years and brought new actors to the fore (SYRIZA, ANEL, POTAMI, Golden Dawn). 
Political parties strive to represent large segments of the population to exert influence on the 
political system. Therefore, they cannot ignore a massive unrepresented movement or group in 
society. They will try to “bring these powers that can absorb this indignation” in an attempt to 
control the political landscape. The Indignant movement is discussed as having transformed the 
electoral arena from a two-party majoritarian to a multi-party coalition system. 
Radicalization started on the right in Germany, which was spotted with the mobilization 
of the PEGIDA movement in 2015 against the unconditional reception of refugees and the so-
called “Islamization of the West”. Participants referred also to movement mobilization on the left, 
with a massive demonstration in Berlin (roughly 250.000 people) protesting the secret 
negotiations of the TTIP deal between the EU and the US government. Notably, apart from brief 
references (18-25HE, 26-40 HE, 41-60HE) – two positive about resistance to the power of 
finance and one negative about camps as a strategy – there was no extensive discussion of the 
Occupy movement or anti-austerity mobilization in Germany. Germany’s close relationship to 
“ordoliberalism”, its resilience in the financial crisis and leading status in the Eurozone, has 
prevented the emergence of a massive anti-austerity movement (Young, 2020). As the German 
focus groups were conducted right after the large anti-TTIP demonstration, participants referred 
repeatedly to the latter as an empowering example of “the voice of the people”. The lack of 
transparency in the negotiations of the deal was discussed as another indication of democracy 
being in crisis because politicians pursue their interests, even when it is at the detriment of 
society. In the words of Stephanie (18-25HE): “you need to explain it to the people and make 
sure that you don’t discuss it [TTIP] behind closed doors, because it’s a matter that concerns us 
all. It might be smarter to include society perhaps a bit more in some decisions, maybe with 
referenda”. The alternative of referenda on important political decisions emerges again, 
especially on topics that participants find themselves completely disregarded.  
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Helga: Of course, it's a good thing [that people protested against the TTIP]. Because public pressure 
creates political pressure. So, in this case there were 250,000 people in the streets, it was gigantic. 
Beatrix: And even if we have this parliamentary democracy, politicians cannot go completely against the 
will of the people. 
Walter: Such a massive crowd gives you already a good feeling that you aren’t the only one who’s against 
it, but there are still 250,000 others. In the end they said that it was 150,000 people, with such things the 
numbers are always downplayed. But it was so massive that Gabriel [vice chancellor at the time] had to say 
that he will look into the TTIP again and Lammert, the Bundestag president, also said that if they don’t have 
the documents in time to examine them sufficiently, he will put the TTIP on ice, which is already telling [of 
the demonstration’s efficacy]. 
Laurenz: I think it works the same way like with the big demonstrations in Germany against the Pershing II 
[missiles], the SS20 and so on. So I was there and I wanted to say ‘Yes!’, I was marching alongside 500,000 
people in Bonn, we were twice the inhabitants of the village there. Ok Kohl didn’t let public pressure 
change his plans, Schmidt first and then Kohl, but it has worked nevertheless and there are always side 
effects that you never would have thought. The same is true with TTIP, this is just the beginning… 
Walter: And in Gorleben, too, if people hadn’t chained themselves to the trees, Gorleben would now be full 
of steel barrels [with nuclear waste] rusting in front of your eyes. But then there is this big massive crowd 
that you can no longer ignore in politics or the media. So, I think this TTIP demonstration was a complete 
success, although it was relatively silenced in the media, but the next demonstration will come.   
         (Germany, Activists) 
Doris: I don’t know what happens with demonstrations, because either the politicians ignore them, or I 
don’t know what kind of influence a demonstration really has. Sure, they make it to the news, but do 
politicians change anything? I mean, I’m not a member of PEGIDA or so, but there are many people that 
are afraid and some just overreact and shift completely to the right… but, I mean, even if these extreme 
people wouldn’t be there, nobody would listen anyways. There are many people that react strongly and they 
are made fun of. And those that have good ideas about the TTIP and the like, I don’t know whether the 
politicians really understand their demands, because they just respond to what they want… 
Ana: Well, I see that demonstrations serve to politicize people and they don’t necessarily need to be directed 
at the politicians, but at the broader context. They appear in the media and help that the topic gets big.  
         (Germany, 26-40LE) 
Participants in Germany reflected also on the power of the people when they are united 
and the usefulness of protest in politics. Even though they doubted its efficacy, discussants 
expressed empowerment when referring to the massive anti-TTIP demonstration. The power in 
numbers indicated that politicians could not silence this “big crowd”, as they would appear 
completely delegitimized. Politicians are portrayed once again as “living in their own world”, 
detached from citizens and everyday life problems. Massive eventful demonstrations were seen 
as effective in indicating a crisis of legitimacy in politics (Della Porta, 2008; Hutter et al., 2019). 
Successful mobilizations were linked to other instances of (retrospectively successful) collective 
resistance, forming a history of “people’s struggles” for social justice. Common examples 
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participants referred to were the anti-nuclear protests in Bonn and Gorleben in the 1970s–1980s 
and the Monday protests that culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Recurrent 
references to the environmental and peace movement in the focus groups indicate its resonance 
and significance in German politics (Karapin, 2010; Kriesi et al., 1995). As indicated in the 
excerpt, the anti-TTIP eventful demonstration went further than political consumerism and 
protesting the dictates of the economy. It had a strong pro-democracy message of transparency, 
accountability and representation in politics, at the national and European level. With the spread 
of social media, “politics behind closed doors” does not seem to work anymore. Citizens wish to 
be informed about important political decisions and their views to be taken into account. In 
juxtaposition, most participants expressed worries when discussing the PEGIDA mobilizations. 
Some discussants accepted their usefulness in attracting media attention and opening the debate 
on the refugee issue. Yet, the majority distanced themselves from the radical right. 
6.3.1.2. Mobilization in the electoral arena 
In the electoral arena in Greece, participants discussed the punishment of mainstream parties and 
the reward of anti-austerity challengers in the critical elections of 2012 and 2015. SYRIZA, a 
transformed left-wing party, moved from 4.5% in 2009 to 36.3% in 2015. It formed a coalition 
government with minority partner (nationalist) ANEL on an anti-austerity mandate. In July 2015, 
SYRIZA organized a referendum before signing the third MoU with the European partners. The 
turnout of the referendum was massive and citizens voted with 61.3% ‘NO’ to more austerity. 
The SYRIZA government, unable to reach an agreement with the European partners, changed the 
outcome of the referendum from ‘NO’ to ‘YES’ (to more austerity), accepting another bailout 
agreement with harsh conditions. This appears to have deeply disappointed Greek citizens as they 
see no genuine change whatever political means they try.  
Ionas: Since 2009 I’d say, whether we liked it or not, politics entered everyone’s life, basically the news 
agenda broadened: Day and night political shows, which didn’t exist right? We used to watch TV series. 
Then the agenda changed completely. Daily there was this bombardment with politics and the economy. So 
we became political beings again... I think there’s disappointment now, because citizens tried their last 
chance with SYRIZA, people who didn’t want to react violently [to the crisis]. They wanted to react lawfully 
by the constitution, in elections, and they decided they wanted a real change, and they lost. All this 
disappointment has numbed them now… I don’t know how it will go from now on, if Greek citizens will 
become political beings again or they’ll remain [passive]; whether they’ll return to the streets or they’ll 
find another collective action plan, but I think this disappointment… 
Aliki: It was planned this disappointment; it was an issue that there’s disappointment with SYRIZA. 
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Ionas: Of course, it was planned, of course. 
Aliki: Of course, because people felt indignation and they had hopes, they saw it as their last chance… 
Ionas: And their hopes were denied. Exactly. Yes, it’s a shock, it’s not just disappointment. A whole society 
of active citizens is shocked as a matter of fact. Because it’s the very active citizens that turn to the centre-
left and the left, these are the people that participate most in politics. 
Akis: There’s activism on the other side too, not only on the left. Because it’s activism, we just don’t agree 
with it. 
Ionas: Yes but I don’t go to that extreme because it’s a small fraction. 
Akis: It used to be small.      (Greece, 41-60HE) 
Discussants suggest that Greek citizens wanted a real political change and tried their 
chance with SYRIZA, a party that openly supported and participated in anti-austerity 
mobilizations. In this sense, voting in elections for an outsider that systematically voiced their 
grievances was the last resort before engaging in lawless means and violence due to the desperate 
position they are in. References to violence escalating with the crises were recurrent in Greece. 
Participants mentioned systemic violence increasing with austerity (poverty, suicides, drug abuse, 
homelessness); physical and psychological violence (family abuse, angry daily encounters); 
polarization and radicalization among political groups (left and right wing) due to unresolved 
problems and anger/indignation mounting up in society. Participants expressed fears of civil war 
in the event that the crises continue. A common interpretative repertoire indicated that the 
election of SYRIZA and the referendum on the proposed MoU filled participants with hope as 
opposed to fear instigated by the crisis and austerity, even among those that did not vote for the 
party. Now this large segment of the population is heavily disappointed, hinting towards 
passivity. This hopelessness and futility is exemplified by the idea that there is a plan against 
“SYRIZA”, which in their view represented an alternative to the status quo. The TINA repertoire 
poses that alternatives to austerity are paradigmatically rejected, if not punished, so that citizens 
not only in Greece but the rest of Europe realize that there is no alternative (see Chapter 5, p. 93-
94). System irresponsiveness to citizen demands and betrayal of the parliamentary left’s anti-
austerity promises, led left-leaning citizens to disappointment and disengagement, while right-
wing sympathizers started mobilizing again. In line with Roberts (2017), Greece appears to have 
entered the spiral of reactive sequences between the left and the right until politics provides 
descent solutions to the crises citizens face. 
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While in Greece citizens had already proceeded with economic voting – punishment of 
mainstream and reward of alternative parties – and were considering punishing also SYRIZA, 
citizens in Germany were engaging with the first step in a political crisis: electoral punishment of 
mainstream parties. Although Chancellor Merkel and the grand coalition were moderately 
successful in the 2013 federal elections, attitudes started changing radically in 2015. Participants 
suggested that it was not so much because of the aid to Greece, but due to the liberal refugee 
policy. 
Armin: I talked with a friend about it recently, it really needs a big bang, otherwise nothing happens. I wish 
in the next election that both people’s parties are punished, that they both get 15% so that they understand 
what’s going on, otherwise it will eventually end in civil war and chaos, it cannot go on like this. I wish that 
they are both punished. I hope, of course, that the [radical] right doesn’t get more votes, I hope not. Oh well 
it’s still two years until the next elections, but that’s my wish. 
Doris: But I think it's [elections] not enough, it needs to be more frequent, because at the moment there are 
many issues on which many people would like to express their opinion somehow. But well, you have to wait 
a few more years, bad luck.  
Armin: Yes, I’m also of the opinion that it’s not enough. I was convinced of my vote two years ago, not 
because of the SPD, but because of Mr. Steinbrück. And I voted, and it was clear from the beginning that 
nothing changes, you can do nothing, you can vote, but they do whatever they want anyway and that’s the 
problem, you’re fooled every time. We need to put pressure from below. Germans are doing well. I always 
say that we have to wake up […] 
Doris: You have to boycott something, if you could do something related to the economy, for example 
people say “we don’t pay any taxes”. So, if we’re dissatisfied with the government, we need to find the 
means to express it, I don’t know, somewhere that hurts.        
Armin: Or simply storm the Chancellor's office and revolution. Mrs Merkel is deposed. 
Igor: Yes, you cannot go very far. 
Armin: There’s this nice page: Petition.org. I signed two already. One that Mrs Merkel resigns and second 
that her immunity is lifted, and I already have 250,000 supporters. (Germany, 26-40LE) 
Participants in Germany express dissatisfaction with the grand coalitions and lack of 
political alternatives among mainstream parties. The idea that citizens are fooled in every election 
because politicians do what they want with their coalitions and compromises was a common 
interpretative repertoire. Discussants proposed electoral punishment of mainstream parties and 
reward of challengers, so that politicians realize that a majority opposes these policies. Yet, 
alternatives were also hard to find. The Greens Die Grünen/Bündnis 90, the radical left Die 
Linke, the Pirate Party and the radical right AfD were discussed as providing some alternative 
political positions, yet not very convincingly. Participants were also in search of a collective 
152 
 
economic strategy that would “hurt politicians”, since it is the only language that they seem to 
understand (attack the money), such as collectively abstaining from paying taxes. The idea of 
referenda on important political issues in between elections, so that politicians are aware of the 
public sentiment, was proposed by a majority. Participants expressed fears of “civil war and 
chaos”, indicating that processes of polarization and radicalization were taking place also in 
Germany. Chancellor Merkel appeared as a polarizing figure with the liberal refugee policy. 
Some participants applauded her (“our Federal Mutti should win the Nobel Prize” Boris, 61+LE), 
but most wanted her out. Armin in this excerpt suggests storming her office to get her out of 
power. After his strategy is seen as too radical, he proposes signing petitions. In either case his 
message is clear, “Merkel muss weg”. 
The financial and refugee crises, as well as the TTIP negotiations brought another 
political actor to the fore, namely the European Union (EU). The EU was perceived as more 
obscure and technocratic compared to the federal government. Participants in both countries 
asked for an equal, democratic and transparent union, where citizens feel substantially 
represented on European matters. The EU was evaluated as secondary to national politics, not 
because of the institution’s insignificance, but due to lack of information on its function.  
Walter: The European Parliament is a good example [of low voter turnout in elections]. So, the powers of 
the European Parliament were indeed strengthened in the last election. Yet electoral participation is low, 
even though it’s something that determines so much. Half of our laws come from Europe I believe, they no 
longer come from the Bundestag. 
Laurenz: Berlin is only going downhill. 
Walter: I know, it makes no sense, I can’t explain this. But then I thought about it for a moment. When I saw 
PM Tsipras [Greek PM and leader of SYRIZA] for the first time in the European Parliament, the Belgians 
were very excited about the Greeks when it was the Euro crisis – so I watched the European Parliament for 
the first time and I thought it was cool. And there’s this Euro channel but I can only watch it in the morning 
from 6 am to 9 am, after that comes HSE Shopping Sender [participants laughing]. And it was back then 
with Europe and I thought that if the European Parliament wanted citizens to know what’s happening, all 
Europeans are interested in European matters, then they could introduce such a European channel, where 
people can watch parliamentary debates about the debt and so on, but there’s none. It’s completely puzzling 
to me why a channel like this doesn’t exist, I can only inform myself about Europe from 6 am to 9 am on the 
Euro channel. They can leave the parliamentary debates without commentary even, but at least I’d know 
what the Belgians really want and how the French are positioned towards Greece and the Eastern 
Europeans. I’m really interested in politics, and European politics, but there’s no such channel. So, you 
have to introduce it somehow.        (Germany, Activists) 
German activists in this excerpt discuss the reasons behind low voter turnout in local, 
national and European elections. They relate low interest in European elections to lack of 
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information on European matters and the proceedings of the European Parliament (see Chapter 5, 
p. 117-118). Most participants presented this lack of transparency as purposeful, so that 
politicians can pass laws and vote policies favourable to them without checks and balances from 
an informed European “demos”. Although activists are more interested in politics than the 
average citizen, participants in all focus groups shared knowledge about their counterparts in 
other countries, which is an indication that they care. Stereotypes about other Europeans were 
also abundant and relied on misinformation and yellow press. Participants suggest that it would 
benefit Europe if there was an official channel where citizens can access factual political 
information about their counterparts in other member states. Walter in this excerpt refers 
particularly to the broadcasting of European parliamentary debates, indicating the importance of a 
strong, accessible and representative parliament for European democracy. 
6.3.2. Injustice: Citizens oppressed in Greece and silenced in Germany 
There was a strong anti-politics discourse in both countries, with politicians at the national and 
European level accused of irresponsiveness and corruption. Yet, there was also awareness of 
citizen responsibility for the political crisis. In Greece, the severe financial and political 
meltdown brought citizens to realize their own contribution to sustaining a corrupt system by 
voting politicians in office for personal gains at the detriment of society. Responsibility weighted 
particularly on politicians, however, since they set the example of what is considered right and 
lawful in public matters due to their increased power and status. Politicians’ abuse of power and 
proximity to business interests were suggested as common trends in Western democracies and the 
EU. Although the latter was seen as less corrupt than Greek politicians, its rigid stance on 
austerity and disregard for democratic politics disappointed participants heavily. Eurosceptic 
positions did not refer so much to the dissolution of the institution, as to its transformation into a 
political union where member states have equal status and influence.  
Zacharias: I think the strategic goal is to shape European citizens, not Greek citizens, European citizens, 
who would be aware of the European context and therefore of the global context that Europe is embedded 
in from a very young age. In other words, active participation in shaping European citizens for a Europe 
that is much more substantial and far more, let's say, fair. 
Andreas: I agree with Zacharias, this should be the goal. 
Platonas: The goal should be that all peoples, all of them, should equally participate in global politics. This 
way we can participate in Europe, the UN, Eurasia and so on. Yet this Europe as it is at the moment, I’m 
sorry but I disagree with the powerful nations of Europe imposing their interests on the powerless. 
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Zacharias: But we don’t disagree. We’re saying the same thing.                       (Greece, 61+HE) 
Likewise, politicians in Germany were portrayed as being too close to special interests 
and were accused of corruption. The multiple and multilevel crises instigated an environment of 
emergency with citizens seen as largely left out of the discussion. The absence of inspiring 
politicians was underlined. Although there were references to domestic politicians (e.g., Merkel, 
Schäuble), European politicians did not receive much attention, either due to lack of knowledge 
or interest in their work. However, it was not just the politicians blamed for the political crisis, 
citizens received their fair share as well. “We have a fat belly”, participants argued. German 
citizens were portrayed as complacent, conforming and passive due to the level of prosperity in 
the country (see Chapter 5 p. 93). Individualism and the “hamster wheel” of everyday life, 
increased complexity with globalization and minimization of citizen influence were proposed as 
root causes for disengagement. In the words of Stefan (18-25LE) “I believe that the complexity of 
issues increased considerably with globalisation, and that perhaps it’s no longer understandable 
for a large part of the electorate which issues one takes a stand on, and if it’s only a matter of 
raising or lowering pensions by one percent for example. Perhaps this is the wrong way to tell 
people which the real issues are and how they can decide on them politically”. 
6.3.3. Identity: Progressive and reactionary alliances in Greece and Germany   
Participants in Greece and Germany were in search of alternatives and a unifying collective 
agency that could bring people together against corrupt politicians and the injustices they 
experience. With disenchantment directed towards centrist parties, the ideological struggle takes 
place between progressive and reactionary alliances on the left and right of the political 
spectrum. Yet, the formation of politicized collective identities appeared particularly challenging 
due to multiple lines of division in society. In Greece, participants referred to the massive strikes 
and attempt to take the parliament in 2010, the Indignant movement in 2011, the critical elections 
and referendum in 2015 as moments when this collective agency materialized. Even though 
discussants constructed politicized collective identities of “the people united”, under closer 
examination divergencies in political consciousness emerged, organized mainly around 
ideologies of class and nation. Feminism, LGTBQ+ rights and environmentalism were also 
present in the discussions, embedded in the left-right cleavage. 
Lena: There’s lack of class consciousness if you ask me. Once you realize which class you belong to and 
why you belong there, you can fight for better life quality for you and your children, for the future. 
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Nassos: May I ask something? I that my mother was rich and my father was poor, what kind of class 
consciousness should I aspire to? 
Lena: Leave your mother and father out of this. What is you? 
Nassos: I mean something else. I disagree with this methodology, I want to stress instead the lack of 
national consciousness, adding to individualism and the elimination of the heroic model, because we always 
talk about rights for the individual and then we get a fragmented society. So, when it’s time to engage in 
collective action we end up saying "but we don’t engage in collective action anymore".  
Moderator: Sorry, what is the heroic model? 
Nassos: Sacrificing for the common good, what’s good for the nation. It's [national heroes like] 
Kolokotronis and Karaiskakis. 
Lena: What’s good for the nation depends on somebody's pocket, so what’s good for the nation is that which 
is good for [rich businessmen like] Vardinoyannis and Latsis. 
Nassos: This is nonsense. [national hero] Kolokotronis didn’t fight for his pocket, nor did Karaiskakis. 
Vlasis: Neither did they fight for their national consciousness, half of them didn't even know Greek, they 
were Arvanites. 
Panos: But it [class] is very vague. 
Vlasis: As vague as the nation though 
George: So, there’s an issue, whether in today's society we see classes in the old sense of the term or not... 
For example, whether a small business owner who exploits his employee but also worries about survival 
whether he’s bourgeois, proletarian or whatever, these identities are a bit more fluid than in the past. 
Nassos: That's right 
George: On the other hand, national consciousness is a category that places together the poor and 
powerless with the big boss, whether s/he’s good or bad. Thus, we cannot all fight under the same flag. 
          (Greece, Activists) 
 In this excerpt activists in Greece debate intensely the need for a political revolution and 
the difficulty in forming a unifying political agency that will bring citizens together in the age of 
individualism, consumerism and fluid identities (Bauman & Bordoni, 2014). For left-wing 
participants (representing PASOK, SYRIZA and radical left groups) class should be the common 
super-category that unites citizens: poor peoples should revolt against the rich oligarchs and 
superpowers. Contrary, for right-wing participants (representing New Democracy, ANEL and 
radical right groups) national homogeneity was prioritized: all Greeks should unite to fight the 
corrupt government and the EU, and re-establish a fair nation. In the focus groups both 
ideological discourses were present. Thus, Marxist anti-capitalist and anti-austerity discourse was 
often coupled with concerns about the nation. It is no coincidence that the group of activists in 
this excerpt discusses the Greek liberation struggle from the Ottoman Empire. There was a 
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certain feeling that the country was under Troika’s occupation. Moreover, the use of negative 
stereotypes by prominent politicians triggered processes of defensive nationalism; preoccupation 
with “Greek history and culture” portrayed as the foundation of Europe; hostility and reverse 
racism towards northern Europeans, especially the Germans. The strategy of collective boycotts 
of foreign products that emerged recurrently in the discussions is an example of this tendency.  
On the other hand, participants in Germany were searching for moderate alternatives that 
could represent their interests. However, due to the grand coalitions, even smaller parties (FDP, 
Die Linke, Die Grünen/Bündnis 90) were delegitimized in citizens’ eyes. Die Linke, having 
reformed ideologically after the fall of communism in Germany, was still perceived as too radical 
on the left. Some participants supported its focus on social policy as opposed to business as usual, 
especially in the financial crisis. Die Grünen/Bündnis 90 party was seen as representing the 
interests of the new left (pro-environment, pro-feminism/LGTBQ+, pro-Europe) and those who 
were against the war in Syria and the oil-lobby, advocating for green policies. Thus, the Left and 
the Greens appeared to provide an alternative to the financial, refugee and looming 
environmental crisis (see Chapter 5, p. 116-117). Among new parties, the Pirate Party received 
some attention attempting to bridge technology, citizen representation and political decision-
making but eventually collapsed. The AfD was discussed as offering alternative positions in the 
Greek crisis (no aid, Grexit), the refugee crisis (cap immigration, Germans first) and the political 
crisis (no TTIP and EU, listen to the people). Yet its populist and nationalist rhetoric, triggered 
fears of a radical right revival.  
Ursula: But I think, the decline in voter turnout is also related to the fact, that one no longer feels 
represented. Well, from what I hear in my circle of acquaintances, and well, where I also find myself a bit… 
I’d prefer to vote for the CSU [that favoured a more restrictive immigration policy, but is only running for 
elections in Bavaria] which is close to me. The party says, okay, it cannot go on like this, at some point, it’ll 
all blow up in our face. But, well, I would never ever vote for these right-wing socks. They’re no alternative 
for me. How can I express my discontent? Well, if I no longer participate in elections. 
Reinhardt: There are two reasons for low voter turnout. One is complacency. That’s a very big factor. 
Hugo: That’s what I said, we have a big belly. 
Elias: Or the exact opposite: Dissatisfaction with the parties. 
Ursula: One no longer feels represented… 
Hugo: Well, the dissatisfied might go to the AfD, there are also dissatisfied… there are those who sit in the 
park with their beer bottle and rumble. They’ve never worked in their life, yes, they just live off social 
security and then they go to Penny [discounter] to get their beer bottles and grumble about politics.  
157 
 
Doris: But … but … I was completely shocked at the last election, how many voted for the AfD… because I 
thought, they’ll get less [votes]. 
Hugo: Well, I have to say, in the last European election, I voted for the AfD, yes, I must say that honestly. 
We’re in West Germany where I can say that… maybe they have their problems… yes, but that’s okay, I 
really voted for them, because of Mr. Henkel [a leading figure who left the party after its radical right turn] 
…and because I really like them. They’re very intelligent people. 
Reinhardt: Oh well, Henkel, that one…  
Hugo: Yes, he’s in the European Parliament. These are intelligent people. For example, they’ve fought 
against the TTIP, and the whole Greece [situation] and so on. No party has said that and, therefore, I had 
to vote for them, because they represent my interests.    (Germany, 61+HE) 
Participants debate the crisis of representation in German politics and the lack of political 
options among mainstream parties. The AfD is discussed as the party expressing dissatisfaction 
and resentment. Hugo (61+HE) refers to its voters in a derogatory manner, as the ones who live 
off the welfare state and complain non-stop about politics, but do nothing in the end (anti-politics 
repertoire). After Doris stressing her surprise at the party’s surge in the European elections, Hugo 
outs himself as one of its voters. His argument is that during these multiple and multilevel crises, 
the AfD was the only party representing his interests. Attempting to explain his choice, he 
presents a leading figure in the party as intelligent, arguing that his vote is based on rational 
criteria. Hugo feels comfortable to express his views because he lives in Western Germany where 
democracy and freedom of expression prevails. This was a common interpretative repertoire 
among the older generation who experienced the West-East divide. This generation was most 
satisfied with the federal democratic system, referring to the “Nazi and GDR dictatorships” as a 
dark period in Germany. Discussion about nationalism reflected a change in right-wing discourse 
(new right, neo-conservative). The latter is not so much about the superiority of any race, but as 
we have seen extensively in the focus groups, it is all about the cultural clash between natives and 
foreigners, accompanied by traditional, conservative values on gender, religion and so on.  
An ambivalent politicized collective identity emerged in the German discussions. On the 
one hand, participants wished to promote their national interests like citizens of any other country 
in a crisis situation. On the other, they were also aware of potential dangers stemming from 
nationalism. Federalism in Germany and the cleavage between western and eastern states 
rendered the formation of politicized collective identification challenging (Colvin & Taplin, 
2015). Eastern Germans in particular were portrayed as being left behind in the “economic 
development” success story.  
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6.3.4. Agency: Disappointment after collective resistance in Greece, moderate and conformist 
citizens in Germany 
Participants in both countries were in doubt about the effectiveness of political engagement, 
especially at the macro level. They suggested that political parties have formed cartels and 
politicians disregard citizens’ preferences. National policies are decided in European and global 
centres behind closed doors at G7/G20 meetings and the NATO headquarters, and multinationals 
have increased their influence over political decision making. Nonetheless, moments of effective 
collective agency emerged when participants narrated instances where “business as usual” 
politics was disrupted. After mobilizing collectively and repeatedly for change, participants in 
Greece suggested that collective agency was expanded with the Indignant movement, voting en 
masse for challenger parties, and participating in the first referendum after the consolidation of 
democracy in 1975. Widespread preoccupation with the revolution and forming a unified agency 
indicates that the 2010-2015 episodes of collective insurrection have socialized and politicized 
large segments of the population. In the words of Platonas (61+HE), “in Greece active citizens 
have taken a stance on many issues, especially during the last period with the MoUs. There are 
currently many political activities that are organized independently of the state. Like solidarity 
initiatives, solidarity clinics, markets without middle men, doctors without borders, engineers 
without borders. This is active society, non-institutionalized but very much active”. However, 
participants expressed disappointment, shock and futility at politicians’ irresponsiveness to 
citizens’ demands. There was doubt that these changes could trigger policy alterations at the 
European and international level. On the contrary, political change in Greece was perceived to be 
constrained by European and international interests. Although, citizens managed to overthrow the 
government several times, they were still receiving the same austerity policies. 
Participants in Germany referred also to an intense political moment in the country and 
expressed empowerment with the massive anti-TTIP demonstration, the refugee welcoming 
initiatives and potential electoral punishment of mainstream parties. However, they appeared at a 
loss regarding alternatives. Discussants portrayed themselves as moderate people, lacking 
revolutionary spirit due to lessons learnt from past experiences with radical politics (national 
socialism and communism). The repertoire that Germans are moderate, law-abiding and 
conformist emerged recurrently in the discussions. In the words of Jan (18-25LE), “and really 
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our prosperity, we have nothing to complain about, I speak now for the whole of Germany or at 
least as I see it, we’re doing well…Perhaps we’ve changed so much as a society that a real 
revolutionary spirit no longer lives with us”. Although participants aspired to revolutionary 
times, they distanced themselves from the contentious past. Influence through elections and 
institutions was seen as the proper medium to effect politics; yet, largely ineffective due to the 
grand coalitions. Individual and collective local action such as volunteering and engaging with 
neighbourhood initiatives were positively evaluated because citizens could see the effects of their 
engagement. Demonstrating was successful when the stakes are high and citizens protest in large 
numbers. As discussed already, however, there was widespread perception that citizens, “the little 
people”, are mostly silenced and nothing ever changes because political parties have become too 
similar and power has left national politics. Most participants in Germany did not perceive much 
influence over European matters either, although their counterparts in Greece saw them as 
leading the EU. 
6.4. Democratic alternatives: Towards an inclusive “demos-centric” representative and 
participatory democracy in Greece and Germany 
Participants in both countries discussed alternatives to the post-democratic crisis of representation 
such as referenda, public deliberative meetings and e-democracy. A minority of radical activists 
and citizens argued for alter-globalization and localization of politics, de-growth policies that 
respect the environment, multi-communitarian living and open-source technology as alternatives 
to capitalism, market democracy and consumerist culture. Yet, most participants in Greece and 
Germany proposed correctives to representative democracy. There was a certain preoccupation 
with politicians listening to citizens and acting accordingly. Participants argued that further 
citizen inclusion in decision-making would make citizenship more active and responsible, and as 
a result democracy would be strengthened. They recurrently brought the example of Switzerland 
as a relatively successful case, expressing concerns, nevertheless, over uninformed citizens and 
minority rights. In Greece participants referred commonly to the (ancient) Athenian direct 
democratic model, not without criticism however, over the exclusion of minorities, women 
(gender) and slaves (race, ethnicity), from politics. It was a historical and cultural resource that 
triggered discussion about alternatives. 
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Anna: Citizens getting more involved in decision-making, I think, it's the best thing that can happen, 
because I've seen something similar in Switzerland. For every important political decision in the country, 
they ask the citizens. I think that would help a lot. 
Aggeliki: I don’t know, I'm personally afraid at the moment. It may happen in Greece too eventually, but in 
the near future. We’re going back to [political] education, you cannot go from totalitarianism to democracy 
overnight. It's good, I don't know how it works, I think Switzerland has a well-organized state in general. 
But first of all, I think citizens need to get educated and then gradually, we can move there. 
Anna: I don’t agree that only the educated should have a say in politics. 
Vivi: This is how the system ended up, the intelligentsia and the little people. Initially, in ancient democracy 
it was the experts, the people who had specialized knowledge. I don’t know, because politics concerns and 
affects everyone, so I guess everyone should have a say in the matter. Yet, it ended up being the educated, 
the upper classes that rule and the little people that get fooled and have no say in anything. 
Anna: Essentially, in a democracy as far as I know, it’s the people who decide. 
Vivi: Yes, in the beginning we had a direct democratic system because the population was small. 
Angeliki: Only men were allowed to participate though. 
Vivi: And there were slaves too, so it’s difficult to compare… 
Anna: But how about deciding on important issues? Not holding a referendum over the garbage bins. For 
instance the citizens decided on immigration, the citizens decided on minimum wage [in Switzerland]. 
Nikos: Especially if the media were re-organized in such a way, so that knowledgeable and not paid people 
were able to provide information regarding the alternatives that we’ll be voting on.        (Greece, 26-40HE) 
Participants propose more citizen inclusion and participation in politics as correctives to 
the crisis of representation and legitimacy in Greece. The etymology “demos+cracy” implies that 
the citizens and their preferences lie in the centre of the political process (Held, 2006). The 
corruption of democracy is seen as privileging the few, the upper classes to rule the many, the 
little people. Regarding the problem of informed political decisions, discussants propose that 
knowledgeable (experts), not paid (media), people should educate the public about possible 
alternatives they are called upon to decide. Another suggestion was the practice of electoral recall 
in the event that politicians engage in corruption, in an attempt to hold them accountable for their 
actions – something that currently seems impossible. The fair allocation of resources at the local 
level (participatory budgeting) inspired by the mobilization of self-organized solidarity networks, 
was discussed to tackle political corruption and foster engaged citizenship. Participants did not 
idealize “the power of the people” either. They underlined existing inequalities in access to 
political information and education that may hinder citizens from making the right decisions. 
They further argued that the majority is not always right. 
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Likewise, discussing democratic alternatives in Germany, participants referred mainly to 
supplements to the political system so that it becomes more responsive to and representative of 
citizens’ preferences. Referenda in Germany on local matters are fairly common compared to 
Greece that lacks these instruments, thus it was a topic that triggered debate. 
Jasmin: So, politicians need a long party career first to get somehow to the top and for example it may be 
already exhausting for them to engage with issues at the local level… But yes, you have the feeling that the 
people who are now in government, they don’t want to change or improve something [substantially]. They 
implement only what needs to be done, the bare minimum, they don’t have a revolutionary drive. 
Gudrun: Yes, in principle [politics] it’s about nepotism, not about ability or other criteria… Now, referenda 
would give people more influence over politics, people would have the feeling that they can actively shape 
things. And I think that if the electoral thresholds were lowered [a party currently needs 5% to enter the 
German parliament], politicians would be a bit more careful with certain decisions, because they would 
have to consider that some things may be overturned eventually. 
Anton: I think that with some questions there’s no “Yes” or “No” answer, some questions cannot be simply 
answered like that. Thus, you have to consider seriously if it’s possible to organize referenda on all issues. 
Jasmin: Yes but referenda don’t have to stay the same either, with a “Yes” or “No” answer, but there can 
be completely new possibilities. There can be four scenarios on which people vote. 
Anton: But then the citizen must also be informed. If you read how citizens really think, in comments and so 
on, how one-sided, how polarizing, then… 
M: On which issues should a referendum be held? 
Leopold: On local political issues. Well something like the Tempelhof that we mentioned earlier and things 
like that. That’s actually a positive development. So, people can really vote on things that affect them 
directly and not on some kind of abstract systemic concept, which may be difficult to understand. But 
definitely on local political issues that affect people directly. 
Jens: On everything, I’d say they should organize referenda on all political issues (Germany, 26-40HE) 
 As shown in previous excerpts, the introduction of frequent referenda on political issues 
emerged recurrently in Germany in an attempt to make politicians more attentive and responsive 
to citizens’ concerns. Participants suggest that referenda will render citizens more responsible and 
politically conscious because they will have to take a stand on societal matters. Politicians would 
also become more considerate of citizens’ grievances because they would have to take their 
views into account when making political decisions. As a result, citizens’ political power in 
society will be strengthened. Participants approved and supported local/state referenda, since they 
have adequate knowledge at this level. The Tempelhof and Waterworks referenda were discussed 
as relatively successful and empowering examples. Moreover, participants proposed advisory 
referenda on focal political issues as “barometers of public opinion”, so that politicians are aware 
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of citizens’ views on important matters. More options could be provided than the polarizing 
‘yes’/’no’ dilemma and experts could inform citizens on the political options they are called upon 
to decide. Referenda were not discussed as panacea to the political crisis however. Lack of expert 
knowledge, concerns over minorities, yes/no dilemmas being too simplistic, and authoritarian 
potentials of direct democratic instruments triggered serious considerations. Participants 
proposed lower electoral thresholds for parties to enter the parliament so that a plurality of 
political views is expressed and citizens’ vote for alternative parties won’t be wasted. The youth 
offered modern suggestions to increase interest and participation in politics, such as expansion of 
e-democracy and further use of technology to lower the costs of engagement, like with social 
media (leFloid) and Youtube channels. All in all, the importance of resources (income education) 
and time in particular was underlined for political engagement in both cases: time to get 
informed, to strategize, mobilize and organize with others, to think critically and engage in 
political projects at different levels of the polity. This conceptualization requires a novel 
approach to citizenship – from the citizen as consumer of political programs to the citizen as 
active agent (Haug, 2009). 
6.5. Discussion 
The chapter presented the inductive analysis of citizen discourse about the availability, novelty 
and efficacy of political strategies in the Greek and German crises. The analysis focused on the 
main interpretative repertoires about the problems participants deemed important; the mobilizing 
actors in the party and movement arena seen as addressing injustice; and evaluations of agency 
and opportunity for action in the two cases. In a period where citizens were excluded in many 
ways from the process of crisis management (Hindmoor & McConnel, 2015), the project allowed 
them to express their views and investigated whether their discursive practices were in line with 
elites or challenged moderately/radically the political establishment.  
Critical juncture literature suggests that citizen political engagement differs in times of 
crisis compared to prosperous times. Crises render politics more plastic and social change more 
tangible from a political opportunity perspective, because they signify that existing institutional 
arrangements no longer work (Collier & Munck, 207). Participants in the two countries seem to 
agree that consensus centrist politics does not represent them anymore. The financial, refugee and 
political crises appear to problematize key aspects of the globalized model, such as financialized 
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capitalism, open borders and technocratic governance. Challengers from the left and the right 
were gaining ground over mainstream parties (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019a). Whereas in prosperous 
times majoritarian governments were supported, in crisis times fragmentation of party loyalties is 
observed. A plurality of parties and movements entered the political arena, triggering power 
shifts from previous to new dominant coalitions. Polarization of political attitudes and 
radicalization of political strategies was discussed to address the crisis of post-democratic 
representation and system irresponsiveness to citizen mobilization. Progressive and reactionary 
alliances along the left – right and libertarian – authoritarian cleavage, made their presence 
noticed, with Europe adding a new transnational dimension to political conflict in the two 
countries. 
In the electoral arena, according to economic voting literature (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 
2007; Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016) incumbents that performed poorly just before or during the 
crises were punished in both countries. In Greece where the crises emerged earlier (2010) and 
their magnitude was more severe than in Germany, citizens punished severely mainstream parties 
that ruled Greece for 35 years (PASOK and New Democracy). They rewarded anti-austerity 
alternatives on the left (SYRIZA) and the right (ANEL, Golden Dawn), and were considering 
punishing SYRIZA after its U-turn on the EU/austerity referendum (which they did in the 2019 
general elections). In Germany, citizens moderately rewarded the grand coalition between the 
CDU and SPD in the 2013 federal elections for keeping the financial crisis at bay. However, in 
2015 participants were already contemplating punishing mainstream parties and rewarding 
alternatives on the right (AfD) and the left (The Greens, Die Linke). The 2017 federal elections, 
echoing our focus group participants, saw the radical right AfD and the Greens increasing their 
representatives in the Bundestag. 
[ Figure A6.1 about here ]   [ Figure A6.2 about here ] 
In the movement arena, according to the political process framework (Kriesi, 2014; 
McAdam et al., 2001), the main politicized grievances, the dominant mobilizing actors, and focal 
opportunities and threats in the political context differ in the two cases. Figures A6.1 and A6.2 
summarize the big descriptive picture in Greek and German politics. In Greece the economic axis 
is more pronounced than the cultural axis and material needs highly underlined (Gunther, 2005). 
The financial crisis is perceived as a process of continuous pauperization of the population by and 
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large. Greece, a country in the European periphery, has not achieved the level of industrialization, 
modernization and post-materialism that is encountered in Germany. The latter appears to be the 
post-material powerhouse of the European core (Young, 2020). German participants expressed 
concerns over life quality, and competing with other powerful players such as France and the 
U.S. to keep their dominant position in the global economy. Economic grievances were discussed 
but were not as politicized as cultural threats at the time. Capitalism, as a system of exploitation 
producing inequality, was problematized more thoroughly in Greece. Participants generally 
agreed that German citizens lacked a certain amount of suffering to get out of their comfort zone, 
to revolt – things seem to be working for them.  
Germany was hit predominantly by another crisis, the refugee crisis. The latter triggered 
threats to life quality, social security and the welfare state, and a cultural clash between the so-
called “secular Christian Germans” and “religious Muslim foreigners”. The refugee crisis appears 
to build on previous migration flows in the 1970s–1980s and populations arriving with the 
dissolution of the USSR and the Reunification process in the 1990s (Street & Hansen, 2015). 
Being the largest country in Europe with diverse federal states and an active divide between 
western and eastern regions (and to a lesser extent between northern and southern states), issues 
of social homogeneity and security were prioritized (Newman, 2010). In Greece on the other 
hand, there was no extensive discussion about cultural clash or Islamophobia. Grievances were 
rooted once again on material issues, like for example “will people be able to find employment in 
this country? Will people have food on their table?”. This doesn’t mean that cultural issues were 
considered insignificant, but they were not as prioritized as material issues at the time. The left-
wing government’s official discourse placed also greater importance on austerity compared to 
cultural threats (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). 
Therefore, in terms of the political process model, we observe that a “certain amount of 
suffering” is required for people to mobilize. Moreover, citizens need allies, mobilizing actors in 
the movement and party arena to voice those grievances, and opportunities/threats in the political 
environment. Support for the Indignant movement was coupled with voting for SYRIZA in the 
anti-austerity mobilization cycle (2010-2015) in Greece, as did participation in the PEGIDA 
movement and support for the AfD in the anti-immigration mobilization cycle in 2015 till present 
time in Germany (Arzheimer & Berning, 2019; Karyotis & Rüdig, 2015). Participants discussed 
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also the mobilization of right-wing actors in Greece and left/green actors in Germany, but their 
presence was indicated secondary. The MoUs, the presence of the Troika, and the arrival of 
refugees in Europe triggered threats in society with citizens mobilizing in the streets and the 
ballots to voice their concerns. The unofficial state collapse in Greece and supervision by a 
“foreign institution”, the Troika, triggered a “nothing to lose strategy”, intense resistance and 
preoccupation with the revolution. Contrary, Germany’s powerful position in the EU provoked a 
more conservative “much to lose strategy” and strong consideration among the citizenry about 
retaining their good performance in times of crisis. 
Yet the crises in Greece and Germany appear to be part of the same process, that of 
globalization and European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Hutter & Kriesi, 2019b). With 
these processes deepening, the current crises brought centre stage the issue of democratic 
representation and legitimacy in a system of multilevel governance (Crum & Merlo, 2020; Della 
Porta, 2013). Post-democracy and corruption, system irresponsiveness to citizen grievances, and 
transference of policy making from national governments to the EU and NATO has triggered 
political disenchantment, a rise in Eurosceptic sentiments, populist tendencies and a return to 
national politics (De Vries, 2018b; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). At the same time, participants in both 
countries discussed an increase in political engagement. They referred to the formation of new 
civic institutions, social movements and political parties to tackle the crises. They were further 
contemplating on the quality of national and European democracy and the use of participatory 
and direct democratic tools at the local, national and European level in an attempt to influence 
politics. In Greece citizen engagement and novelty of political strategies has been significant. 
With participation in massive general strikes, attempts to occupy the parliament, formation of the 
Indignant movement and engagement in alternative forms of resilience, citizens triggered four 
snap general elections in five years punishing mainstream parties and supporting alternatives. 
Likewise, in Germany participants discussed a period of intense mobilization, with pro-refugee 
solidarity networks and welcoming initiatives, PEGIDA mobilizations, the massive anti-TTIP 
demonstration, punishment of mainstream parties and search for alternatives. 
[ Table A6.1 about here ]   [ Table A6.2 about here ] 
 Detailed discourse analysis of citizens’ political strategies per crisis, with a focus on 
repertoires of injustice, identity, agency and alternatives, highlighted plausible mechanisms for 
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the discussed patterns in Greek and German politics (see Tables A6.1 & A6.2). With regard to 
injustice and blame attributions, scholars argue that the politics of crises are politics of blame 
avoidance (Boin & t’Hart, 2001; Roose et al., 2017). However, politicians and citizens alike may 
take responsibility for the crisis situation out of fairness, honesty and necessity in identifying the 
root causes of the problems so as to provide effective solutions. Participants in both countries 
identified domestic politicians, the EU, corrupt and complacent citizens as responsible for the 
crises they perceive. Awareness of dysfunctional institutional arrangements (post-democracy, 
corruption) and citizens’ contribution to the problem (clientelism, passivity) was rather present 
when crises were felt directly – responsibility was acknowledged. Blame avoidance and 
stereotyping emerged when the crises under discussion affected participants indirectly and were 
perceived at the European level (responsible and fair Germans in the financial crisis; poor but 
hospitable Greeks in the refugee crisis).  
Identity refers to the political actors citizens perceive as available and legitimate to 
address grievances and tackle the crises (Gamson, 1992). As shown in the chapter, mainstream 
centrist parties were seen as part of the problem (neoliberal convergence, post-democracy, 
corruption) and delegitimized due to perceived crisis mismanagement in both countries. A 
plurality of left and right-wing political actors emerged. In Greece participants’ discourse referred 
to old and new left-wing (PASOK, the Communist Party, SYRIZA) and right-wing actors (New 
Democracy ANEL, Golden Dawn), ideologies such as class and nation, material bread and butter 
issues, strikes, protests and solidarity networks. Participants in Germany discussed old and new 
right-wing (CDU/CSU, AfD, FDP) and left-wing actors (SPD, Die Grünen/Bündnis 90, Die 
Linke), ideologies such as religion and culture, and post-material issues like environmentalism, 
ethical consumption, individual responsibility and life-style politics. Politicization of issues and 
mobilization of actors may change over time as new crises emerge (from financial to refugee to 
environmental to covid-19 pandemic crisis) (Roberts, 2017). It would thus be simplistic to refer 
only to rightist tendencies in Germany and leftist tendencies in Greece. Discourse about class/ 
inequality and nation/religion, plus new issues such as gender/environment and the locus of 
political power (participatory, direct, demos-centric vs. representative, technocratic, elitist) in a 
globalized world were present in both countries.  
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Agency addresses citizens’ evaluations of events, organizations and institutions that 
facilitated political engagement and social change. Participants in both countries were rather 
sceptical about the influence of “the little people” in complex multilevel polities and the presence 
of multinationals blurring the lines between nations, markets and politics. Yet, they shared 
numerous examples of strategies that introduced new and altered existing institutions as an 
outcome of their collective rather than individual mobilization. The emergence of grassroots 
solidarity networks and new/transformed political parties addressing the crisis of representation 
are relevant examples (Della Porta et al., 2017; Kousis, 2017). Participants in Greece appeared 
more agentic than their counterparts in Germany. They created new opportunities for social 
change with sustained political participation in the movement and party arena. On the other hand, 
participants in Germany discussed engagement, but also hesitation and passivity. Affected by the 
crises at a later stage (2015), they were still evaluating their severity, level of emergency, and 
elites’ management capacity. Prosperity in the country and downward comparisons with southern 
Europeans gave them a sense that things may not be going well, but in other countries things 
were going terribly. 
National and European elites employed the TINA doctrine in their crisis management 
strategy (Castells, 2017; Hindmoor & McConnel, 2015). Participants in Greece and Germany 
challenged this doctrine by narrating their engagement in alternative social movements and 
political parties. Social economy, self-organized solidarity networks, multi-communitarian living, 
e-democracy (technology and democracy), participatory and direct democracy (referenda, 
informative public meetings with experts, participatory budgeting) were among their suggestions. 
The latter focused on correctives to representative democracy and empowerment of citizen voice 
rather than system replacement. The severity of crises, socio-political legacy, structural position 
in the world economy (underdog vs. powerhouse), and politicians’ management capacity, shaped 
citizens’ political strategies and level of rupture with the status quo. Therefore, more radical 
alternatives were discussed in Greece and more moderate repertoires in Germany. The latest rise 
of “populist” left- and right-wing actors, in both countries and Europe, could be seen as a reaction 
first to the transference of political power to supra-national and international levels (“the invisible 
world that governs”); and second to the technocratic transformation of democracy, where citizens 
demands and grievances are disregarded as “populist” or short-sighted in the public debate.  
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7. Discussion and conclusions 
This last section discusses the utility of the analytical framework in light of the results. The 
discussion chapter addresses points of comparison and contrast between the Greek and German 
cases and provides plausible explanations for their similarities and differences. It further outlines 
the limitations of the project and proposes areas for future work. Finally, the concluding chapter 
(epilogue) addresses the key research questions and discusses current political developments in 
Greece and Germany amidst broader socio-political transformations. 
7.1. Societal construction of the Greek and German crises 
The project aimed to investigate the societal construction of the crises in Greece and Germany, 
two countries that have been on the spotlight since their onset in Europe in 2010 (Roose et al., 
2017; Sommer et al., 2016). The country selection highlights power inequalities between the 
north and the south of Europe and examines whether these influence citizens’ crisis perceptions 
and their political responses to these problem-areas. In addition, the heads of states in the two 
cases have been involved in rather confrontational communication, circulating simplistic 
stereotypes about responsible and worthy Europeans and those lacking these qualities (Kutter, 
2014; Sternberg et al., 2018). The project attempted a dialogical, solidarity-driven approach to 
Europe’s crises highlighting complexity by examining the so-called weakest (Greece) and 
strongest case (Germany), so as to find points of comparison and contrast, of agreement and 
disagreement, of allegiance and division between the two publics. The aim of the project was to 
investigate whether and how Greek and German citizens talk to and past each other about the 
crises they experience and the political strategies to tackle those problems.  
Instead of taking “the crises” as a given by relying on a deductive theoretical 
conceptualization, the project interrogated the processes of crisis construction in the two 
countries through the discourse of those most commonly missing in the literature, citizens 
themselves (Stanley, 2014). Furthermore, the project mapped the action repertoire to tackle the 
crises, and the extent of agency, subtlety, radicalism, and alternatives generated from below. The 
project employed mixed methods in order to combine quantitative, representative survey research 
about generalizable political patterns in the two cases with qualitative in-depth analysis of citizen 
discourse about explanatory mechanisms behind these processes (Woolley, 2009). The project 
attempted to bridge the micro and macro levels of structures and processes, with greater focus 
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brought into citizen discourse about their crisis experiences behind the commonly cited statistics. 
In an era of TINA doctrines and states of exemption justified by the emergency that crises 
supposedly pose, the project allowed citizens to express themselves about the things they deem 
important and examined the legitimation process of political elites and their management 
strategies (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015; Stanley, 2014). 
To accomplish these aims I developed a novel grounded theoretical framework for the 
social construction of crises and political strategies from below, synthesizing literature on (see 
Table 7.1): political talk (Gamson, 1992; Perrin, 2006; White, 2011); discourse analysis (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987; Stråth & Wodak, 2009) ; critical junctures (Collier & Munck, 2017; Della Porta, 
2015; Roberts, 2015); economic voting (Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 
2007); political process (political and discursive opportunity structure) (Kriesi, 2014; Koopmans 
& Statham, 1999; McAdam et al., 2001); and intergroup psychology (Tajfel, 1982; Reese & 
Lauenstein, 2014). The goal was to explain not only citizens’ crisis perceptions and political 
strategies in the party and movement arenas, but to examine the relationship between the two 
publics and with Europe as a whole.  




Case Selection Holistic dialogical approach: comparison of strongest 
and weakest case, examination of power inequalities in 
Europe and how they affect crisis perceptions and 
political strategies. 
Political talk Novel grounded theoretical framework for the analysis 
of crisis constructions and political strategies. 
Systematic analysis of citizen discourse on current 
crises still a hiatus in the literature. 
Critical junctures Revision of macro-level analytical framework 
developed from the crises in L. America, & application 
to the European context at the micro level of analysis. 
Economic voting Test assumptions of economic voting by employing 
two cases with diverse degrees of legitimacy crisis and 
status in the EU (debtor-creditor), establishing 
connections between party and movement politics. 
170 
 
Political process Revision of the role of grievances, mobilization, and 
opportunity, in times of crisis, addition of alternatives 
to the model. Development of process model of 
polarization and radicalization. 
Intergroup psychology Test assumptions of intergroup competition and 
solidarity by employing real life competing groups 
(material, symbolic, political), examination of 
multilevel identities in Europe. 
 
By the time I embarked on this project in 2015, the Greeks had participated in massive 
anti-austerity mobilizations already for five years, culminating in the election of a radical left 
anti-austerity party in government (SYRIZA) (Karyotis & Gerodimos, 2015). In juxtaposition, 
the Germans had rewarded once again Chancellor Merkel and the moderate grand coalition 
between the mainstream parties CDU and SPD, while supporting also the new radical right party 
AfD (Weisskircher & Hutter, 2020). An intriguing question emerged as to why Greek citizens 
turned increasingly to the left, whereas German citizens predominantly to the right at the same 
moment in time amidst the crises in Europe (Roberts, 2017). An intuitive answer was that Greek 
and German citizens did not perceive the crises in the same way, and thus, they engaged in 
divergent political strategies to cope with these problem-areas. Furthermore, their structural 
position in Europe is diametrically different – with Germany leading the EU and Greece 
approached as the weakest link in the European chain (Hall, 2018). 
Scholars seem to disagree on the type of crises under discussion. Kriesi and his team 
(2014; 2015; 2019) examine the Great Recession. Della Porta and colleagues (2015; 2017; 2018) 
refer to the crisis of late capitalism/neoliberalism. Hooghe and Marks (2018) examine the crisis 
of European integration. Bauman (2014) and Castells (2017) propose a state of multiple and 
multilevel crises taking place. The majority of these studies examine objective crisis indicators 
such as GDP per capita, debt ratio, number of asylum applications, electoral volatility; and rely 
on elite and media framing of the crises (Murray-Leach et al., 2014). Contrary, this project 
focuses on citizens’ subjective experiences and meaning-making processes when talking crisis 
politics. Crises generate deep ideological divides and discursive battles over the most adequate 
framing of the origins and the most appropriate exit strategies (Coleman, 2013; Hay, 1996). Since 
crises contain both objective and subjective dimensions, as all social phenomena due to human 
reflexivity, citizens may agree on their emergence, but disagree visibly on diagnostic and 
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prognostic interpretations. Thus, a basic assumption of this study is that in order to understand 
and explain citizens’ political strategies (prognostic interpretations), we first ought to investigate 
how these publics experience and describe the crises in their own terms (diagnostic 
interpretations). The better the fit between diagnostic and prognostic interpretations, the greater 
the resonance of crisis constructions with citizens’ lived realities.  
Therefore, a first group of research questions addressed specific discursive processes 
behind the societal construction of crises – namely, social construction, discursive performance 
and subject positioning (see Chapter 2). Firstly, the project examined how citizens define the 
crises in their own terms: the issues around which these emerge, whether they are one or 
multiple, similar or different. Secondly, the project interrogated the discursive performance of 
these crisis constructions: the processes of blame attribution, the extent of responsibility 
acknowledgment, and the level of compliance with dominant elite explanations. Thirdly, the 
project investigated the relationship between the two publics and the subject-positioning patterns 
in these crisis constructions: the politics of solidarity and competition between Greek and 
German citizens, the level of stereotyping in their discourse, and the perception of Europe and its 
institutions. 
Survey data and in-depth focus group analysis pointed towards the same direction (see 
Chapter 4 and 5). Drawing on the focus groups (2015), I inductively categorized the crises as 
financial, refugee, and political. Although participants referred to all three as multiple and 
multilevel, their predominance and severity differed in each case as shown in Chapter 5. In 
Greece the dominant issue was the complete financial (unofficial bankruptcy, -25% GDP) and 
political meltdown (corruption, clientelism) in the country; and the presence of the Troika 
dictating policies from afar. The refugee crisis added further severity to a sense of generalized 
crisis. In Germany the emergency situation was triggered predominantly by the refugee crisis, the 
decision to receive 1.5 million refugees, secondarily by the financial/Greek crisis (as participants 
referred to it); but crucially by the lack of political alternatives among the mainstream “people’s 
parties” CDU and SPD and their partners (grand coalitions). Although examined separately for 
scientific clarity, the crises were perceived as multiple and overlapping, extending to the 
European and international level. Yet, the national and local level was indeed underlined, as it is 
the sphere that citizens interact with one another and are most familiar with. 
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Survey data (2017) indicated that these same issues triggered serious concerns among the 
Greeks and the Germans (see Chapter 4). In Greece the top-three most important issues in society 
were austerity-related – unemployment, poverty, taxation – while in Germany they were 
immigration-related, namely immigration, terrorism and social security. Trust in political 
institutions, particularly politicians and political parties, and satisfaction with democracy were 
rated extremely low in Greece, and surprisingly, low also in Germany. Specific democratic 
evaluations indicated serious deficits in basic liberal democratic functions, such as competitive 
elections, representation of diverse interests in society, and the rule of law. At the same time, 
participants in both countries requested more from existing democracies, supporting further 
social, participatory and direct democratic elements in line with the focus groups. 
A first unexpected finding was that during the exact same period, the crises in Greece and 
Germany were triggered by different issues, namely the economy and immigration. However, the 
post-democratic crisis of representation was narrated in very similar ways. Another unexpected 
finding was that Germany was also facing a serious political crisis, although scholars tend to 
approach it as a crisis-surviving case in Europe (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). 
To go one step further, it is due to the underlying political crisis that material (austerity) and 
symbolic (immigration) threats were perceived as crises per se instead of serious problems to be 
tackled. As the project shows, citizens perceive a generalized crisis when democratic politics 
cannot provide solutions to emerging problems for the majority of the population and represent 
their interests in the public sphere over a critical period of time.   
As a result of the differential politicization of issues, the Greeks employed interpretative 
repertoires on “austerity”, “neoliberal punishment” and “capitalist crashes”; while the Germans 
problematized interpretative repertoires on “Islam”, “cultural clash”, “religious and political 
radicalization” (see Chapter 5). Participants in Greece constructed the financial crisis as a 
neoliberal scheme by superpowers debt-colonizing poorer countries after experience with 
austerity in Africa and L. America. In contrast, participants in Germany would introduce the 
“Greek particularity” argument to refer to an almost idiosyncratic type of corruption and 
clientelism in southern European countries. On the other hand, the Germans would construct the 
refugee crisis as a humanitarian crisis that nonetheless triggered a sense of “foreign invasion” 
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among the citizenry. The Greeks would refer to a humanitarian crisis as well, yet triggered by 
illegitimate oil-wars in the MENA region, identifying with the weak.  
Surprisingly, when discussing the political crisis of representation in their countries and 
Europe, Greek and German participants were echoing each other, describing very similar 
problems. They introduced interpretative repertoires on “post-democracy”, “puppets of the 
economy” and “money-oriented politics”, to narrate the growing collaboration among politicians, 
special interests and the media, at the expense of the citizenry. They argued that citizen power 
and influence, having left state politics, was visibly minimized.  Important political decisions are 
taken in European and global centres of finance and governance. Although the Greeks and the 
Germans identified with Europe as a political (democracy) and moral union (peace), they 
criticized the EU for transitioning towards a “lobbyist association” that amplified existing 
democratic deficits. In short, participants argued that democracy at the national and European 
level is in crisis and particularly the functions of representation, accountability, responsiveness, 
and transparency, as shown in Chapter 5.  
The political crisis in Greece, being more severe due to pre-existing problems with 
corruption and clientelism, the unofficial bankruptcy in 2010 and presence of the Troika dictating 
austerity from afar, was described as a crisis of representation and legitimacy. German 
participants referred mainly to a crisis of representation. The political crisis in Germany emerged 
later with citizens in 2015 still contemplating its severity. The country’s surviving status in the 
financial crisis has prevented a crisis of legitimacy at that point in time. Should the post-
democratic crisis of representation and responsiveness continue, however, this may change as 
participants suggested in the focus groups. I refer to a crisis of responsiveness in the case of 
Germany because politicians did not take citizens’ views into account when handling the 
financial and refugee crises (Engler et al., 2019). In the case of Greece, it is also a crisis of 
responsibility, since politicians’ non-responsive strategies were perceived as ineffective in 
dealing with the problems at their source (Karyotis & Gerodimos, 2015). Consequently, the crises 
were perceived as multiple, multilevel, and never-ending. 
But why do Greek and German participants construct the financial and refugee crises in 
such contrasting ways, yet describe the post-democratic crisis of representation at the national 
and European level in so similar terms? There is a basic difference in the Greek and German 
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crises. Whereas the former refers to threats to survival and is perceived as forced pauperization of 
the population, the latter involves threats to life quality and is portrayed as cultural clash between 
the locals and the foreigners (hierarchy of needs, Maslow, 1943; modernization and post-
materialism, Inglehart, 1997). A basic assumption of modernization theories is that citizens bond 
together in societies in order to increase their chances of safety and survival. When these basic 
necessities are threatened citizens may survive, but they will persist in a state of traumatic anxiety 
(Maslow, 1943). It is no coincidence that it is the Greeks who introduce discursive themes of life 
and death, and refer extensively to increasing incidents of violence and suicides. In the event that 
these basic necessities are satisfied, citizens turn their attention to more complex needs such as 
life quality, culture, self-development and self-actualization. Again, it is no coincidence that it is 
the Germans who introduce a certain preoccupation with life quality, work-life balance, and post-
materialist, liberal values. When the struggle for survival is pacified, political conflict may shift 
to the cultural domain and the clash of lifestyles (Inglehart, 1997). This finding is supported by 
research indicating that the economic/class cleavage is traditionally more pronounced in Greece, 
compared to the cultural/religious cleavage in Germany (Bornschier, 2010; Gunther, 2005).  
Who was blamed for the severe material and symbolic threats? Participants blamed 
corrupt politicians and complacent citizens in both countries. In Greece, participants underlined 
the politics of corruption and clientelism that led to political degeneration (Lyrintzis, 2005). A 
widespread sense of injustice emerged because citizens have been deprived of crucial information 
on the financial and political collapse in the country. The presence of the Troika dictating 
austerity from afar and turning a blind eye to people’s suffering (foreign occupation, economic 
war), emerged as a differentiating factor in the two countries. In Germany, participants blamed 
the politics of consensus and grand coalitions that deprived them of viable political alternatives in 
the party arena. Corruption and the growing collaboration between politicians and business 
interests were identified as main causes. Political scandals and the neoliberal reforms introduced 
by Chancellor Schröder and the Green-Left coalition in 2002-2005 delegitimized a left-wing anti-
austerity discourse in the financial crisis (Saalfeld & Schoen, 2015). 
This brings us to the common political crisis in the two countries. Whereas politicians 
used to be the intermediaries between the citizens and the state (and currently the markets and big 
tech), due to the post-democratic crisis of representation, citizens do not know where to turn to in 
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order to voice their grievances and promote their interests (Hay, 2007; Mair, 2013). My findings 
resonate with Bauman’s argument (2014), that these multiple and multilevel crises pose a 
political dilemma between moving towards global governance (power without politics) and 
(re)turning to the nation-state (politics without power) to tackle those issues. As shown in 
Chapter 5, the financial and refugee crises triggered disenchantment with consensus third-way 
politics, globalization, and European TINA policies. Third-way politics enabled the 
depoliticization of societal issues and paved the way for the “neoliberal convergence” of 
mainstream labour and conservative parties in economic policy, immigration, democracy and 
Europe (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). My findings indicate that the vast numbers of their supporters 
appear visibly disappointed, since they can no longer discern meaningful programmatic 
differences between the centre-left and the centre-right. As a result, they turn to more 
ideologically distinct left and right-wing actors in the party and movement arena to voice their 
grievances and represent their interests. 
7.2. Societal construction of political strategies in the Greek and German crises 
Having outlined the diverse processes of issue politicization in the Greek and German crises, it is 
no surprise that citizens engaged in varying political strategies to tackle these problem-areas. Yet, 
a certain convergence was also expected due to the common crisis of representation at the 
national and European level. Crises signify major episodes of institutional innovation, since they 
indicate that existing institutional arrangements no longer work and new paradigms are needed 
(Collier and Munck, 2017). As such, crises can generate radical social transformations at the 
micro (citizens), meso (organizations) and macro (institutions) levels of social interaction, 
establishing enduring legacies and producing alterations to path dependent politics (Della Porta, 
2015; Kriesi, 2014; Roberts, 2015). Social change can emerge top-down via elites and political 
institutions, but also bottom-up through citizen mobilization and engagement. My findings show 
that since status quo politics no longer work, crises trigger polarization – the vacation of the 
moderate centre and consensus on the previous socio-political paradigm – with challengers 
emerging on the left and the right promoting alternatives to the problematic situation.  
For years, resource mobilization and the political process framework suggested that it is 
resources and opportunities rather than grievances and threats that foster political engagement 
(Kriesi, 2004; McAdam et al., 2001). Yet in crisis times, my project suggests, political 
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engagement is triggered by the intensity and severity of crises; mounting grievances (recession, 
poverty, immigration, minimization of citizen power); disenchantment with mainstream political 
actors (labour and conservative parties); and threatening contingencies in the socio-political 
environment (MoUs, long summer of migration, EU TINA policies) (Della Porta, 2015; Roberts, 
2017). The comparison between a post-materialist and crisis-hit case was employed to test these 
assumptions. The second set of research questions examined citizens’ selection of political 
strategies and their discourse about grievances (injustice), mobilization (identity), opportunity 
(agency) and alternatives (see Chapter 3). The analysis examined the targets of injustice and 
responsibility attributions; the actors in movement and party politics citizens identified with in 
promoting contestation; opportunities and threats in the socio-political context facilitating and 
obstructing citizen action; and plausible alternatives to the post-democratic crisis of 
representation.  
Once again, survey and focus group analysis pointed towards the same direction (see 
Chapter 4 and 6). In contrast to mainstream theories of political participation (post-materialism, 
resource mobilization) and according to critical juncture literature, the Greeks appear to engage 
in politics more than the Germans in an attempt to change their desperate situation (more 
grievances and threats, less resources and opportunities). As shown in Chapter 4, more than half 
of Greek respondents in our sample reported engaging in movement and party politics: the 
massive strikes before signing the first MoU in 2010, the anti-austerity Indignant movement in 
2011, electoral punishment of mainstream parties and reward of challengers in the general (2012, 
2015) and European (2014) elections, and the referendum on EU/austerity in 2015. Common 
strategies among the Germans aimed at addressing particular issues instead of the political system 
as a whole such as the popular anti-TTIP demonstration, economic voting in state, federal (2013, 
2017) and European (2014) elections, the refugee welcoming initiatives, the anti-immigration 
PEGIDA marches, the Tempelhof and Waterworks referenda. 
Vote intentions in our sample and actual election results are in line with the focus groups. 
Mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties are losing ground, while challengers on the left 
and the right are winning votes in both countries. Electoral dealignment and realignment was 
more restructuring in Greece than Germany. The Greeks punished severely mainstream parties 
and rewarded challengers mainly on the left – with austerity, corruption and democratic renewal 
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being the main issues – in the critical elections of 2012, 2014 (European) and 2015 
(Altiparmakis, 2019). A plurality of alternative parties emerged after the collapse of the centre-
left PASOK and centre-right New Democracy. In Germany, focus group participants were 
contemplating economic voting strategies, which they put into effect in the 2014 European 
elections and the state and federal elections in 2017, rewarding mainly right-wing challengers 
that mobilized against immigration in the refugee crisis (Bremer & Schulte-Cloos, 2019). Apart 
from the critical emergence of the radical right party AfD and the transformation of existing 
parties to respond to citizen discontent (e.g., SPD, Die Grünen), the German party system appears 
relatively stable. However, the political constellation in the two countries is more complex as 
indicated in the focus groups (see Chapter 6). The Greeks supported secondarily right-wing 
actors, as the Germans promoted left and green parties. What is observed in both cases is 
polarization of political attitudes due to party convergence; and radicalization of political 
strategies due to TINA irresponsiveness to citizens’ grievances (see Figure 7.1).  
 
Figure 7.1. Process model of polarization and radicalization in the Greek and German crises. 
Citizens in both countries engaged further in self-organized solidarity networks and 
voluntary associations to assist people in need due to lack of state provision. Greek participants 
reported higher engagement in these initiatives, possibly out of necessity (survival), after the 
















from the anti-austerity movement in the financial crisis and extended their activities in the 
refugee crisis (Kousis, 2017). In Germany the solidarity welcoming initiatives were formed in the 
refugee crisis and were facilitated by a rich network of humanitarian and activist organizations 
(Lahusen, Kousis, & Zschache et al., 2018). As regards democratic alternatives, participants 
rejected the TINA doctrine and supported further citizen inclusion in politics (see Chapter 4 and 
6). They suggested that politicians should find ways to listen to citizens’ views on important 
issues via advisory referenda, public deliberative meetings, opinion polls and e-democracy, and 
make use of experts and independent media to inform the public about political alternatives. They 
repeatedly brought the example of Scandinavian social democracies as societies that respect the 
citizen and provide a basic safety net for people to flourish above material needs and survivalism. 
Switzerland was admired for giving citizens the opportunity to express their opinion on important 
political issues with referenda. Electoral recall was proposed by a majority in an attempt to hold 
politicians accountable for broken electoral promises and corruption. Thus, the Greeks and the 
Germans requested more from existing democracies, not less. 
Contrary to widespread “populism” arguments based on analysis of party manifestos and 
deductive party categorizations (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015), participants did not construct any pure 
will of “the people”. Democratic legacy seems to trigger diverse conceptualizations in the two 
cases: the city-states direct democratic model shaped by a culture of resistance in Greece vis-à-
vis the federal decentralized representative model shaped by a culture of moderation in Germany 
(Colvin & Taplin, 2015; Featherstone & Sotiropoulos, 2020). In both countries, participants 
acknowledged that there are crucial differences in economic, social, and political interests among 
diverse groups in society. They discussed eventful moments where a politicized collective agency 
was formed more or less spontaneously, such as the Indignant movement and the anti-TTIP 
demonstration, due to massive citizen turnout and support (power in numbers). However, the 
formation of politicized collective identities that represented citizens by and large was discussed 
as particularly challenging. Most discussants conceded that referenda and public deliberative 
meetings should have an advisory role, expressing concerns over minority rights. Further 
integration of first- and second-generation migrants in the polity was debated.  
All in all, survey and discourse analysis indicated that the differential politicization of 
grievances (austerity and corruption vs. immigration and party convergence), diverse 
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identification with political actors in the party and movement arena (austerity vs. immigration 
challengers), and varying political and discursive opportunity structure (debtor vs. creditor) in the 
two cases conditioned citizens’ political responses to the crises they perceive. Instead of an 
“either or” logic, the project suggests that the processes of grievance politicization, supply 
mobilization, and opportunity/threat appropriation, as well as the mechanisms of injustice 
attribution, identity politicization, and agency formation – are activated for citizen mobilization 
to occur (see Chapter 3 and 6). Yet, in crisis times, even more crucial seems to be citizens’ 
political awareness (cognitive liberation) and active participation in these processes, which in 
turn enacts further opportunities for political change from below, as my project shows.  
Focus group analysis indicated that awareness of grievances among the citizenry emerged 
earlier compared to the institutional actors expected to represent citizens’ interests. Massive and 
enduring engagement in social movements, eventful demonstrations and solidarity networks to 
address those grievances, uncovered the crisis of representation and legitimacy and brought 
contestation to issues that were presented to citizens as TINA. It paved the way for the 
transformation of existing and the emergence of new political actors in the electoral and 
movement arena that aimed at voicing citizen discontent. In some cases, it even destabilized the 
political system as a whole, triggering snap elections, resulting in hung parliaments, and fostering 
collaborations among parties that were previously considered unthinkable. As such, increased 
citizen mobilization in party and movement politics enacted further opportunities for engagement 
and generated political alternatives from below. 
With respect to competing theories regarding the rise of left-wing anti-capitalist (Castells, 
2012; Della Porta, 2015; 2018) and right-wing authoritarian challengers (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019a; 
Norris & Inglehart, 2019), my project, investigating political strategies in the movement and 
party arena, in two countries that are differentially positioned and impacted by Europe’s crises, 
indicates that both tendencies are present. In Germany, the post-materialist powerhouse of 
Europe, citizen concerns centred around threats to life-quality and powerful position in the world 
economy. Capitalism and globalization, more or less, works for Germany (Hall, 2018; Hübner, 
2015). As a result, participants in their majority suggested moderate strategies to render the 
political system more responsive, and protested its post-democratic transformation mainly 
through elections, political consumerism, volunteering and eventful demonstrations (much to lose 
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strategy) (Weisskircher & Hutter, 2020). In Greece, citizens challenged radically the national and 
European establishment in the streets and the ballots. They attempted a political revolution, as the 
proposed economic and political model (austerity, globalization) signifies widespread poverty for 
the population by and large (nothing to lose strategy) (Garyfallou, 2020). My analysis illustrates 
the mobilization of left-wing libertarian and right-wing authoritarian alliances, with the economic 
axis (class/inequality) being more pronounced in Greece and the cultural axis (nation/religion) 
more prominent in Germany. Positions on Europe and globalization add a new dimension to 
political conflict problematizing the locus of power and citizen influence in an increasingly 
globalized political environment (Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Hutter & Kriesi, 2019b). 
7.3. The Greeks, the Germans and Europe amidst the crises 
The Greeks, the Germans, and Europe were present in each and every of these crises, although 
the focus groups did not address these issues or the relationship between the two publics 
explicitly (see Chapter 5 and 6). With regards to their relationship, participants reproduced the 
political conflict that emerged at the elite level, approaching each other as opponents rather than 
allies in Europe, especially in the financial and refugee crises (see Table 7.2).  
Table 7.2. How Greek and German citizens talk about crisis politics in Europe 
Different crises Crisis of representation and 
radicalization of strategies 









Resistance of small nation against 
superpowers 
Responsibility of powerful nation to 
keep Europe together 
  
The Greeks would identify with other nationals in the global South (the Spaniards, 
Argentinians, Syrians) “oppressed by super powers”, and notably with the Icelanders due to their 
alternative crisis management strategy (punishment of politicians and bankers). The Germans 
identified with other “responsible northern Europeans” (the Dutch, French, Swedes) and 
positioned themselves with leading world powers such as France and America. In the political 





of the same family that suffered from undemocratic policies decided on higher levels. Critical 
repertoires that challenged the stereotypes of “lazy Greeks” and “authoritarian Germans” 
emerged in the discussions when participants were able to take responsibility for the unjust 
situation, acknowledge mutual interdependence and approach issues from an internationalist 
perspective. Their emergence – even as minority discourse, in the sense that they were the 
exception and not the rule – indicates that dominant discourses were challenged and citizens do 
not passively consume information. 
Europe was politicized in the discussions. Participants tended to differentiate between the 
categories of “Europe” as a political (democracy, solidarity) and moral (peace, unity) project, and 
“the EU” as a technocratic economic institution that promoted business interests at the expense of 
European citizens. In line with research on European integration, the lack of meaningful 
representation in the European Parliament and the democratic deficits of powerful non-
majoritarian institutions (i.e., Council and Commission) were underlined (Crum & Merlo, 2020; 
Della Porta, 2013). Participants expressed also pro-European sentiments and desire to move 
towards a meaningful political union characterized by similar economic and social policies, 
substantial democracy and solidarity. Echoing research on multiple and multilevel identities, 
although participants identified predominantly with their local region and nation state, inclusion 
in a super-ordinate category and the sense of being part of a larger community triggered positive 
associations (Fligstein e al., 2012; Reese & Lauenstein, 2014). 
Yet, the disproportional influence of powerful member states (Germany, France) in the 
EU was perceived as dominating by the Greeks. Likewise, the Germans disapproved of their 
“great responsibility in Europapolitik” that affected visibly their domestic politics. Which of the 
two tendencies will prevail, the politics of division and competition or the politics of alliances 
and solidarity, remains to be seen. As Collier and Munck (2017) suggest, critical junctures are 
long-term processes involving intense power struggles. It will take years before we have a clear 
view of the crisis outcomes for politics and society. As the project shows, this process will 
depend heavily on the interaction among the emergence of crises, elites’ management capacity, 





7.4. Intergroup variation 
The project indicated limited variation in perceptions of crises and evaluations of political 
strategies among diverse age and education focus groups. The excerpts in the analysis were 
selected from all age groups and education levels, ordinary citizens and activists alike. 
Noteworthy variation emerged at the ideological (left – right, libertarian – authoritarian, 
integration – demarcation) and country level (Greek underdog vs. German superpower). These 
groups debated opposing interpretative repertoires and provided diverse justifications for their 
political choices. Limited variation may also be the outcome of the analytical method, namely the 
examination of interpretative repertoires that were generally accepted and reproduced across 
focus groups (Stanley, 2016; White, 2011). In this section, I will elaborate on plausible sources of 
variation, referring to biographical availability (age) (McAdam, 1986) and inequalities in 
participation (education) (Verba et al., 1995) as topics for future research. Scholars tend to agree 
that politics is a resource-intensive activity that requires time, knowledge, employment, 
embeddedness in organizations, and interaction with aggrieved others to flourish (Stoker & Hay, 
2017).  
With regard to biographical availability, younger participants in both countries (18-25) 
were preoccupied with social change, globalization and technological innovation. They expressed 
more positive repertoires towards European and global interconnectedness compared to older 
groups, but lacked experience with extensive engagement and complex political processes. The 
26-40 and 41-60 groups – that is productive and reproductive age – seemed to be most affected 
by the crises. With the need for a secure job to sustain their families and rising responsibilities the 
aspiration to overthrow the system and change society radically appeared more nuanced and 
reformist. The elderly groups (61+), although seemingly disconnected from current political and 
technological challenges, showed extended political experience and brought a reflexive stance to 
historical and political legacies. 
Education in this study was also employed as a proxy for income/class. With respect to 
inequalities in participation, lower educated participants appeared more politically dissatisfied 
and less efficacious. They seemed to employ the “anti-politics” repertoire more often than higher 
educated participants, as they feel they are invited to participate only in rigged elections, while 
experiencing the most negative consequences of the economy and immigration. They show lack 
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of political interest, not because they don’t care, but due to the fact that the costs are higher for 
them (time, money, knowledge). Instead, they focus on family, work, and making a living (the 
Hamster wheel of everyday life). However, they still have opinions about politics and how things 
should be governed – they are not apathetic. 
 These observations indicate directions for future research. It would be intriguing to 
investigate whether the youth is indeed more positive than older groups about global and 
European interconnectedness, even amidst Europe’s crises, and the role of social media in their 
evaluations. Another area for future research could examine whether the “anti-politics” repertoire 
is more widely employed among lower income and education groups, the reasons behind it and 
possible repercussions for political engagement. Furthermore, discourse analysis of the main 
interpretative repertoires about crises and political strategies does not do justice to narratives of 
intersectionality and multiple lines of oppression that reflect the unique experiences of 
individuals and social groups (Stanley, 2016). This study focused mainly on the nationals of these 
countries, who notably referred to the relative exclusion of first and second-generation migrants 
from politics. It would be beneficial to examine also the views of those most regularly excluded 
from politics, if we wish to not replicate power inequalities in our research: the migrants and 
refugees, women and LGTBQ+ groups, the poor and homeless, the disabled, and especially the 
intersection along multiple lines of marginalization (Butler, 2020).   
7.5. Limitations and directions for future research 
Having outlined the main findings, I will refer to limitations of the research project and suggest 
avenues for future work. In particular, the project draws on survey research and qualitative focus 
group analysis in Greece and Germany to generate scientific insights into crisis politics from 
below in Europe. The POLPART focus groups were conducted in the capitals of the selected 
countries. Globalization and European integration underline the issue of scale in politics and the 
cleavage between urban metropolises and rural areas (Bauman & Bordoni, 2014). Future research 
should examine whether important differences in crisis perceptions and evaluations of political 
strategies emerge between these areas. Furthermore, although the two cases were selected for 
their heuristic value, conflicting relationship, and power asymmetry in the EU, they are not 
representative of all southern and northern European countries. An important finding was the 
unique effect of political culture and democratic legacy on crisis perceptions and political 
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strategies in diverse societies. As such, more research is needed on the commonalities and 
differences among different European regions (northern, southern, eastern).  
Moving to the research method, mixed methods allowed for a fuller picture to emerge that 
would not be possible by employing either approach alone (Denzin, 2010). Broad political 
patterns in the two countries were bridged with citizens’ justifications and explanatory 
mechanisms behind these processes, testing the commonality and applicability of a limited 
number of focus groups. Discourse analysis highlighted important limitations in survey research, 
such as the generality of pre-formulated questions and answer categories unable to capture 
multiple and multilevel crises or eventful political strategies from below. The project focused 
increasingly on citizen discourse about these processes and not on causal relationships between 
abstract variables. Yet, for future work, the preliminary statistical analysis could provide the basis 
for more complex examination of intergroup variation in crisis perceptions and political 
strategies, that could be supplemented by focus group analysis on these comparisons.  
The psycho-sociological, constructivist approach to discourse analysis introduced in the 
project examined the main interpretative repertoires about crises and political strategies emerging 
across focus groups when participants debated crisis politics. The aim of analysis was to 
reconstruct the general sentiment that facilitated the specific crisis interpretations in the two cases 
(Stanley, 2014). The project reported also on critical repertoires and “silenced” minority 
discourse when these appeared (see Chapter 5, discursive performance). Yet, critical repertoires 
and minority discourse were not the main focus of the project. Future research should examine 
the structure and function of these repertoires, and the reasons behind receiving a minority status. 
Could it be that they did not resonate with citizen experience at large or were perceived as too 
radical or extreme? What is the role of the media in the designation of public discourses as 
minority or dominant? 
Following systematic procedures in data collection and analysis is crucial for comparative 
research. The cross-national POLPART project allowed for identical standardized procedures in 
survey and focus group research (see Saunders & Klandermans, 2020). Yet again, surveys 
measure self-reported attitudes and behaviour intensions, not actual political engagement. On the 
other hand, focus groups generated rich data and intriguing theoretical and empirical insights, but 
they are far from “natural” discussions (Duchesne et al, 2013; Stanley, 2014). Their public 
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deliberative format and moderator’s presence may hinder citizens from disclosing honest feelings 
and opinions. For instance, participants seem to avoid expressing extreme views (racism as 
taboo) and reporting engagement on illegal activities (e.g., occupation of governmental 
buildings). Future research may incorporate participant observation, experimental procedures, 
individual and group interviews on sensitive issues and with citizens that hold extreme views as 
to capture the full spectrum of political behaviour.  
Despite political heterogeneity being common among households and workspaces, 
research indicates that citizens tend to discuss politics with like-minded others (Bennet et al, 
2001). Placing together left-wing, right-wing, and centrist discussants, who were politically 
involved in varying degrees, generated a plurality of repertoires on the topics of interest. The 
level of political argumentation was noteworthy among all age and education groups, as well as 
the extent of popular wisdom and political awareness, in line with previous studies (Gamson, 
1992; White, 2011). However, in-depth discussions with people holding contrasting views are far 
from natural. They resemble public deliberation, with a non-directive moderator taking the back 
seat while ensuring that all participants have equal opportunity to express themselves on the 
topics of interest (Fishkin, 1991; Habermas, 1996). It would be relevant to compare the quality of 
argumentation in politically homogeneous vs. heterogeneous groups – a comparison that may 












Chapter 8. Epilogue 
This concluding chapter provides direct answers to the key research questions and discusses 
scientific and societal implications for theory and practice. The current research project indicated 
complexity in citizens’ perceptions of crises and selected political strategies in Greece and 
Germany. Whereas literature at the macro level approaches crises as de facto structures, my 
research allowed a more nuanced picture to emerge, focusing on citizens’ meaning-making 
processes and coping mechanisms. The project showed that different threats, multiple and 
multilevel, initiated a sense of crisis in the two cases. However, it was the political crisis that was 
discussed as most important. Moreover, while the publics in the two cases supported political 
actors of opposing ideological orientations at the time, a closer examination indicated that the 
processes of polarization and radicalization in the two cases were common. Politics may shift to 
the left or the right depending on the type and severity of crises, politicians’ management 
capacity, emerging opportunities and threats at different levels of the polity, and last but not least 
citizen mobilization and engagement.  
  This project provides a supply-side critique of post-democratic politics from below. For 
years scholars reflected on the quality of our democracies and whether we are facing a “real” 
crisis or citizens have become increasingly critical (Hay, 2007; Norris, 2011). My study shows 
that we have reached a point in time where we cannot avoid the realization that our politicians 
could do a better job in representing citizen interests and communicating with transparency and 
clarity the complexity of current political arrangements. Even in conspiracy theorizing we ought 
to explain why citizens engage with alternative theories about their politicians lying to them. 
Could it be because they are on the losing side every time despite the government’s ideological 
orientation, while the political and business class appears to be making gains even amidst the 
crises? This project suggests that it is time to take citizen critique seriously, otherwise TINA 
doctrines may lead to grim authoritarian prospects. 
It has been six years since the focus groups and four years since the surveys were 
conducted. Is the analytical framework and research findings presented in this project still 
relevant for Greek, German, and European politics? With the Covid-19 pandemic and looming 
environmental crisis it seems that crisis politics is here to stay. Undeniably, these existential 
threats will trigger more tensions in the spheres of the economy, immigration, and politics. The 
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cleavages that these crises will trigger, the politicization of issues, the availability of political 
actors in movement and party politics, and contextual influences at the national and international 
environment will co-determine citizens’ political strategies to tackle these problem areas. Here, I 
will briefly discuss current political developments in Greece and Germany, and position the 
project within broader international challenges.  
In the 2019 Greek elections, citizens turned to the previously dominant centre-right party 
New Democracy, punishing the left-wing SYRIZA after disenchantment with denied anti-
austerity promises and in the midst of rising geopolitical tensions with Turkey (refugee crisis, gas 
and oil extraction in the Mediterranean). New Democracy, in line with right-wing discourse, 
shifted the political debate from austerity to immigration. Refugees are portrayed once again as a 
burden on a crisis-ridden society. Despite disappointing its radical electorate, SYRIZA moved 
from the margins to the mainstream, replacing the old dominant centre-left PASOK and 
introducing new politics in the electoral arena (pro-lgtbq+, pro-environment, pro-social Europe) 
(Hutter, Kriesi, & Vidal, 2018). A new radical left party with transnational European orientation 
“MeRA25/ DiEM25” emerged in its place. The far-right party Golden Dawn dissolved amidst 
criminal investigations and a new moderate nationalist party Greek Solution entered politics. In 
light of the unresolved financial and refugee crises and with new threats on the horizon, the 
political system is in a process of transformation. Novel and transformed political actors enter 
and exit the party and movement arena, in an attempt to represent mounting citizen discontent. 
The financial issue remains crucial, and the predominance of the left-right economic cleavage 
seems stable in Greek politics, but coalition governments are more likely to replace majoritarian 
two-partyism in times of crisis. 
In the 2017 federal elections, Germany witnessed the eventual rise of the AfD as main 
opposition, climbing on the second and third place in many state parliaments and appearing as the 
main challenger in eastern parts of the country (e.g., Thuringia, Saxony, Brandenburg). The 
dominant centre-right CDU adopted a harder line on immigration in order to reclaim dissatisfied 
voters from the radical right. The liberal mainstream parties CDU and SPD, the free-market FDP, 
the Greens Die Grünen and the radical left Die Linke have engaged in new alliances in an attempt 
to deter any coalitions with the AfD. Yet, the country seems to be facing another period of right-
wing radicalization with reported rise in anti-Semitism and anti-immigrant sentiment culminating 
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in the murder of the CDU politician Walter Lübcke – a proponent of Chancellor Merkel’s liberal 
refugee policy. In line with the polarization thesis and the new left legacy in Germany (Kriesi et 
al., 1995; Rüdig, 2012), the Greens appear to be also on the rise. Will the Covid-19 pandemic and 
imminent environmental crisis trigger a move towards the Greens and the Left, a return to the 
liberal centre or the conservative, nationalist right? It will largely depend on the new alliances 
and viable political alternatives that will be put up for discussion. Majoritarian governments seem 
unlikely, and a new coalition between the CDU and the Greens is discussed after Chancellor 
Merkel steps down in 2021. 
 All in all, we have entered a period of intense economic, cultural, political and 
technological transformations as the world becomes increasingly interconnected and digitalized 
(Butler, 2020; Mbembe, 2019). While globalization was traditionally associated with the 
expansion of capitalism and western liberal values, the “centre of the world” is shifting towards 
the East (China, India). The fourth industrial revolution, increasing automation, artificial 
intelligence (AI), big tech and the spread of the internet and social media facilitate global 
interconnectedness without minimizing economic and social inequalities nonetheless (Beramendi 
et al., 2015). Consequently, as everyday reality and politics become increasingly complex and 
interdependent, we also notice resistance to these trends from citizens, politicians, social 
movements, business and the media.  
The multiple and multilevel crises currently erupting around the globe are part of the 
struggle between the old world that is dying and the new world that is not fully born yet, to 
paraphrase Gramsci’s interregnum quote. Likewise, in this project I showed the emerging 
struggle between old politics, born out of the Westphalian nation-state and the Industrial 
revolution, and the new politics of global interdependence and Post-industrial AI revolution. 
Present debates over the Green New Deal and experiments with the Universal Basic Income, but 
also authoritarianism, xenophobia and racism are on the table. As Bauman (2014) insightfully 
argues, the dilemma between politics without power (nation-state) and power without politics 
(globalization) is not an easy or straightforward one, and the outcome will depend on the 
interaction between multiple factors at the micro, meso, and macro levels in society. Take for 
instance the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. Like with the financial and refugee crises, these problem-
areas surpass the nation-state and require transnational cooperation to be effectively tackled. 
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However, as political power and decision-making moves higher to international governance 
institutions, citizens emerge increasingly powerless and dissatisfied with political outcomes, 
while democracy becomes a euphemism (Ruling the void, Mair, 2013).  
In line with previous research on democratic deficits and political disenchantment 
(Crouch, 2004; Della Porta, 2013; Hay, 2007; Mair, 2013; Stoker, 2006), this project shows that 
when citizens are left out of the discussion, cynicism, populism, authoritarianism and even 
conspiracy theorizing are on the rise. Until recently, politicians approached citizens like kids that 
don’t understand the complexity of issues. Contrary, participants in this project suggested that 
politicians should find ways to communicate the complexity of issues at stake in transparent ways 
and engage people in meaningful political processes. They argued for independent (social) media 
that can hold politicians and business tycoons accountable beyond partisan and economic 
interests. Electoral recall of corrupt officials was suggested by a majority. Advisory referenda, 
public deliberative meetings, and use of e-democracy to inform and engage citizens were 
proposed to improve representative democracy and tackle political cynicism. In short, citizens in 
the two cases asked for more substantial inclusion in politics, not less. 
In the European context, references to “Greek and German particularities” do not promote 
transnational solidarity, but foster competition and enmity, as this project indicates. For instance, 
OECD data have repeatedly shown that Greek citizens are among the most hard-working 
Europeans (world population review 2020), while the German media talk about the “lazy 
Greeks”. Likewise, the significant presence of German rescue groups in the Mediterranean (e.g., 
Jugend Rettet and the Iuventa crew) and the noteworthy refugee-solidarity stories of activists like 
Pia Klemp and Carola Rackete (infomigrants, 2019) are silenced in the Greek media, promoting a 
stereotypical image of the “authoritarian Germans”. Surprisingly, the two publics were talking to 
each other when discussing the crisis of democracy in their societies and Europe. Should 
politicians highlight their interdependence, not only in the political but also in the financial and 
refugee crisis, Greek and German citizens could approach one another as allies in the same 
family rather than opponents promoting antagonistic interests. With more crises on the way, 
transnational solidarity and cooperation, not only in Europe but across regions, appears to be the 
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Table A1.1. Characteristics of survey participants by country 
 Greece Germany 
Age (%) 
 
18-34: 37%, 35-49: 46%, 50-65: 
16%, Mage= 39 (11.0) 
18-34: 39%, 35-49: 45%, 50-65: 17%, 
Mage= 40 (11.5) 
Gender (%) 
 
50% male, 50% female 51% male, 49% female 
Education (lower 1-3 ISCED, 4 
vocational, higher 5-6 ISCED) 
52% lower, 10% vocational 38% 
higher 




57% employed, 24% unemployed, 
7% in education, 5% retired 
63% employed, 5% unemployed, 12% 
in education, 7% retired 
 
Table A1.3. The focus group screening questionnaire 
 
1. Name:  Click here to enter text. 
 
2. Gender:  Male  ☐  Female  ☐   
 
3. Date of Birth: Click here to enter text. 
 
4. Country of Birth: Click here to enter text. 
 
5. Nationality: Click here to enter text. 
 
6. What is the highest level of education you have completed or in the process of 
completing?: Click here to enter text. 
 
7. Which of these descriptions best describes your current activity ? (please tick one): 
☐ in paid work either as an employee or self-employed 
☐ in education 
☐ unemployed and actively looking for a job 
☐ unemployed but not actively looking for a job 
☐ permanently sick or disabled 
☐ retired 
☐ doing housework, looking after children or other persons 
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☐ other: Click here to enter text.  
 
8. If you are in paid work what is your current occupation?: Click here to enter text. 
 
9. Do you consider yourself to be a member of a minority group (for example a religious, 
ethnic minority or other):  
a. yes ☐  no  ☐  
b. if yes, which one?: Click here to enter text. 
 
10. How interested would you say you are in politics on a scale where 0 means not interested at 
all and 10 means very interested? Please tick one of the following boxes: 
  
11. In politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Where would you place your views 
on this scale, where 0 means left and 10 means right? Please tick one of the following 
boxes: 
Left                                                                                                  Right  
0  ☐  1  ☐   2  ☐   3  ☐   4  ☐  5  ☐  6  ☐  7  ☐  8  ☐  9  ☐  10  ☐   ☐ Don’t Know 
 
12. Have you taken part in any of the following activities….. 










contacted a politician, government or local government 
official 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
donated money to an organisation ☐ ☐ ☐ 
used internet to write or share political content  ☐ ☐ ☐ 
worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker  ☐ ☐ ☐ 
boycotted or bought certain products for political or 
ethical reasons 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
joined a strike ☐ ☐ ☐ 
signed a petition ☐ ☐ ☐ 
taken part in a public demonstration ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Not interested at all                                                          Very interested  
0  ☐  1  ☐   2  ☐   3  ☐   4  ☐  5  ☐  6  ☐  7  ☐  8  ☐  9  ☐  10  ☐   ☐ Don’t Know 
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any other act of protest (specify): ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
13. Did you vote in the last national election?:  
a. yes ☐  no  ☐ 
b. if yes, which party or candidate did you vote for?: 
 
14. On a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means strongly disagree and 10 means strongly agree, to 
what extent do you agree with the following statements?  
 




b. Organised groups of people can have an impact on public policies in this country. 
 
 
15. How did you find out about this focus group? Click here to enter text. 
 
16. How can we contact you regarding the focus group? 
a. Contact number: Click here to enter text. 
b. Email address: Click here to enter text. 
Home address: Click here to enter text. 
Strongly disagree                                                              Strongly agree  
0  ☐  1  ☐   2  ☐   3  ☐   4  ☐  5  ☐  6  ☐  7  ☐  8  ☐  9  ☐  10  ☐   ☐ Don’t Know 
Strongly disagree                                                              Strongly agree  










Table A1.4 Characteristics of focus group participants by country 
 
 Greece Germany 
Gender (%) 
 
55% male, 45% female 54% male, 46% female 
Education (lower 1-4 ISCED, 
higher 5-6 ISCED) 
46% lower, 54% higher 45% lower, 55% higher 
Political interest (0 not at all – 10 
very much) 
7.7 (2.2) 8.1 (1.7) 
Left – Right self-placement (0 left 
– 10 right) 
4.0 (2.5) 4.7 (1.9) 
Collective efficacy (0 not at all – 
10 very much) 
7.0 (2.4) 7.1 (1.6) 
Voting (%) 
 
64% last election 87% last election 
Demonstration (%) 
 
40% last 12 months 44% last 12 months 
 
 





Age Gender Education  Political 
Interest 
Ideology  Voting  Demonstration 
1 Paulina 18-25LE 21 Female Secondary  0 3 No  Last 12months  
2 Iasonas 18-25LE 21 Male  Secondary 7 5 No Ever 
3 Lambros 18-25LE 25 Male Secondary 8 0 No Last 12months 
4 Vlassis 18-25LE 18 Male  Secondary 6 5 Yes Ever 
5 Alexis 18-25LE 18 Male Secondary 8 4 Yes Ever 
6 Korina 18-25LE 19 Female Secondary 8 0 No Last 12months 
7 Mihalis 18-25HE 24 Male Tertiary 10 0 No Last 12months 
8 Georgia 18-25HE 24 Female Tertiary 10 0 No Last 12months 
9 Petros 18-25HE 21 Male  Tertiary 4 7 No Ever 
10 Giorgos 18-25HE 23 Male  Tertiary 7 5 Yes Ever 
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11 Maria 18-25HE 20 Female Tertiary 8 3 Yes Last 12months 
12 Niki 26-40LE 27 Female Secondary 6 5 No  Last 12months 
13 Alkisti 26-40LE 29 Female Secondary 7 5 Yes Ever 
14 Nikos 26-40LE 38 Male Secondary 8 3 Yes No 
15 Valantis 26-40LE 27 Male Secondary 8 0 Yes Last 12months 
16 Manos 26-40LE 40 Male Secondary 7 1 Yes Ever 
17 Vivi 26-40HE 30 Female  Tertiary 6 5 No Ever 
18 Stamatis 26-40HE 35 Male Tertiary 8 5 Yes No 
19 Anna 26-40HE 27 Female Tertiary 7 3 No Last 12months 
20 Athanasia 26-40HE 34 Female Tertiary 10 5 Yes No 
21 Aggeliki 26-40HE 27 Female Tertiary 3 5 No Last 12months 
22 Makis 26-40HE 37 Male Tertiary 10 7 Yes Ever 
23 Nikos 41-60LE 59 Male Secondary 8 5 Yes No 
24 Minas 41-60LE 46 Male Secondary 9 3 Yes Ever 
25 Despoina 41-60LE 57 Female Secondary 4 2 Yes Ever 
26 Eleni 41-60LE 51 Female Secondary 4 5 No Ever 
27 Evaggelia 41-60LE 41 Female Secondary 7 6 No  No 
28 Olga  41-60LE 45 Female Secondary 8 3 Yes  Last 12months 
29 Lina 41-60LE 44 Female Secondary 8 6 Yes Ever 
30 Nikos 41-60HE 42 Male Tertiary 5 5 No Ever 
31 Ionas 41-60HE 57 Male Tertiary 10 10 No Last 12months 
32 Kostas 41-60HE 59 Male Tertiary 9 4 Yes Ever 
33 Takis 41-60HE 50 Male Tertiary 10 3 Yes Last 12months 
34 Alexia 41-60HE 47 Female Tertiary 5 6 Yes No 
35 Aliki 41-60HE 55 Female Tertiary 5 3 Yes Ever 
36 Kiki 61+LE 62 Female Secondary 8 7 Yes No 
37 Liza 61+LE 65 Female Secondary 10 1 Yes Last 12months 
38 Savvas 61+LE 63 Male Secondary 8 5 Yes Ever 
39 Kyriakos 61+LE 67 Male Primary 8 7 Yes No 
40 Kosmas 61+LE 73 Male Primary 7 7 Yes No 
41 Andreas 61+HE 62 Male Tertiary 10 5 Yes Last 12months 
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42 Platonas 61+HE 67 Male Tertiary 10 4 Yes Last 12months 
43 Zacharias 61+HE 61 Male Tertiary 8 1 Yes Ever 
44 Koula 61+HE 64 Female Tertiary 7 5 Yes Ever 
45 Rosa 61+HE 65 Female Tertiary 4 6 Yes No 
46 Nasos Activists 46 Male Tertiary 10 10 Yes Ever 
47 Panos Activists 27 Male Tertiary 9 0 Yes Last 12months 
48 Giorgos Activists 33 Male Tertiary 9 0 No Last 12months 
49 Vlassis Activists 25 Male Tertiary 10 8 No Ever 
50 Lena Activists 59 Female Tertiary 8 7 No No 
 





Age Gender Education  Political 
Interest 
Ideology  Voting  Demonstration 
1 Norbert 18-25LE 18 Male  Secondary  7 6 Yes Ever  
2 Jan 18-25LE 23 Male  Secondary 9 2 Yes Ever 
3 Jasmin 18-25LE 23 Female  Secondary 4 5 No Last 12months 
4 Stephan 18-25LE 25 Male  Secondary 7 3 No No 
5 Helga 18-25HE 20 Female Tertiary 8 6 No No 
6 Gerhard 18-25HE 24 Male  Tertiary 7 5 Yes No 
7 Melanie 18-25HE 23 Female Tertiary 9 7 Yes Ever 
8 Stefanie 18-25HE 25 Female Tertiary 8 5 Yes Last 12months 
9 Johann 18-25HE 19 Male  Tertiary 6 3 Yes No 
10 Leopold 18-25HE 25 Male  Tertiary 9 4 No No 
11 Anastasia 26-40LE 27 Female Secondary 4 4 Yes No 
12 Armin 26-40LE 34 Male Secondary 9 5 Yes No 
13 Doris 26-40LE 33 Female Secondary 8 4 Yes Last 12months 
14 Igor 26-40LE 37 Male Secondary 10 5 Yes Ever 
15 Anton 26-40HE 28 Male Tertiary 10 1 Yes Last 12months 
16 Jasmin 26-40HE 26 Female  Tertiary 7 3 Yes Last 12months 
17 Leopold 26-40HE 34 Male  Tertiary 4 4 Yes No 
18 Jens 26-40HE 39 Male Tertiary 10 6 Yes Last 12months 
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19 Gudrun 26-40HE 39 Female Tertiary 9 7 Yes No 
20 Susanne 26-40HE 34 Female Tertiary 3 5 Yes No 
21 Jennifer 41-60LE 45 Female Secondary 9 3 Yes Last 12months 
22 Christine 41-60LE 41 Female Secondary 8 7 Yes Last 12months 
23 Melanie 41-60LE 54 Female Secondary 7 4 Yes Ever 
24 Sascha 41-60LE 42 Female Secondary 10 5 Yes Ever 
25 Konstantin 41-60LE 53 Male Secondary 8 5 No No 
26 Marko 41-60LE 46 Male Secondary 6 8 No Ever 
27 Alexander 41-60HE 43 Male Tertiary 9 5 Yes  No 
28 Ingrid  41-60HE 58 Female Tertiary 8 4 Yes  Last 12months 
29 Pauline H 41-60HE 49 Female Tertiary 10 5 Yes Ever 
30 Pauline C 41-60HE 46 Female Tertiary 9 2 Yes Last 12months 
31 Konrad 41-60HE 45 Male Tertiary 8 8 Yes No 
32 Otto 41-60HE 54 Male Tertiary 8 7 Yes Ever 
33 Benjamin 61+LE 62 Male Secondary 10 0 Yes Last 12months 
34 Wilma 61+LE 62 Female Secondary 8 5 Yes Last 12months 
35 Patricia 61+LE 68 Female Secondary 8 7 Yes Ever 
36 Boris 61+LE 70 Male Secondary 8 5 Yes Ever 
37 Dieter 61+LE 72 Male Secondary 8 4 Yes Last 12months 
38 Krtistina 61+LE 71 Female Secondary 7 3 Yes No 
39 Ursula 61+HE 63 Female Tertiary 8 8 Yes Ever 
40 Elias 61+HE 71 Male Tertiary 10 3 Yes Last 12months 
41 Hugo 61+HE 65 Male Tertiary 10 4 Yes Ever 
42 Reinhardt 61+HE 67 Male Tertiary 9 8 Yes Last 12months 
43 Doris 61+HE 61 Female Tertiary 10 6 Yes Last 12months 
44 Helga Activists 54 Female Tertiary 9 7 Yes Last 12months 
45 Laurenz Activists 57 Male Secondary 8 5 Yes Last 12months 
46 Beatrix Activists 45 Female Secondary 9 4 Yes Last 12months 
47 Walter Activists 55 Male Tertiary 10 0 Yes Last 12months 





Table A1.7. Coding of strategies 
STRAT1 STRAT2 Evaluations Personal experience 
Coded before 
pictures shown 
Coded before and after pictures shown 
Nothing (people 
























































one’s own experience as 
a participant in a form of 






• Contact a politician 
• Joining a political party 
• Running for office 
• Referenda 
• Citizens’ initiatives 
Civic Engagement 
• Neighbourhood watch 
• Community Centres 
• Food(Time) Banks (LETS) 
• Charity/Fundraising 





not use when 
institutions are a 
cause). Use this 
when participants 
respond to what 
‘people’ can do 
with a solution that 
is about the state  
Lifestyle Politics 
• Political consumerism 
• Recycling  
• Cycling to work 
• Be the change you want to 
see 
Raising Awareness 
• Sharing information online 
• Contacting media to express 
views 




• Leave the city 




Figure A1.1. Moderator’s sticky notes. Most important issues on the right and proposed political 















Figure A1.2. Pictures used to prompt discussion of what people can do about important issues 















Table A4.1. Most important issues in Greece and Germany 
Most important Issues in society         Greece  Germany  Chi square Sig 
Unemployment (1)  64% (10)  11% X2 (1,2230)=737.1, p<.001 
Poverty (2)  40% (4)  25% X2 (1,2230)=60.7, p<.001 
Taxation (2)  40% (9)  12% X2 (1,2230)=250.4, p<.001 
Healthcare (3)  30% (8)  13% X2 (1,2230)=102.1, p<.001 
Immigration (4)  24% (1)  48% X2 (1,2230)=169.1, p<.001 
Corruption    (5)  23%     (11)  6%     X2 (1,2230)=134.1, p<.001 
Education  (6)  20% (3)  26% X2 (1,2230)=13.7, p<.001 
Political system (7)  19% (10)  11% X2 (1,2230)=32.1, p<.001 
Inflation (8)  13% (6)  20% X2 (1,2230)=21.8, p<.001 
Pensions (9)  10% (3)  26% X2 (1,2230)=111.0, p<.001 
Crime (9)  9% (6)  20% X2 (1,2230)=67.8, p<.001 
Environment (11)  3% (5)  24% X2 (1,2230)=279.1, p<.001 
Housing (12)  2% (7)  15% X2 (1,2230)=153.1, p<.001 
Terrorism (13)  1% (2)  36% X2 (1,2230)=575.1, p<.001 
Gender Inequality  (13)  1% (12)  5% X2 (1,2230)=53.5, p<.001 













Table A4.7. Democratic aspirations in Greece and Germany 
Democratic quality 






 Greece Germany  
Courts treat everyone the same 9,1 (1,8)  8,4 (2,1) t(2228) = -8.50, P<.001 
Government protects citizens against 
poverty 
9,0 (1,8)  7,8 (2,2) t(2228) = -16.44, P<.001 
Free and fair elections 8,9 (1,9)  8,2 (2,1) t(2228) = -8.94, P<.001 
Media are free to criticize the 
government  
8,4 (2,3)  8,2 (2,1) t(2228) = -1.40, P=.16 
Citizens voting in referenda 8,0 (2,3)  7,3 (2,3) t(2228) = -7.47, P<.001 
Citizens can participate in public 
meetings 
8,0 (2,2)  7,8 (2,1) t(2228) = -1.61, P=.11 
Political parties offer alternatives 8,0 (2,3)  6,9 (2,1) t(2228) = -12.33, P<.001 
 (N=1120) (N=1110)  
 
 
Table A4.7. Democratic evaluations in Greece and Germany 
Democratic quality 






 Greece  Germany  
Free and fair elections 6,0 (2,9)   7,2 (2,6) t(2228) = 10.64, P<.001 
Media are free to criticize the 
government  
4,3 (3,1)   7,1 (2,5) t(2228) = 24.42, P<.001 
Political parties offer alternatives 3,4 (2,6)   5,3 (2,3) t(2228) = 19.70, P<.001 
Courts treat everyone the same 2,8 (2,8)   5,5 (2,8) t(2228) = 24.54, P<.001 
Citizens voting in referenda 2,5 (2,8)   3,8 (3,0) t(2228) = 10.91, P<.001 
Citizens can participate in public 
meetings 
2,3 (2,4)   5,8 (2,7) t(2228) = 34.96, P<.001 
Government protects citizens 
against poverty 
2,0 (2,4)   4,4 (2,8) t(2228) = 23.12, P<.001 
 (N=1120)  (N=1110)  
222 
 
Table A4.8. Political strategies (last 12 months) in the movement and party arena in Greece and 
Germany 




Chi square test Sig  
 Greece Germany  
Vote 80% 65% X2 (1,2230)=52.1, p<.001 
EU vote 62% 46% X2 (1,2230)=14.2, p=.003 
Boycott 38% 20% X2 (1,2230)=4.59, p=.02 
Petition 20% 23% X2 (1,2230)=0.17, p=.68 
Strike 16% 2% X2 (1,2230)=27.1, p<.001 
Referenda 14% 8% X2 (1,2230)=11.4, p<.001 
Demonstration 19% 6% X2 (1,2230)=6.4, p=.01 
Social media    14%     7% X2 (1,2230)=1.09, p=.30(ns) 
Town hall meeting 9% 6% X2 (1,2230)=3.52, p=.06 
Contacting 7% 5% X2 (1,2230)=0.01, p=.91(ns) 












































Political strategies Ever Ever   Chi square test Sig 
 Greece Germany    
Vote 86% 71%   X2 (1,2230)=91.4, p<.001 
Referenda 75% 30%   X2 (1,2230)=550.4, p<.001 
EU vote 65% 50%   X2 (1,2230)=58.6, p<.001 
Boycott 51% 29%   X2 (1,2230)=127.3, p<.001 
Demonstration 45% 19%   X2 (1,2230)=195.2, p<.001 
Petition 42% 47%   X2 (1,2230)=9.21, p=.002 
Strike 32% 11%   X2 (1,2230)=166.1, p<.001 
Social media   22%   12%      X2 (1,2230)=43.1, p<.001 
Town hall meeting 19% 15%   X2 (1,2230)=8.21, p=.004 
Contacting 15% 12%   X2 (1,2230)=5.08, p=.03 
 (N=1120) (N=1110)    
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Table A4.8. Efficacy of political strategies in the movement and party arena in Greece and 
Germany 
Political strategies Efficacy      (1-5 scale) 
Mean (SD) 
Efficacy   (1-5 scale) 
Mean (SD) 
T-test Sig 
 Greece Germany  
Vote 3,2 (1,4) 3,4 (1,2) t(2228) = 3.18, P=.001 
EU vote 3,1 (1,4) 3,1 (1,2) t(2228) = 1.34, P=.18(ns) 
Boycott 2,9 (1,4) 2,9 (1,3) t(2228) = -0.30, P=.76(ns) 
Referenda 2,8 (1,4) 3,4 (1,2) t(2228) = 11.48, P<.001 
Strike 2,8 (1,3) 2,6 (1,2) t(2228) = 3.67, P<.001 
Petition 2,7 (1,2) 3,1 (1,2) t(2228) = 6.96, P<.001 
Demonstration 2,6 (1,3) 2,7 (1,2) t(2228) = 1.56, P=.12(ns) 
Town hall meeting 2,5 (1,3) 2,9 (1,2) t(2228) = 9.06, P<.001 
Contacting 2,0 (1,1) 2,4 (1,2) t(2228) = 9.86, P<.001 
Social media   1,1 (1,2)   1,2(1,1) t(2228) = 1.26, P=.20(ns) 


















Table A5.1. Thematic analysis of discourse about crises in Greece 
Social construction  Discursive performance Subject positioning 
• Financial crisis (national 
level): Mode of survival; 
welfare state retrenchment; 
Unemployment-
exploitation; Depression, 
homelessness, drug abuse, 
suicides; Emigration  
▪ Refugee crisis (European 
level): Illegitimate wars, 
Greek solidarity, lack of 
European solidarity, EU 
incompetence, extra burden  
▪ Political crisis (national 





Troika & TINA doctrine 
• Forced poverty, 
Exemplary punishment 





• Poor but hospitable, 
Wealthy Europeans don’t 
share, Identification 
with the weak, oil-wars 
& EU to blame 
• Fatalism, victimization, 
conspiracy theorizing, 
Troika as foreign 
occupation, EU as the 
right of the strongest, 
Citizens, politicians and 
EU to blame 
• Subjects: not European 
enough, inferiority 
complex 
• Others: Wealthy but 
insensitive Europeans, 
Germans/EU 
• Subjects: poor but 
hospitable, deferring 
racism accusations  
• Others: Wealthy but 
insensitive Europeans (more 
racist) 
• Subjects: politically aware 
&responsible citizens 
• Others: corrupt politicians 
&citizens, EU/Troika/ 















Table A5.2. Thematic analysis of discourse about crises in Germany 
Social construction  Discursive performance Subject positioning 
• Financial crisis (European 
level): Griechenlandkrise, 
responsible for our debts, 
Hamsterwheel, budget cuts, 
flexibility & precarity  
▪ Refugee crisis (national 
level): Material/Symbolic 
threats, criminality 
&terrorism, wars in MENA, 
Lack of EU solidarity   
▪ Political crisis (national & 
European level):  
convergence/lack of 
political options, crisis of 
responsiveness, puppets of 
the economy/post-
democracy, EU as lobbyist 
association 
• Paying again for others; 
fear for the future, Poverty 
in Germany too, Greeks, 
the EU & banks to blame 
(Greek particularity) 
• Foreigners in our country 
(integration); 
Islamophobia; We can’t 
do it or don’t want it; 
Politicians, the EU, &war 
to blame  
• Punish mainstream 
parties, reward 
alternatives; 
Europapolitik as big 
responsibility; Politicians 
& EU to blame 
• Subjects: responsible, law-
abiding (good Europeans) 
• Others: corrupt Greeks, 
retiring early but also 
relaxed & hospitable 
• Subjects: welcoming but 
realists 
• Others: Hungarians, 
Polish, British (no 
solidarity) 
• Subjects: law abiding but 
conformist 
(powerlessness, silenced) 
• Others: corrupt politicians, 
















Table A6.1. Thematic analysis of discourse about political strategies in Greece 
 
 
 Social construction of political 
strategies In Greece 
Discourse about grievances:  
Injustice/Blame 








- Institutions: Produce again, 
exports 
- Individual: Boycotts of foreign 
products, emigration 
- Collective: Solidarity networks, 
alternative barter economy, anti-
austerity movements & parties 
- Expansion of political repertoire: 
Alternative forms of resilience, 
solidarity networks 
- Issue: Mode of survival, 
continuous pauperization 
- Level: National and 
European/global 
- Injustice: All citizens pay the 
price, yet not all corrupt, 
exemplary TINA punishment so 
that other Europeans know 
- Responsibility: Corrupt 
politicians, corrupt citizens, 
clientelism 
- Politicized collective 
identities: The people against 
the markets 
- political subjects: lawful 
citizens, crisis-stricken citizens, 
the new homeless 
- opponents: corrupt citizens, 
corrupt politicians, the EU & 
German politicians (Merkel, 
Schäuble)  
 
- Citizenship: Active  
- Efficacy: Moderate at 
the local level, low at the 
macro level  
- Agency: Revolution, 
collective economic 




- Institutions: Stop the war and 
export of weapons, Dublin regulation 
- Individual: Donations, 
volunteering 
- Collective: Solidarity networks, 
pro-refugee & anti-refugee 
movements & parties, 
- Expansion of political repertoire: 
Solidarity networks, Rescue teams on 
Greek islands  
- Issue: Inhumane treatment of 
refugees, extra burden on a 
shuttered economy 
- Level: European/global & 
national 
- Injustice: Greece as the largest 
“hot spot”, lack of EU solidarity 
- Responsibility: Superpowers 
competing for resources 
- Politicized collective 
identities: poor but hospitable, 
the oppressed vs. superpowers 
- political subjects: fugitives of 
war & famine, caring citizens 
- opponents: superpowers 
wealthy but insensitive 
Europeans 
- Citizenship: Active  
- Efficacy: Moderate at 
the local level, low at the 
macro level  




- Institutions: Democratic state, rule 
of law 
- Individual: Be good/lawful citizen, 
survivalism 
- Collective: Indignant movement, 
punishment of status quo, reward 
anti-austerity parties, referendum 
- Expansion of political repertoire: 
anti-austerity mobilization 
(movement, parties, networks) 
- Issue: Crisis of 
responsiveness/responsibility, 
citizen representation 
- Level: National & 
European/global 
- Injustice: no influence no 
matter what strategy, Troika 
occupation 
- Responsibility: clientelism, 
post-democracy, capitalism 
- Politicized collective 
identities: The people against 
the markets &corrupt politicians 
- political subjects: lawful 
citizens, crisis-stricken citizens 
- opponents: corrupt citizens & 
politicians, the Troika, German 
politicians (Merkel, Schäuble)  
- Citizenship: Active  
- Efficacy: Moderate at 
the local & national level, 
low after SYRIZA’s 
capitulation 
- Agency: Revolution, 
occupy the parliament 
don’t pay taxes 
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 Social construction of political 
strategies in Germany 
Discourse about grievances:  
Injustice/Blame 






crisis   
- Institutions: Greek bailout 
packages, Grexit 
- Individual: Support Greek tourism, 
accurate information 
- Collective: Nothing - citizens were 
not asked, support anti-bailout   
- Expansion of political repertoire: 
international solidarity initiative, 
AfD   
- Issue: Respect Eurozone 
criteria, economic threats  
- Level: European (Greek) 
&national 
- Injustice: we practiced restrain, 
why pay for others? 
- Responsibility: Greek corrupt 
politicians &citizens, laziness, 
early retirement  
- Politicized collective 
identities: Responsible 
Germans vs. Irresponsible 
Greeks, German paymaster  
- political subjects: responsible 
citizens, disadvantaged groups 
- opponents: corrupt Greeks & 
politicians, the EU  
- Citizenship: Passive  
- Efficacy: Low at the 
micro level, 
low/moderate at the 
level of institutions 




- Institutions: Stop the war & arms 
trade, refugee camps in the MENA 
region 
- Individual: Donations, 
volunteering 
- Collective: Solidarity initiatives, 
pro-refugee & anti-refugee 
movements & parties 
- Expansion of political repertoire: 
welcoming initiatives, PEGIDA, AfD 
- Issue: material & symbolic 
threats, foreign invasion, chaotic 
state response 
- Level: National &  
European/global 
- Injustice: Foreigners in own 
country, lack of European 
solidarity 
- Responsibility: War in Syria, 
Chancellor Merkel, federal 
government   
- Politicized collective 
identities: welcoming but 
realists vs. unintegrated 
Muslims &radicals 
- political subjects: volunteers, 
realistic/rational citizens 
- opponents: Ch. Merkel, right 
& left-wing radicals, 
unintegrated Muslims, 
xenophobic EU countries  
- Citizenship: Moderate  
- Efficacy: Moderate at 
the local level, low at the 
federal level  




- Institutions: Democratic state, rule 
of law 
- Individual: Be good/lawful citizen, 
get informed, passivity 
- Collective: punishment of Grand 
coalition, support moderate 
alternatives, referenda 
- Expansion of political repertoire: 
New movements (TTIP, PEGIDA) & 
parties (AfD, Pirate Party)  
- Issue: party convergence lack of 
options, crisis of representation  
- Level: National & 
European/global 
- Injustice: politicians don’t 
listen, citizens are silenced 
- Responsibility: Corrupt 
politicians, passive citizens, post-
democracy 
- Politicized collective 
identities: The people against 
corrupt politicians  
- political subjects: responsible 
citizens, disadvantaged groups 
- opponents: the Grand 
Coalition, complacent citizens  
- Citizenship: Moderate  
- Efficacy: Moderate at 
the local level, low at the 
federal level 






























institutional:   
- solidarity 
networks            
- Indignant 
Movement
• Institutional:   
- status quo 










































institutional:       
-solidarity 
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- PEGIDA     
anti-TTIP 
demonstrations
• Institutional:       
- punishment of 
mainstream 
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Figure A6.1. The crises and political strategies in Greece 




The thesis examines the processes of crisis construction and political engagement in Greece and 
Germany in 2015-2017. Instead of taking “the crisis” as a given by relying on a deductive 
theoretical conceptualization, it investigates how citizens themselves define the crises and their 
political strategies in two countries that highlight Europe’s power asymmetries between the north 
and the south. Synthesizing literature on political talk, critical junctures, economic voting, 
political process and intergroup psychology the thesis introduces a novel grounded theoretical 
framework. Mixed methods were selected in order to combine representative survey data on 
generalizable political patterns with in-depth focus group analysis of discourse about the 
explanatory mechanisms behind these patterns. The analysis indicated that different threats, 
multiple and multilevel, initiated a sense of overlapping crises in the two cases. In Greece the 
crises were triggered by the financial and political collapse, and the presence of the Troika 
dictating austerity from afar. Contrary in Germany the crises were initiated by the so-called 
refugee crisis and the lack of political alternatives among mainstream parties. Yet, in both cases, 
it was the political crisis of post-democratic representation at the national and European level that 
transformed these material and symbolic threats into crises per se. The diverse politicization of 
grievances, identification with political actors and political opportunity structure in the two cases 
shaped citizens’ political strategies. In Germany, the post-materialist powerhouse of Europe, 
citizens’ concerns centred around threats to life-quality and dominant position in the world 
economy. Citizens suggested moderate political strategies to render the political system more 
responsive to their grievances. Alternatively, citizens in Greece challenged radically the national 
and European establishment, as the proposed economic and political model signifies widespread 
poverty for the population by and large. Positions on Europe and globalization provided a new 
transnational dimension to political conflict, problematizing the locus of citizen influence in an 
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